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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the initial allocation of pollution
permits in a dynamic tradeable market. Tradeable pollution permit markets are an
increasingly common method of environmental regulation and it is apparent that
future schemes may have a number of repeated compliance periods. It is important
to consider how and to what extent the dynamic allocation of pollution permits
determines the market e¢ ciency at the equilibrium. This objective is developed in
three parts. First, Part I introduces the topic and sets out the current relationships
that exist between the initial allocation of permits and market e¢ ciency and nds
strong links between the two. It is shown that markets with imperfect competition,
transaction costs or multiple periods can result in links between the initial allocation
and market e¢ ciency. In Part II, a generalised model is created to investigate the op-
timality of dynamic permit allocations and nds the dynamic use of grandfathering
(free allocation based on emissions information) permits is, in general, sub-optimal.
It is argued that alternative dynamic mechanisms should be considered, such as
auctions and other relative performance mechanisms. Part II is concluded by an
investigation into the link between market e¢ ciency, dynamic initial allocations and
rmslobbying over a permit allocation. Firms have the ability to determine their
permit allocation by their choice of emissions and lobbying activity. It is shown that
in some circumstances, lobbying activity may alter market e¢ ciency and may result
in reductions in social welfare. In Part III, an alternative dynamic allocation mech-
anism is considered, namely a rank-ordered contest, which can optimally allocate
permits and simultaneously accomplish a predetermined secondary policy objective.
5
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the policy implications and future work
associated with this research.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Background and Development of Environmen-
tal Regulation
1.1.1 What is Environmental Regulation?
As a consequence of economic growth over the last 50 years, public concern for
the state of the environment has steadily increased to a point where present day
governments have now established an array of policies to control and prevent envi-
ronmental damage (see, for example, Gray 1995; Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Desai,
2002, Jordan 2005). Environmental policies considered by governmental regula-
tors tackle many diverse problems such as air and water pollutants, the disposal of
household and hazardous waste and the conservation of ecosystems and species, to
name but a few. The variety of environmental problems has illustrated the need for
diverse and focused regulation, for example, many environmental problems cause
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damages that are both local and specic to individual governments (e.g. non-point
pollution), however there are also problems that create transboundary issues and
must be regulated by international agreements, such as the control of greenhouse
and ozone depleting gases. This thesis concentrates on pollution control.
Given the variety of pollution regulations that aim to protect our environment,
it is useful to make a distinction between two broad categories of regulations:
command-and-control regulation and market-based mechanisms.1
It is generally assumed that command-and-control policies regulate by the use
of prescriptive requirements on the technology or performance of a rm (Freeman
and Kolstad, 2007). First, command-and-control regulations can involve regulatory
requirements where a technology (technique) standard is specied. A regulator may
require regulated rms to adopt specic technologies, for example they may have to
implement the Best Available Control Technology (BACT), Best Available Technol-
ogy Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC) or Best Practicable Environmental
Options (BPEO) (Pearce and Brisson, 1993). By denition, this type of regulation is
rigidinsofar as the regulated rms technology/technique decisions are restricted.
The remaining command-and-control regulations are performance-based standards
in which rms are specied a maximum limit of pollution where any violation of the
standard is met with a monetary penalty. To reach a specied regulatory goal, per-
formance standards allow rms greater exibility in the techniques and technology
than do technology standards.
Command-and-control policies tend to be considered as the traditionalregula-
1Of course, other types of pollution control do exist, for instance, a third category may in-
clude rms non-mandatory (voluntary) pollution reductions (See, for example, Khanna, 2001;
Gunningham et al. 2003).
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tion in which the regulator dictates either technology or performance requirements
that must be achieved by the regulated rms. By way of contrast, market-based
mechanisms use the aspects of law and regulation that encourage behaviour through
market signals(Stavins, 2007 p19) (for a recent survey of market-based instrument
experience, see Stavins, 2003). Two of the most widely documented market-based
approaches to environmental policy are pollution taxes (Pigou, 1932; Rajah and
Smith, 1993) and tradeable permit markets (Coase, 1960; Crocker, 1966; Dales
1968a; 1968b; Montgomery 1972; Anderson and Leal 2001; Tietenberg, 2006).
As pollution is a denitive example of a negative externality, it is possible for a
regulator to correct for market failure by levying a tax on an amount of pollution
equal to the marginal social damage at the socially optimal level of pollution (Baumol
and Oates, 1988). Polluting rms face a charge on every unit of emissions and as a
result, the rm will internalise the full social cost of the emissions choice. Instead of
setting a pricefor emissions a regulator could, as an alternative, create tradeable
licenses for pollution. In such a process, rms are entitled to pollute a level of
emissions equal to the amount of licenses they hold (which can be bought and sold
amongst other regulated rms).2 We discuss this mechanism in more detail later in
the chapter.
As Hahn and Stavins (1991; 1992) and Stavins (2007) has suggested, other types
of market-based mechanisms do exist but are used infrequently, such as deposit-
refund systems (Porter, 1983), information disclosure regulation (Hamilton, 1995)
and the reduction in market barriers and government subsidies.
2The choice between whether a regulator should use either a tax or tradeable permit market
was initially investigated by Weitzman (1974).
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1.1.2 Market-Based Versus Command-And-Control Regu-
lation
During the past 50 years economists have strongly advocated the use of market-
based regulation as an e¢ cient alternative to command and control policies (Kneese
and Schultz, 1975; Schultz, 1977; Ackerman and Hassler, 1981; Anderson and Leal,
2001). As Harrington and Morgenstern (2007) have set out, there are number of key
benets of implementing market-based mechanisms. The most important, from an
economic perspective, is cost e¤ectiveness.
Consider a regulator whose objective is to achieve a specied reduction in pol-
lution under a command-and-control system. As already discussed, using such an
approach implements standards (emission and/or technology) which are relatively
costly for society as rms tend to have heterogeneous abatements costs (due to dif-
ferences in production, age of plants, knowledge, experience and so on), which means
that rms that nd pollution control relatively costly will experience identical stan-
dards to rms that nd pollution control relatively cheap.
In contrast, market-based mechanisms embrace the heterogeneity in the control
cost of rms and allow a pre-specied level of aggregate pollution to be reached
at the lowest cost to society. Instead of requiring identical emissions reduction or
technology adoption, market-based mechanisms, through the use of price signals,
induce rms to choose a level of emissions whereby rmsmarginal abatement costs
are equated and as a consequence the burden of pollution abatement is e¢ ciently
distributed among rms at the lowest cost to society (Montgomery, 1972; Baumol
and Oates 1971, Tietenberg 1985). In essence, market-based mechanisms achieve a
17
pre-specied aggregate pollution target at lowest cost by allowing rms the freedom
to choose di¤erent levels of pollution.
Although, cost e¤ectiveness is the central argument for advocating the use of
market-based mechanisms, there are many other possible reasons for implementa-
tion.3 We briey discuss a selection below.
A key benet of market-based mechanisms is the potential creation of incentives
to reduce emissions over time by developing and adopting new abatement technol-
ogy (see Kerr and Newell 2003, Ja¤e et al. 2003; Requate, 2005 and references
therein). Due to the prescriptive standards associated with command-and-control
regulation, rms have very little (monetary) incentive to over-comply with uniform
standards.4 Reducing emissions by way of technology adoption can reduce a rms
compliance cost of meeting a standard, however, rms that overcomply with reg-
ulatory standards may experience further stringent standards in the future the
Ratchet E¤ect. In contrast, this Ratchet E¤ectseldom occurs in market-based
mechanisms. For example, in a tradeable permit market (or tax system), rms that
create and adopt abatement technology can reduce their emissions and as a result
can sell their surplus permits (reduce their tax burden) for monetary gain.
Market-based mechanisms have also been advocated due to lower informational
requirements. In a command-and-control system, the regulator must acquire in-
formation on the most up-to-date and cost e¤ective technologies whilst obtaining
3For surveys on the theoretical advantages of market-based mechanisms over command-and-
control policies see Stavins (2003) and Harrington and Morgenstern (2007).
4However, overcompliance of technology or performance standard is possible and does exist, even
if limited in scope and longevity (Gunningham et al. 2003). Fiorino (2006) suggests, rms may
choose to overcomply and incorporate voluntary environmental management systems to: reduce
the risk of occurring penalties, anticipate new regulations, improve relationship with regulator,
improve resource use and production e¢ ciency and improve public image.
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information about each rms marginal cost curves. As market-based mechanisms
generally emphasize the aggregate reduction in emissions this information is not
required. For instance, theoretically, a tradeable permit market regulator only re-
quires information to create, allocate and monitor the pollution permits there is
no requirement for information on rmsmarginal costs.5
Market-based mechanisms have some key advantages over command-and-control
policies, however, the arguments that advocate the use of market-based mechanisms
have not gone unchallenged. Fundamentally, critics of market-based mechanisms
often note the ethical and moral problems that are encountered and argue that this
type of regulation should be avoided. Other criticisms focus on the inherent bias in
the economic literature in favour of market-based mechanisms.
In contrast to the Free-Market Environmentalism(Anderson and Leal, 2001),
which advocates the establishment of property rights to solve environmental prob-
lems, a body of literature has countered these claims by arguing that the use of
market-based mechanisms are immoral and unethical (Kelman, 1981; Sago¤, 1988;
Goodin, 1994; Chinn, 1999; Nash, 2000).
It is often argued that society has a stewardshiprole regarding the earths en-
vironmental system whereby society needs to prevent environmental degradation
for ourselves and future generations. As Goodin (1994) suggests, market-based
mechanisms are objectable as governments cannot sell what they do not own. Us-
ing market-based mechanisms create prices and markets for non-marketable goods.
5However, the true extent to which market-based mechanisms can reduce information needed
depends on the heterogenous circumstances of the problem in question. With respect to optimal
setting of an environmental tax, a large amount of information on rmsmarginal abatement cost
curves may be required.
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Yet, it may be di¢ cult to monterise the damages that are caused by the pollution,
especially at the limiting case where pollution may create irreversible damages, such
as the loss of human life (Kelman, 1981).
Moreover, Kelman (1981 p27) argues that the use of market-based mechanisms
makes a social statement of indi¤erence toward the motives of polluters in reducing
pollution. This means that society cares about the ends but not the meansof
obtaining a desirable level of pollution.6 Firms that reduce pollution in market-
based mechanisms primarily do so with the aim of higher (lower) prots (costs) and
the altruistic reduction of pollution is not given much consideration. Yet society
may care about environment quality and the motives behind polluters reducing
emissions.
Not only do market-based mechanisms portray an indi¤erence to the motives of
polluters, it is also argued that these schemes fail to fully stigmatise polluting rms
(Goodin, 1994). If an individual or rm is ned for some social disorder they pay
the debt to society. However, the action still remains wrong from the viewpoint of
society even after payment of the ne. However, this is not the case in market-based
mechanisms. It is argued that taxes and tradeable permits are used to legitimise
pollution by allowing rms to pollute by conditioning this action on some form of
payment. In other words, a rm is allowed to legitimately pollute. However, this
argument fails to recognise the existence of this problem in command-and-control
regulation, where the rights to pollute require no nancial payment.
6However, it has been argued that market-based mechanisms force democracyby providing
a focus on what level of pollution in society is desirable (Ackerman and Stewart, 1985; Heinz-
erling, 1995). In contrast, it is argued that command-and-control regulation is determined by
self-interested factions such as lobbying groups.
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As rms are allowed to pollute conditional on a nancial payment (such as a tax
or the price of a permit) it leads on to the issue of environmental justice (Goodin,
1994: Chinn, 1999). This system allows rms to pollute given some nancial pay-
ment, however this may be unfair on rms that are unable to provide such payments.
Moreover, in market-based mechanisms, rms usually have a choice as to the level
and location of pollution. Therefore it is possible, without prescriptive regulations
forcing the location and limit on emissions, that low-income and minorities groups
in society may be exposed to larger amounts of pollution by rms relocating and
increasing emissions in less prosperous areas (Chinn, 1999).
Aside from the ethical and moral issues discussed above, other, less fundamental,
criticisms do exist. Cole and Grossman (1999) and Driesen (1998) argue that a large
amount of the analysis (especially early studies) that compared market-based and
command-and-control mechanisms oversimplied and exaggerated the di¤erences
between the two types. As Harrington and Morgenstern (2007) have commented,
both command-and-control and market-based regulation do use elements of prescrip-
tive regulation (coercive methods) and economic instruments (penalties) to reach a
required outcome few schemes are ever pure. Indeed, both types of mechanisms
su¤er from common regulatory weaknesses such as problems with the monitoring
and enforcement of pollution (Freeman and Kolstad, 2007). Cole and Grossman
(1999) argue that command-and-control regulation are not inherently ine¢ cient
and the benets of this type of regulation are underplayed whereas market-based
mechanisms have often been ine¢ cient (see, for example, Hahn and Noll, 1982).
Furthermore, early studies did not accurately take into account the institutional
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and political contexts of implementing environmental policy, however it is vital
that comparison between market instruments and prescriptive regulation must be
fair to be meaningful (Freeman and Kolstad, 2007 p7). Accordingly, the litera-
ture is slowly becoming aware that the benets of market-based mechanisms over
command-and-control are conditional on the context in which the policies are placed
(Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1991; Hahn and Stavins 1991; Tietenberg 2006; Harring-
ton and Morgenstern, 2007). In other words, market-based mechanisms may not
be the most desirable types of regulation for all environmental problems. This is
especially true when the pollutant has local and threshold e¤ects (Hahn and Hester,
1989a; 1989b; Hahn and Stavins, 1991; Tietenberg, 2007). But in what contexts do
market-based mechanisms thrive compared to command-and-control regulation?
First, market-based mechanisms, especially tradeable permit markets, work well
when there are signicant di¤erences in rmspollution control costs (Newell and
Stavins, 2003; ORyan, 2006; Stavins 2007). With respect to tradeable permit
markets, the wide variation in pollution control costs allow larger gains from trades
to exist. In contrast, if pollution control costs are similar among rms then fewer
gains from trade exist and it may be desirable to implement uniform performance
and technology standards.
Second, the gains from trade in a market-based mechanism will depend on the
number of participating rms. A larger number of rms will mean a possible larger
variation in control costs and a sustainablemarket (taxation system). However, if
few rms are regulated then market-based mechanisms can su¤er as the gains from
trade may be small due to thinmarkets (Hanley and Mo¤at, 1993) and a loss in
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revenue from a pollution tax. This has additional problems when the thinmarket
is a¤ected by strategic behaviour (Hahn, 1984).
Third, the e¤ectiveness of the two types of regulations depends on the nature of
the pollutant. Market-based mechanisms do not allow for source specic control and
this may pose a problem when the regulated pollutant is non-uniformly mixed in
the atmosphere. Under market-based mechanisms, non-uniformly mixed pollutants
may cause hot spotswhere higher level of emissions concentrations occur at some
geographical areas. To solve this issue, regulators must use spatially or temporally
di¤erentiated emissions charges or introduce additional trading rules. However,
these additional mechanisms may cause a reduction in the cost e¤ectiveness (e.g.
larger transaction cost (Stavins, 1995)) and it may be possible to use command-and-
control regulation at lower cost.
Fourth, with respect to tradeable permit markets, the costs of monitoring and
enforcement may also reduce the desirability associated with such a mechanism
(Hahn and Axtell 1995; Montero 2007). If it is di¢ cult to legitimately monitor
and enforce a permit market, it may easier and more cost e¤ective to introduce
technology standards.
Fifth, market-based regulation to be (cost) e¤ective has to overcome the political
barriers of implementing such schemes. This may be troublesome when rms and
the regulator prefer the status quo (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975; Ackerman and
Stewart 1985; Hahn and McGarthland, 1989).
Up to this point we have discussed what types of regulation occur in most indus-
trialised countries and briey explained the debate around whether it is desirable to
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use command-and-control or market-based regulation. Yet, what has happened in
reality? Is there a trend in implementing environmental policy within industrialised
countries? If so, what has caused this trend in regulation? Our next subsection will
attempt to answer these questions.
1.1.3 The Trend in Environmental Regulation
As discussed above, modern environmental regulation began in the late 1960s and
early 1970s where command-and-control regulations were predominantly used. Ini-
tially using command-and-control regulation was an obvious choice as regulators in
industrialised countries were uncertain and inexperienced with respect to the sci-
ence of pollution, the regulatory process and the relationships between industry and
the government. It seemed plausible that regulation should take the form of pre-
scriptive regulation where uncertainty over environmental results was minimised.
Indeed, there was a belief in bureaucratic rationality where social and economic
problems can be solved through the application of technical, hierarchy, uniform rules
and neutral compliance(Fiorino, 2006 p39). As Eisner (2007) suggests, regulation
in this early stage (especially in the US), focused on the adversarial relationship
between the conicting objectives of the regulator and industry. As a product of the
command-and-control regulation movement, the UK implemented the 1956 Clean
Air Act (McCormick, 2002) and the US followed by legislating the amendments to
the Clean Air and Water Acts in 1970 and 1972 respectively (Eisner, 2007).
From the introduction of command-and-control regulation, the last 50 years (es-
pecially in the last 15 years) has seen a movement towards a greater use of market-
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based mechanisms. For example, many countries in the EU have introduced taxes
and charges for pollutants and in 2005, the EU introduced a tradeable permit mar-
ket for carbon dioxide. A similar trend has occurred in the US where market-based
mechanisms have been used to control the levels of lead, CFCs, sulphur dioxide
and nitrous oxides. Recently, seven northeastern US states have implemented plans
to create a Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to control carbon dioxide
(Burtraw et al. 2005). The movement towards an increased use of market-based
mechanisms can be placed in the context of a movement towards Reexive law
(Teubner, 1983; Orts, 1995). Unlike substantive law, which is rather prescriptive
and reactionary, reexive law is playing a role in the transition to a new, more
adaptable regulation. The goal of a reexive strategy is to induce people and or-
ganizations to assess their behaviour continually, so they may respond to new in-
formation, emerging technologies and changing expectations(Fiorino, 2006 p161).
This di¤ers from command-and-control regulation as this can be used to create in-
centives and procedures that induce people and organizations to assess their actions
and...adjust them to achieve socially desirable goals, rather that tell them what to
do(Fiorino, 2007 p159).
Although, the movement towards market-based mechanisms has had a paradigm
shift in the culture and ethos of environmental regulation, command-and-control
regulation still accounts for the majority of environmental legislature even though,
as discussed above, market-based mechanisms are typically the most cost e¤ective
policy (Ackerman and Stewart, 1985; Hahn and Stavins, 1991; Kehone et al. 1998;
Hahn, 2000). What can account for the shift in environmental regulation? and why
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has the shift in regulations been smaller than expected?
An important motivation for moving towards market-based mechanisms is due to
the dissatisfaction created from implementing command-and-control policies (Hahn
and Stavins 1991 Fiorino 2006; Stavins 2007).7 As described above, in the last 50
years of stable economic growth, the associated cost burden of command-and-control
regulation has continually increased (Eisner, 2007).
Since the adoption of command-and-control regulation in the 1970s, the political
and cultural perspectives on how we view regulation and pollution has altered greatly
(which is a consequence, in part, of the political culture in the 1980s and 1990s). As
described earlier, Kelman (1981) opposed the use of market-based mechanisms as
it was unethical and immoral, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, this argument has
generally dissipated. Presently, the right to polluteno longer poses signicantly
issues as it once did and as Stavins (2007 p35) suggests, market-based mechanisms
have moved from being politically problematic to politically attractive. Indeed,
Stavins (2007) comments on the widespread support for market-based mechanisms
from environmental non-governmental organisations.
The two most important determinants of environmental policy may be the nan-
cial cost of the mechanisms and the political acceptability of mechanisms, however,
there are other, additional reasons for the change. After 50 years of regulation, reg-
ulators have learned a great deal about the design and implementation of environ-
mental policies. Regulators have had the opportunity to implement a diverse range
7Note that the choice of environmental policy is a result of the political pressure and negotiations
of stakeholders in regulation (Tietenberg, 1998; Hahn, 2000; Desai, 2002). An obvious inuence
is the regulator, however, the choice of policy and instrument use also depends on lobbying from
interest groups and political parties (e.g. Greenpeace, WWF,CBI), the transfer and impact of
information through media services, international organisation (e.g. UN), among others.
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of policy instruments and as a result have improved their experience of market-based
instruments.
As science and technology have progressed, most industrialised countries have
become aware of new and diverse pollution problems, such as the reduction of the
ozone layer and global climate change. Yet as new pollution problems are realised,
command-and-control has proven to be insu¢ cient at tackling the problem. Many
pollution problems are transboundary and need e¤ective policy instruments, some-
thing market-based instruments can potentially assist in.
Market-based mechanisms are being used extensively on newand previously
unregulated pollution problems, such as the reduction of carbon dioxide. This tends
to be much easier to implement as regulators do not need to consider the political
barriers that are created when there is an incumbent policy instrument.
Although market-based mechanisms have increased in popularity there still ap-
pears to be an inherent resistance against such schemes. As Kehone et al. (1998)
and Stavins (2007) have suggested, there are a number of reasons for the slow move-
ment towards market-based instruments. Generally, the slow movement is due to
the preference for the status quo from the majority of stakeholders. Regulated
rms often prefer command-and-control as it may be less costly. In market-based
mechanisms regulated rms may have to bid for permits in an auction or pay
an emissions tax something that does not occur in command-and-control policies.
Indeed, market-based mechanisms may be least-cost on aggregate, however, it is
possible that some rms may nd market-based mechanisms more costly than tradi-
tional regulation (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975). Moreover, moving to market-based
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mechanisms may reduce rmslobbying e¤ectiveness. In general, within command-
and-control regulation, regulated rms may have invested time and resources into
lobbying. However, the adoption of market-based mechanisms focuses attention on
aggregate pollution (instead of rm specic standards) and as a consequence may
make rmslobbying activities less e¤ective (or at least requires rms to adjust their
lobbying techniques for market-based mechanisms).
Regulators may also prefer to use command-and-control policies. If regulators
are risk averse they may prefer instruments that accomplish environmental outcomes
with greater certainty. Implementing, technology or performance standards may
achieve an environmental outcome with more certainty than say, a tax.8 Regulators
that use command-and-control policies have scope in which to use symbolic politics
so they can appear to be strict on pollutersby requiring high levels of technology
or performance standards but allow relaxations or exemptions in other areas of
production. As Eisner (2007 p53) suggests regulatory design is driven not by a quest
for e¢ ciency or e¤ectiveness but by the goals of achieving certainty of results and
preserving todays victories. Although command-and-control regulation is often
seen as costly and inexible, the regulator may be slow to adjust as it may have
obtained specialist skills and information that may be irrelevant in a market-based
approach (such as activities to determine the best available control technology).
The discussion thus far has only considered a typical industrialised country,
however, countries have di¤erences in the advocation, development and implemen-
tation of market-based mechanisms. Although, it is not in the scope of this chapter
8Indeed, a reason why tradeable permit markets continue to be a preferred instrument over
emissions taxes is the greater certainty regarding the aggregate emissions level.
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to give a detailed analysis of the di¤erences of environmental policy between dif-
ferent industrialised countries, we do highlight some fundamental di¤erence in the
American and European experience of market-based mechanisms.9 First, US and
the EU have very di¤erent relationships between the government and regulated in-
dustry. As Fiorino (2006) argues, the EU countries tend to create a regulatory
climate where cooperation and consensus is the norm, for example in European
environmental policy, there tends to be a large amount of voluntary agreements
and cooperative behaviour between the regulator and rms. In contrast, the US
federal government and industry have been kept at arms lengthdue to the re-
liance on formal regulations (Fiorino, 2006). Second, the US is narrower in scope
(with respect to technology processes and techniques) and more prescriptive than
the EU. This has lead to a greater need for legal compliance and deterrence pro-
cedures than the EU. Third, US environmental policy is centralised to the Federal
government (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)). As Harrington and Mor-
genstern (2007 p107) argue, a centralised process was necessary as [m]ost states
had, in the minds of many, demonstrated that they could not act quickly enough
or forcefully enough to deal with the multitude of environmental problems facing
the country. In contrast, as the EU consists of 27 sovereign member states, a large
proportion of environmental regulation is decentralised. However, due to continuing
economic integration there is a tendency for harmonisation of polices to occur in
the EU. Currently, many policies are centralised to the European Commission yet
9For discussion of the UK environmental policy see Vogel (1986), Gray (1995), for the U.S.
see Fiorino (2006) and Eisner (2007). For discussion of other industrialised countries see Jänicke
and Weidner (1997) and Desai (2002). For a comprehensive guide to contemporary European
environmental policy see Jordan (2005).
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there appears still to be exibility within the process (Weale, 2005). For example,
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is centralised with the
aggregate carbon dioxide target and broad guidance, yet each member state has an
active involvement in creating, developing, implementing and enforcing the permit
markets rules (Watanabe and Robinson, 2005). Finally, as Harrington and Morgen-
stern (2007) highlight, di¤erent types of mechanisms are used in the US and EU.
The majority of market-based instruments in the US are tradeable permit markets
whereas, in Europe, emissions taxes and charges are the norm. This composition of
mechanisms may occur due to the USs centralised regulatory system and the EUs
decentralised framework and issues with national borders and sovereignty.
1.2 Tradeable Permit Markets
One of the most innovative market-based mechanisms, and the subject of this thesis,
is a tradeable permit market. The fundamental idea of a tradeable permit market
is credited to Dales (1968a; 1968b) and Crocker (1966) who argued for a system
of pollution regulation where rms can legitimately pollute when they hold a well-
dened and tradeable pollution right.10
To implement a tradeable permit market the regulator must determine (through
discussions with the general public and industry) a desirable, or socially optimal,
level of emissions. The target level of emissions is then partitioned into individual
pollution rights which allows the holder to emit a specied level of emissions of the
10The terminology rightis used loosely. As Raymond (2003) explains, this is not a property
right as it is licensed to rms from the government. Instead, one might consider licensed property.
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pollutant within a certain time period (e.g. one tonne of carbon dioxide in time
period 2007-2012). The regulator creates trading rules for the pollution rights and
then allocates the individual pollution rights to the regulated rms. After initial
allocation, the pollution rights can be traded among the regulated rms.
Allowing for the transferability of pollution rights results in the environmental
target being satised at the lowest social cost. A rm that nds pollution abatement
relatively costly has the opportunity to lower its cost by purchasing allowances from
the market. Moreover, rms that nd pollution abatement relatively cheap have
the ability to sell any excess permits to the market. In equilibrium, the lowest
social cost will be achieved when each rm chooses a level of emissions (pollution
reduction) so that their marginal abatement cost is equated to the permit price. Put
di¤erently, the social cost of a specied pollution reduction target is minimised when
rmsmarginal abatement costs are equated the level of abatement is e¢ ciently
distributed among the regulated rms.
As discussed above, market-based mechanisms, and in particular tradeable per-
mit markets, have become an increasingly common regulatory tool. Tradeable per-
mit markets are used most frequently in controlling air pollutants. Schemes include
the sulphur dioxide trading program or Acid Rain Program(Ellerman et al. 2000;
Carlson et al. 2000), NOx budget program (Farrell, 2000; 2001), Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) (Foster and Hahn 1995), Lead-phase down pro-
gram (Kerr and Maré, 1998), Ozone depleting gases (CFCs) (Hahn and McGartland,
1989), volatile organic matter (Shannon; 1995), European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) (Watanabe and Robinson, 2005) and the Regional Greenhouse
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Gas Initiative (RGGI) (Burtraw et al. 2005).
Although the application of tradeable permit markets to air pollution has been
the most successful and well known application, others do exist. Applications have
be discussed in water pollution and water supply (Eheart, 1980; Hanley and Mo¤at;
1993; Hanley et al. 1998), shery quotas (ITQs) (Newell et al. 2005), waste disposal
(Miranda et al. 1994 ), biodiversity conservation and land use (Mills 1980; MacMil-
lan, 2004), forestry (Chomitz, 2004), recycling (Dinan, 1992), Energy (Berry, 2002)
and even outerspace (Scheraga, 1987).
A frequently discussed issue in most tradeable permit markets is the regulators
initial allocation of permits to the regulated rms. Early in the theoretical discus-
sions of tradeable permit markets, the seminal work of Montgomery (1972) argued
that the e¢ ciency at the permit market equilibrium was independent from the reg-
ulators initial allocation of permits. Therefore, a regulator could allocate permits
focusing on equity issues and continue to maintain e¢ ciency in the permit market.
However, as will be explained later in this thesis, the initial allocation of permits
can a¤ect both the equity and e¢ ciency of a tradeable permit market. It is gener-
ally agreed that the initial allocation matters a great deal, not only in terms of its
impact on the fairness of the program but also on its cost-e¤ectiveness. The initial
allocation process also turns out in many emissions trading systems to be the most
controversial aspect of the implementation process(Tietenberg 2006 p127). This
issue is the focus for the thesis.
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1.3 Objective of Research
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate issues in the initial allocation of
pollution permits which a¤ect the e¢ ciency in a tradeable permit market. This
thesis investigates two central characteristics about permit markets, namely, (i) a
market with multiple periods and (ii) the free allocation of permits to rms. It
is true for both characteristics that they predominantly occur in tradeable permit
markets and it is important to understand their link with market e¢ ciency. To
investigate this area, this research attempts to answer three sub-questions:
 What are the consequences for market e¢ ciency in a tradeable permit market
when rms are initially allocated permits in a multi-period market?
 What are the consequences for market e¢ ciency in a dynamic tradeable permit
market when rms lobby over permit allocations?
 Are there optimal alternative initial allocation mechanisms that can be used
in a dynamic setting?
In answering these questions, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature in a
number of areas. By creating a generalised allocation mechanism that can model all
types of distribution, the consequences for market e¢ ciency can be explained in a
dynamic permit market. From this, specic types of mechanisms can be advocated
to distribute permits in a multiple period market. Moreover, we introduce lobbying
activity to a multi-period permit market and investigate the impact of e¢ ciency.
As a result, it is shown that regulators, in certain circumstances must take this
into consideration when allocating permits. Finally, given the investigation into
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the impacts of market e¢ ciency from the initial allocation mechanism, we o¤er a
possible solution to problems with current allocation mechanisms.
From the outset, this thesis restricts research to the theoretical investigation of
tradeable permit market e¢ ciency, insofar as the wider economy is not our main
focus. Indeed, this research is theoretical and (mainly) analytical, therefore the
extension to empirical investigation is left for future work. Moreover, as our primary
focus is on the e¢ ciency of the tradeable permit market, we do not focus on the
equity and fairness issues but do indicate, in passing, suggested literature for the
interested reader.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
The thesis is separated into three distinct sections, Part I introduces the thesis
topic with this general introduction and a review of the literature that focuses on
the theoretical issues of e¢ ciency and permit allocation. Part II, investigates the
e¢ ciency of a tradeable permit market when (i) there are multiple periods and (ii)
when rms lobby over permit allocations. Part III concludes the thesis by illustrating
a possible alternative allocation mechanism and concludes the ndings of this thesis.
In Chapter 2 the conventional independence of the initial allocationresult is
explained. We then review the key studies that illustrate the importance of the
initial allocation with respect to the e¢ ciency at the market equilibrium and nd
that the initial allocation may be important to market e¢ ciency when the permit
market is imperfectly competitive, transaction costs exist and the market is dynamic.
In Chapter 3 we generalise the analysis of initial allocation mechanisms that
34
are based on inter-rm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering
and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using rmshistorical
output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting,
while using rmshistorical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and
only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve
social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is
independent of output and emissions. We then outline su¢ cient conditions for a
socially optimal relative performance mechanism.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the e¤ects of lobbying over permit allocation in
a multi-period tradeable permit market. We model a permit distribution that is
based on rent-seeking the combined e¤ect from each rms (updated) historical
emissions and lobbying activity. We nd, permit market e¢ ciency is determined
by the rent-seeking costs. If rent-seeking costs are separable (independent), then
distortions are created in the permit market. However, when costs are non-separable
(interdependent), the fusionof past emissions and lobbying activity can maintain
e¢ ciency in the permit market. Moreover, when permits are distributed using static
grandfathering the permit market is e¢ cient. Allowing the aggregate emissions cap
to become endogenous (variable) reduces social welfare.
In Chapter 5, we investigate an alternative permit allocation mechanism, namely,
a rank-ordered contest. Each rm is rank-ordered with respect to a pre-determined
actionchosen by the regulator which is independent from rmschoices of emissions
and output. We nd that using a permit allocation contest can optimally allocate
pollution permits to rms in the tradeable permit market. It is shown that a permit
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allocation can be chosen in the contest to maximise some secondarypolicy objective
pre-determined by the regulator. We conclude with a numerical estimation of what
choice of permit allocation maximises the secondarypolicy objective.
In Chapter 6, the thesis concludes with a general discussion of the results and
possible recommendations this thesis can give to policymakers
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Developments in the
Initial Allocation of Permits: A
Review
2.1 Introduction
Tradeable permit markets are an increasingly popular method of controlling pollu-
tion, for example, they are used in sulphur dioxide regulation in the US (Ellerman et
al. 2000) and more recently, as regional carbon dioxide regulation in the EU (Watan-
abe and Robinson, 2005). Due to the heterogeneous circumstances encountered in
tradeable permit markets, success of a scheme depends extensively on the regulators
choice of market design. When implementing tradeable pollution markets, the reg-
ulator must carefully consider issues that involve market participation (exclusion),
pollutant type, trading and reporting rules and so on. One important design issue
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is the regulators initial allocation of pollution permits to market participants.
Within a tradeable permit market, the regulator has signicant informational
asymmetries regarding the participating rms and, as a result, the regulator is un-
able to distribute permit allocations that anticipate the least-cost (e¢ cient) equi-
librium outcome (if they could, trading would not be required). It follows that the
initial allocation of permits may be an important issue for the regulator and rms
as it has the potential to determine the distribution of rmsrents (equity) and pol-
lution reduction incentives (market e¢ ciency). Due to the importance of the initial
allocation, this chapter aims to survey the theoretical developments in the initial
allocation of permits.
In this chapter, we discuss the major contributions in the literature that have
extended the theoretical analysis of the initial allocation of permits.1 We begin the
survey by illustrating the seminal work of Montgomery (1972). Montgomery (1972)
proved that under a perfectly competitive market the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium
outcome was independent of the choice of initial allocation (although it will a¤ect
the equity of the market). In policy terms, the perfectly competitive market will
establish the least-cost outcome with any initial allocation vector. However, the in-
dependence between the initial allocation of permits and the least-cost outcome only
holds due to a number of strong (and often unrealistic) assumptions. We therefore,
discuss the major contributions in the literature that have advanced the theoretical
developments in the permit market literature on the initial allocation process. In
particular, we focus attention on how (and to what extent) the initial allocation
1Other surveys relating to aspects of tradable permits include Tietenberg (1980) who discusses
general implementation issues in permit trading and Koutstaal (1999) who discusses imperfectly
competitive behaviour and transaction costs in emissions markets.
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a¤ects market e¢ ciency when three assumptions are relaxed (i) imperfectly com-
petitive markets (ii) the existence of transaction costs and (iii) a dynamic market.
We nd that when a permit market involves imperfectly competitive behaviour,
transaction costs or dynamic periods, the initial allocation may be an important
determinant for permit market e¢ ciency at the equilibrium outcome. Therefore,
allocating permits based only on equity and distributional arguments should not
be considered. Instead, when regulators implement a permit market, they should
consider the likely issues that may arise (e.g. strategic behaviour of rms) in that
permit market and devise an appropriate allocation mechanism. As permit mar-
ket circumstances are largely heterogeneous, the initial allocation choice should be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
Due to the vast selection of literature that, directly or indirectly, discusses the
initial allocation process, our chapter is restricted in two main directions. First,
we restrict our attention to grandfathering permits the free allocation of permits
based on historical emissions or output as this method is frequently used in existing
schemes. However this is not the only option for initial allocation. One alternative
to grandfathering is the auctioning of permits and it is generally considered that auc-
tions can e¢ ciently allocate permits and allow the auction revenue to be recycled
(something that does not happen with grandfathering) (see, for example Cramton
and Kerr, 2002). However, auctions have been used infrequently due to rmspo-
litical pressure (lobbying activity) for a grandfathering method (Svendsen, 2005).
Second, we restrict our literature survey to theoretical issues of initial allocations
that relate to market e¢ ciency. It follows that we do not consider issues that relate
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to distributional and equity arguments in permit allocation, such as the fairness
of certain initial allocations (see, for example, Raymond, 2003). Although impor-
tant, as these issues often determine the viability of schemes, we neglect discussions
which involve the political and equity issues. This survey does not propose how to
choose optimal mechanisms as this must take into consideration both the e¢ ciency
and distributional arguments and will inevitably depend on the circumstances of
the tradeable permit market.2 Moreover, although we discuss the empirical, exper-
imental and simulation evidence to support the theoretical results, this is not the
focus of our chapter. It is our objective to consider the theoretical consequences for
market e¢ ciency when key assumptions about the permit market are violated.
The chapter is organised as follows, in section 2.2 we discuss the independence
of the initial allocation with respect to the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome,
in section 2.3 we discuss three distinct developments of the permit market litera-
ture that focus on the initial allocation of permits, namely imperfectly competitive
behaviour, transaction costs and dynamic markets and nally section 2.4 has some
concluding remarks.
2.2 The Independence of Initial Allocations
We begin the discussion of initial allocations by explaining the rationale for a prop-
erty rights-based approach to pollution and show, under certain conditions, that
2There is a large amount of literature associated with comparing the e¢ ciency and equity
di¤erences in alternative initial allocation processes (e.g. grandfathering vs. auctioning). Examples
of this literature include Lyon (1982; 1986), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995), Ja¤e
and Stavins (1995), Kverndokk (1995), Bovernberg and Goulder (1996), Goulder et al. (1997),
Parry (1997), Rose et al. (1998), Parry et al. (1999), Goulder et al. (1999), Burtraw et al. (2001;
2002), Cramton and Kerr (2002), Kampas and White (2003) and Requate (2005).
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the permit market equilibrium outcome is independent from the initial assignment
of permits. This sets up our subsequent analysis of the results of relaxing these
conditions.
2.2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
Pollution is the denitive example of an externality, as the polluter inadvertently
reduces the su¤erersutility without equal compensation for the damages that it
causes (Baumol and Oates, 1988). One proposed method to counter the problem
and hence reduce the e¤ects of pollution on the environment is to dene legal and
enforceable property rights where an economic agent holds the right to pollute or
conversely the right not to be polluted.
One of the rst expositions to dene property rights for externalities was the
seminal paper by Coase (1960). Coase argued that an e¢ cient level of pollution
can be achieved by relying on the polluter and su¤erer bargaining given a set of
well dened property rights. Coase began by assuming a bargaining system for well
dened property rights which assumed that there were no informational deciencies
such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems when transactions occurred
(i.e. no transaction costs). Given these assumptions, if property rights were allo-
cated to either of the agents (polluter or su¤erer) then a Pareto e¢ cient bargaining
equilibrium will exist.
Consider a rm that in the production of a good creates a harmful pollutant.3
3Assume that the marginal net private benet and marginal external cost are linear and con-
tinuous so that the unique intersection point is the e¢ cient outcome for the externality (Baumol
and Oates, 1988)
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Suppose an a¤ected household is endowed with the right to be protected from the
pollution. The household may allow pollution to occur by accepting suitable com-
pensation (for at least the su¤ering caused) from the rm. This is essentially the
minimum compensation level the household is willing to accept. Simultaneously, the
rm may choose to compensate the household if the amount it spends reimbursing
the household is less than the fall in income it would experience if not allowed to
pollute. This is the maximum compensation level the rm is willing to pay. The
outcome is that the rm and household can enter into a Pareto e¢ cient bargaining
agreement if the minimum compensation level the household is willing to accept is
lower than the maximum the rm is willing to reimburse.
In the above example, the household was allocated the property rights for the
pollutant. Yet it is possible to distribute the property rights to the rm. In our
example, this would mean that the ownership of the property right switches so that
the rm has the right to pollute. It follows that the household may be willing to
reimburse the rm (for not polluting) until the cost of compensation makes it more
rational to take other actions e.g. move to a new (unpolluted) household property.
Therefore, there is a maximum level of compensation the household will award to
the rm. On the other hand, the rm is willing to accept a compensation payment
only if it covers at least the cost of reducing the pollutant- the minimum amount it
will accept. When the rms minimum willingness to accept compensation is lower
than the households maximum willingness to compensate, then there is a viable
Pareto e¢ cient bargaining equilibrium and a socially optimal level of emissions.
In summary, the property rights for pollution can be initially allocated to either
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the rm (the right to pollute) or the household (the right not to be polluted). Re-
gardless of the initial allocation, bargaining between the agents results in an e¢ cient
equilibrium for the property rights. As Coase (1960) argues, if property rights are
well dened and no transaction costs exist, the e¢ cient equilibrium outcome for an
externality is independent of the initial distribution of property rights.
Under an emissions trading program a similar logic applies, rms (agents) bar-
gain over the ownership of the pollution permits (property rights) in a tradeable
market and the initial distribution of permits is independent to the e¢ ciency at
the equilibrium. In his (1972) paper, Montgomery used the analytical framework
of an emissions trading scheme and formally proved Coases result that the e¢ cient
equilibrium outcome is independent of the initial allocation of property rights.
2.2.2 The Original Independent Initial Allocation Solution
In this subsection, we attempt to follow Montgomery (1972) and illustrate that
e¢ ciency at the equilibrium is independent of the initial allocation. To provide
a focus for discussion, we restrict attention to an ambient permit system (APS)
which refers to a permit system where the property rights are in terms of air or
water quality. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse alternative pollutant
systems, for this, the reader is referred to Baumol and Oates (1988), Hahn (1986),
Krupnick et al. (1983) and Tietenberg (1985) for a comprehensive discussion.
Montgomery in his 1972 study, constructed a tradeable pollution market and in
the process, proved that the equilibrium outcome in the market was independent of
the initial allocation of pollution permits. To obtain this result three key restric-
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tions are assumed (1) the product and permit markets are perfectly competitive so
that there is no strategic behaviour (2) there are no transaction costs involved in
trading the pollution permits and (3) the product and permit markets are static and
therefore the regulator and polluters are myopic in their analysis of emissions and
other regulatory issues.
Montgomery (1972) essentially assumes that rm i ( i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) emits a
single pollutant ei at a cost of ci(ei), which is convex and twice di¤erentiable, where
the aggregate emissions vector for the pollutant is E = (e1;:::;en). There are j =
1; 2; : : : ; k geographical receptor regions where the damage from a pollutant may
vary due to factors (such as the wind speed and direction, locality of sources), and
is represented by a n k matrix H where hij is the transfer coe¢ cient showing the
impact of one unit of emissions from rm i at the point j.
Socially Optimal Condition
A regulator determines, through the political process, a level of desirable emissions
that are required, denoted by Q = (q1;:::;qk). The goal of the regulator is to achieve
this emissions target at the lowest possible cost. A vector of emissions E is chosen
to
Min
X
i
ci(ei)
subject to
EH  Q;E  0
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From the Kuhn-tucker conditions, the least cost allocation occurs when
c0i(ei) +
X
j
jhij  0;
X
i
ei(c
0
i(ei) +
X
j
jhij) = 0 (2.1)
qj  
X
i
eihij  0;
X
j
j(qj  
X
i
eihij) = 0 (2.2)
where j is the value placed on relaxing the emissions constraint (qj) by one unit.
Equation (2.1) illustrates that at the least cost allocation, every rm will equate their
marginal cost of reducing emissions with the weighted marginal cost of reducing
concentration at each receptor (Tietenberg, 1985). Equation (2.2) illustrates that
the level of emissions (damages included) will equal the number of permits available.
Market Equilibrium
By assuming lij is the quantity of permits allowing rm i to emit at point j, l0ij
is the initial allocation and pj is the price of a permit at the jth receptor, we can
focus on the existence and e¢ ciency of the market equilibrium. As the pollutant is
non-uniformly mixed, k markets will be created where each rm must hold a number
of permits for each receptor. Firm is objective is to minimise the cost of emissions
and net demand for pollution permits. Formally, we have
min
ei
ci(ei) +
X
j
pj(lij   l0ij) subject to lij  eihij
This occurs when
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c0i(ei) +
X
j
jhij  0; ei(c0i(ei) +
X
j
jhij) = 0 (2.3)
pj   j  0;
X
j
lij(pj   j) = 0 (2.4)
lij  
X
i
eihij  0;
X
j
j(lij  
X
i
eihij) = 0 (2.5)
X
i
(lij   l0ij)  0;
X
j
pj(
X
i
(lij   l0ij)) = 0 (2.6)
where equation (2.6) is a market clearing condition. Comparing (2.1)-(2.2) and
(2.3)-(2.5), it is easily seen that the market equilibrium coincides with the least-cost
allocation, when pj = j, as the same set of su¢ cient conditions are satised with
the market equilibrium and the aggregate cost minimisation problem (Baumol and
Oates 1988). Intuitively, in the market, each rm competitively exchanges permits
to minimise their abatement costs and net expenditure on permits and therefore
equates their marginal abatement costs (the shadow values of pollution control) to
the price in each receptor. As the market is competitive, this happens for all rms
which results in the su¢ cient condition for the aggregate cost minimisation problem
being satised. Throughout this chapter (and thesis) we denote this outcome as the
least-cost equilibrium.
Observing equations (2.3)-(2.6) illustrates that l0ij, the initial allocation of per-
mits, is not an inuential parameter (it does exist in the market clearing equation
(2.6) but only as a summation and hence total supply). This e¤ectively says that if
a rm receives an arbitrary allocation of permits (given that the markets are static,
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perfectly competitive with no transaction costs) a rm can costlessly trade permits
until the rm minimises its abatement cost. In other words, the rms behaviour is
independent from the number of permits that it receives. It follows that the market
equilibrium (the vector of emissions and prices as well as the portfolio of permits
held by each rm) is independent of the initial allocation.
The independence of initial allocations suggests a regulator can choose any initial
allocation rule and be assured that the resulting equilibrium will be e¢ cient. The
choice of an allocation rule can therefore be based on equity considerations alone.
2.3 Modications to the independent initial allo-
cation
Montgomery (1972) proved permit market e¢ ciency is independent from the choice
of initial allocation. However, the assumptions used to obtain the result are often
unrealistic for current tradeable permit markets. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand the implications for market e¢ ciency when the assumptions of the tradeable
permit market are modied. We attempt to understand how and to what extent the
initial allocation determines the equilibrium outcome by surveying the important
theoretical developments in the literature regarding (i) imperfectly competitive per-
mit and output markets (ii) costly permit trading and (iii) dynamic permit markets.
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Competitive
permit market
Imperfectly
competitive
permit market
Competitive
product mar-
ket
Perfectly com-
petitive permit
and product
market, e.g.
Montgomery
(1972).
Cost Minimi-
sation Manipu-
lation (CMM),
e.g. Hahn
(1984)
Imperfectly
competitive
product mar-
ket
Imperfect prod-
uct market with
perfectly com-
petitive permit
market, e.g.
Malueg (1990).
Exclusionary
Manipulation
(EM), e.g. Mi-
siolek and Elder
(1989).
Table 2.1: Permit and Output Market Structures
2.3.1 Imperfectly competitive pollution and product mar-
kets
There are a number of permutations available for the perfectly competitive assump-
tion to be relaxed. As can be seen in Table 2.1, one must consider three forms of
imperfect competition, either in the permit market, the product market or both.
We consider each in turn.
Imperfectly competitive permit market and competitive product market
First, we consider an imperfectly competitive permit market.4 It may be possible
for a dominant (permit market) rm to act as a monopolist/monopsonist in which
it manipulates the permit market to minimise their expenditure on abatement and
purchase of permits. This is known as Cost Minimisation Manipulation (CMM).
4Throughout this chapter, we implicitly assume there is complete compliance in the permit
market. Van Egteren and Weber (1996) and Malik (2002) consider the relevance of the initial
allocation for rm non-compliance.
48
Hahn (1984) was the rst study to suggest that the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium
is related to the initial allocation of permits. Focusing on CMM, he analysed an
optimisation problem by allowing the rm with market power to choose a permit
price.
It was shown that if the dominant rm was allocated permits di¤erently from
what it would choose at equilibrium then an incentive would exist for the rm to
trade in a manner not consistent with the least-cost equilibrium (that is, allocation of
too many or too few permits would result in monopolist and monopsonist behaviour,
respectively). The dominant rm will choose a permit price to obtain their optimal
permit holdings whilst minimising their nancial burden at the expense of reduced
market e¢ ciency. Doing so would result in an uncompetitive permit price and
cause aggregate abatement costs, across the sum of polluters, to be higher than
would occur at the least-cost allocation. Hahn (1984) also found that as the initial
allocation deviates from the equilibrium level (in both directions) the aggregate cost
(ine¢ ciency) would increase. In policy terms, it is possible to achieve the least cost
allocation by allocating a number permits to the dominant rm identical to the
number chosen by the rm in equilibrium. If the dominant rm obtained permits
equal to the choice made in equilibrium then there is less requirement for the rm
to participate in trading and hence the manipulatory behaviour and ine¢ ciency is
reduced.
The importance of the initial allocation with respect to the least-cost equilibrium
outcome is not dependent on a monopolist or monopsonist having the ability to
inuence the permit price as similar theoretical results exist when a small number
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of rms act as price-makers. For example, Westskog (1996) extended the CMM
model by applying it to an international permit market with multiple market power
countries. The market contained a number of leaders which acted like Cournot
countries within that group, and the remaining countries followed as a competitive
fringe. Here, the market e¢ ciency was still inuenced, in a similar manner, by the
initial allocation of permits.
As discussed, the traditional view of CMM focuses on the ability of a market
power rm to manipulate the permit price due to the divergence between the initial
allocation and the permit holdings chosen by the rm in equilibrium. However, the
extent to which a dominant rm manipulates the market may depend on the size of
permit (mis)allocation. Recently, this reasoning has been adapted by Maeda (2003).
Maeda (2003) found that a necessary condition for CMM to exist is the requirement
that the number of excess permits allocated to the monopolist must be larger than
the net demand (net shortage) for permits in the market. In other words, If a
rm obtains excess permits but this is small in proportion to the net demand in
the market, then there is very little potential of the rm being able to signicantly
manipulate the permit price. Therefore, a dominant rm can hold permits over
and above its optimal holdings without participating in uncompetitive behaviour.
As a consequence, an upper limit of permit holdings exists where additional permit
holdings below this level do not a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the market and therefore, the
initial allocation is independent of the equilibrium outcome. Over and above this
threshold, market power becomes prevalent and market e¢ ciency may reduce.
It appears that CMM is theoretically important in linking the initial allocation
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to the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium, yet the theory may be of lesser importance due
to the small number of possible scenarios. CMMmay be an important issue when (i)
the market is thin, that is, there is a small number of traders and (ii) when excessive
permits are allocated to rms over and above net demand (over some threshold).
The thinness or lack of potential traders, may occur due to the geographical
boundaries of an emissions scheme where very few rms have the opportunity to
participate in the scheme (e.g. Hanley and Mo¤at (1993)). Even if a large number of
rms participated in the market, trading restrictions (used mainly for non-uniformly
mixed pollutants) may restrict the number of potential traders (e.g. ONeil et al.
(1983)).
Also, CMM may be an important issue when a rm is allocated too many (few)
permits and, due to their market dominance, has the opportunity to inuence the
market (e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2003)). The experimental evidence regarding
the existence of CMM opportunities is in general agreement with Hahns hypoth-
esis. Godby (2000; 2002) investigated a permit market with one dominant rm
and a small number of traders using an experimental approach. By specifying a
dominant trader and altering the magnitudes of the initial allocation to the traders,
the evidence suggested that Hahns hypothesis was correct. As an alternative to
Godbys (2002) small number of players, Böhringer and Löschel (2003) simulated
an international carbon trading scheme where one country had a dominant position
due to an excess allocation of permits. The excess permits are known as hot-air :
an allocation given over-and-above the expected emissions of a country (the former
Soviet Union countries are likely to experience this in an international permit mar-
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ket due to a dramatic economic downturn after the Kyoto baseline period). They
found the initial allocation of permits can a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the market. More
recently, Klepper and Peterson (2005) discussed di¤erent institutional and permit
allocation designs in hot-air economies. They found, in agreement with Hahns hy-
pothesis, that the permit allocation choices in hot-air economies were important in
determining the equilibrium outcome.5
An imperfectly competitive permit and product market
Up to this point we have discussed market power in relation to a dominant rm
minimising its abatement cost and purchasing of permits with detrimental e¤ects to
the permit market simple market power. However, it is possible that a dominant
rm in the permit market has the possibility of manipulating the amount of permits
(and consequently the permit price) to increase rivalsproduction costs in the output
market Exclusionary Manipulation (EM). In other words the dominant permit
market rm will choose a permit price (or permit holdings) to try and exclude fringe
rms from the product market by increasing their production costs. For example,
this may occur when a permit market is established where a large proportion of the
regulated rms are in the same regional product market (such as energy producers).6
The value of a permit to a dominant rm now includes the benet it obtains
from inuencing the product market vis-à-vis the permit price. Misiolek and Elder
5CMM has also been analysed through a double auction allocation system with mixed results
with respect to the control of market power and the subsequent e¤ects on the market e¢ ciency
(Brown-Kruse et al., 1995; Carlén, 2003; Cason et al., 2003; Muller et al., 2002).
6We assume that the rm is dominant in both the permit and product market, however, it can
be assumed that the rm is a price taker in the output market. The key issue to understand is the
rm has dominance in the permit market which will raise rivalscosts, irrespective of whether the
rm is a price-taker or dominant in the product market (Salop and Sche¤man, 1983; Rogerson,
1984; Salop and Sche¤man, 1987).
52
(1989) were the rst to formally show the e¤ects of such a scenario. They described
two cases: a monopolist and a monopsonist in the permit market.7
Similar to the CMM case above, a monopolist in the permit market experiences
traditionalincentives in which the rm would supply too little to the permit market
(abate too little) to increase prot from permit sales. With exclusionary manipula-
tion, the dominant rm has an added incentive to increase the permit price (restrict
supply) as this may enhance its monopoly power in the product market by raising
the per-unit production costs of the product market rms (to exclude rival rms).
Therefore, for a monopolist, both incentives motivate the dominant rm to reduce
the permit supply (the dominant rm holds more permits than without EM).
For a monopsony in the permit market, the incentives are more complicated. The
rm, as a traditional monopsonist, will purchase too few permits (abate too much)
compared to the least-cost equilibrium. However the monopsonist has an incentive to
purchase more permits to increase the permit price so that the per-unit production
cost of other rms in the industry increase (in an attempt to increase the product
price). Therefore, a monopsonist has two conicting incentives. Paradoxically, due
this conict, as the exclusionary value of a permit increases, the dominant rm will
increase its purchase of permits and thereby improve the distribution of permits and
market e¢ ciency (again, the rm will hold more permits than without EM). In the
extreme case, it is even possible for the monopsonist to purchase more permits than
in a competitive market.
7Alternatively, Innes et al. (1991) considered the case where a rm is a monopolist in the product
market with potential market power in the permit market. The competitive fringe, although
participating in the permit market has a separate product market. They nd, in contrast to Hahn
(1984), to maximise welfare, the initial allocation to the dominant rm should be larger than the
rms choice of emissions in equilibrium (Remark 3, p331).
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Recently, this framework was adapted to illustrate the criterion needed for an
e¢ cient permit allocation. Eshel (2005), with imperfect competition in the permit
and product markets, found if the dominant rm is a net supplier of permits, then
similar to Misiolek and Elder (1989), there is an incentive for the rm to increase
the permit price to raise the remaining rmscosts. Eshel (2005) nds, the rm may
have an incentive to increase the permit price even if it is a net demander of permits
(as a monosponsit one would expect the price of permits to be chosen below the
dominant rms marginal abatement cost). Although increasing the permit price
will increase the dominant rms cost, it is willing to do this if the prot obtained
from the product market outweighs the increased cost from the permit market. In
other words, raising the permit price will reduce the remaining rms output in the
product market which increase the dominant rms prot in the output market.
Exclusionary manipulation is not just a problem when one dominant rm can
exert power in both permit and product markets. Von Der Fehr (1993) introduced
a duopoly in the permit and product market and found that changing the market
structure does not appear to alter the results of EM: strategic considerations in both
markets continue to motivate each rm to minimise their permit market cost whilst
simultaneously attempting to increase their rivals product market cost. Similarly,
Sartzetakis (1997a) modelled a Cournot Duopoly product market where only one of
these rms had dominance in the permit market and found the permit price increased
when the initial allocation of permits was increased to the dominant rm. Again,
the dominant rms ability to increase the price was used as a strategy to raise
rivalscost (and deter entry in the product market). Indeed, Sartzetakis (1997a)
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found by controlling (reducing) the initial allocation of permits to the dominant
rm, market power could be controlled in the permit market. Therefore, under a
theoretical duopoly setting, the initial permit allocation appears to inuence the
e¢ ciency at the market equilibrium.8
Competitive Permit Market and Imperfectly Competitive Product Mar-
ket
The nal scenario involves a competitive permit market and an imperfectly compet-
itive product market. For example, this could occur if a competitive permit scheme
(due to a large number of participating rms) covered multiple product industries
which, in their own right, were imperfectly competitive, such as the European Union
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). In order to analyse the possible consequences,
Malueg (1990) and Sartzetakis (1997b) have considered the welfare issues of an
imperfectly competitive product market with a competitive permit market. Both
studies assume a link between the output of a rm and the emissions it creates so
that abatement e¤orts (and costs) inuence production decisions (and costs).
As discussed in section (2.2.2), given a competitive permit market, abatement
e¤ort will be redistributed so that rmsmarginal abatement costs are equated. A
rm that nds abatement cheap relative to the permit price (a low-costrm) will
increase its abatement and sell any surplus permits to the market whereas a rm that
nds it relatively expensive to abate (a high-costrm) will reduce its abatement
whilst purchasing permits in the market. As a consequence, the aggregate cost of
8Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1995) also consider a duopoly in the permit and product market
and nd trading may lead to ine¢ cient choices of production and abatement.
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reducing pollution is minimised. It follows that with the introduction of a tradeable
permit market, the equalisation of marginal abatement costs improves welfare due
to the pollutant being reduced at the lowest possible cost.
A second e¤ect occurs in the product market. Due to imperfect competition in
the product market and each rmsspecic abatement technologies, output from
product market may be redistributed from the low-cost to the high-costrms
which will result in a reduction in welfare (prot reduction). High-costrms in
the permit market acquire permits and thereby reduce their marginal abatement
cost (which has direct a¤ects on their marginal production costs). In the imperfect
product market, high-costrms reduce marginal production costs and as a result
increase output. The exact opposite is experienced by low-costrms.
Malueg (1990) suggested that the net e¤ect on welfare was ambiguous for the case
of an oligopolistic product market. He nds the extent to which social welfare can
improve depends on the distribution of cost reductions. In particular, if the tradeable
permit market evenly (unevenly) distributes cost reductions among rms then
social welfare will rise (fall). Intuitively, an evendistribution of cost reductions
means that the relative a¤ect on output choice is negligible whereas an uneven
distribution results in high-costrms altering their output relatively more than
low-costrms.
By modelling a Cournot duopoly, Sartzetakis (1997b) found di¤erent results.
Although a redistribution of output from the high-costrm to the low-costex-
ists, this e¤ect was proven to be smaller than the benet obtain from the reduced
aggregate abatement costs from the permit market. The negative welfare e¤ect is
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limited due to the fact that rms will, in equilibrium, adjust their abatement until
their marginal abatement cost is equal to the permit price. As a result, the change
in marginal production costs of all rms is limited.
It is clear from both studies that an imperfectly competitive product market has
an e¤ect on social welfare. Yet it appears not to a¤ect the equilibrium outcome in the
permit market: the imperfectly competitive product market has no e¢ ciency e¤ects
on the permit market and as the permit market is competitive, the initial allocation
does not alter the equilibrium outcome. This mirrors the result of Montgomery
(1972) discussed earlier.
In summary, the discussion of the last three subsection leads to the following
remark;
Remark 1 An imperfectly competitive permit market is a su¢ cient condition for
the initial allocation to determine the equilibrium outcome in the permit market.
2.3.2 Transaction Costs
In the traditionalmodel of a tradeable permit market, it is assumed that partic-
ipating rms can costlessly trade permits. Yet this assumption is often unrealistic
as transaction costs occur in a variety of forms. Prior to the exchange of permits,
rms may nd it costly to search for potential traders. Transaction costs can occur
due to the existence of informational deciencies in the permit market, such as the
imperfect and asymmetric information on the location of traders, the availability of
permits for purchase or sale, and so on. Moreover, transaction costs may continue
to pose a problem after a trading partner has been found as trade negotiation may
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be costly (which also includes the cost of time spent bargaining).9
Hahn and Hester (1989a; 1989b) found clear conrmation of large transaction
costs (and reduction in market e¢ ciency) due to the large amount of trading and
administrative restrictions in the EPAs Emissions Trading Program and in the per-
mit program for the Fox river, Wisconsin.10 The existence of transaction costs was
supported by Foster and Hahn (1995) whereby they analysed the trading activity in
the Los Angeles basin (RECLAIM) and found transaction costs signicantly altered
behaviour in the permit market. Moreover, Gangadharan (2000) econometrically
tested the existence and severity of transaction costs in the RECLAIM emissions
program. Transaction costs appeared to be most inuential in the earlier periods of
the program which suggests at the beginning of emissions programs, as very little
trading has taken place, the search and informational costs are large but as rms
gain knowledge and experience of the market, the cost of trading falls. That is, as the
market develops, rmsexperiences of trading are enhanced and the search and infor-
mational costs will diminish. This argument is supported by evidence from the SO2
emissions trading program. Doucet and Strauss (1994), Conrad and Kohn (1996),
Joskow et al. (1998), Schmalensee et al. (1998) and Ellerman et al. (2000) provide
evidence that transaction costs declined throughout time as rms gained more ex-
perience with trading permits (as time progressed the permit price was relatively
9We do not consider the regulators costs throughout the planning, implementation and en-
forcement of a trading scheme. For instance, when the structure of the market is rst chosen
preliminary consultations with industry and government are needed, and once a program has be-
come operational the regulator faces costs through the implementation and enforcement of the
administrative structure (Krutilla, 1999; Kohn, 1991). Henceforth, we neglect the costs associated
with the regulator and instead focus on rm-to-rm transaction costs.
10See also Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) for a discussion about the Emissions Trading Pro-
grams divergence from the cost e¤ective allocation.
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stable). A fundamental reason for the successful development of this market was
the improved market information and price discovery experienced by rms through
the annual auction mechanism. Similarly, Kerr and Mare (1998) econometrically
analysed the US lead permit market and found evidence that suggested transaction
costs existed and were important to the cost e¤ectiveness of the market.
It is evident from the above discussion that transaction costs, if present, can
change market e¢ ciency. With this in mind, Stavins(1995) study was the rst to
analyse the relationship between the initial allocation, transaction costs and market
e¢ ciency. By associating a cost with exchanging permits, Stavins (1995) modelled
a rm optimisation problem which explicitly considered transaction costs.
Stavins (1995) found that introducing transaction costs created a wedge(the
marginal transaction cost) between a rms marginal abatement cost and the permit
price. Consequently, if marginal transaction costs were non-zero, the equalisation
of rmsmarginal abatement cost will not be achieved (a reduction in e¢ ciency).
According to Stavins (1995), the a¤ect of changing initial allocation is dependent
on the specic functional form of the transaction cost (the second derivative of
the transaction cost function). In particular, he found that when the marginal
transaction cost is constant (second derivative is zero), the initial allocation does
not alter the e¢ ciency at equilibrium, similar to Montgomery (1972).
However, non-constant marginal transaction costs do appear to alter the e¢ cient
equilibrium of abatement. If marginal transaction costs are increasing (decreasing),
then a movement of the initial allocation away from the e¢ cient equilibrium allo-
cation level will increase (decrease) the departure from the least-cost equilibrium.
59
When marginal transaction costs are increasing, the cost of additional transactions
increases at an increasing rate. Therefore it will be relatively expensive to reach the
e¢ cient market equilibrium with an allocation level that is further away from the ef-
cient level. Conversely, decreasing marginal transaction costs allow scale economies
to occur in transactions. Therefore, it will be relatively easier for a rm to reach
the e¢ cient equilibrium with an allocation that is further away from the least-cost
equilibrium level.
Supporting these ndings, Cason and Gangadharan (2003) experimentally tested
the e¤ects of the initial allocation with transaction costs. A laboratory experiment
was created where subjects were placed into a situation with zero, constant and
decreasing transaction costs and the initial allocation was altered to determine the
e¤ects on the equilibrium outcome.
Up to this point, the theory has focused on the consequences of transaction costs
when trading has been approved. Yet costly trading can also be encountered when
rms are uncertain about the regulators approval of trade. This is evident in non-
uniformly mixed pollutant markets where regulatory trade approval is necessary
due to the increased likelihood of the ambient environmental target being violated
(Hahn and Hester, 1989a). Each rm in the emissions market has the option to
trade. If the rm decides not to trade then zero transaction costs are experienced
and the emissions (abatement) choice is the only required action. However, if the
rm decides to trade then the rm will incur transaction costs associated with
searching for potential trading partners with the possibility that the trade will not
be approved.
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Using this logic, Montero (1998) extended the Stavins(1995) transaction cost
model to include a rms uncertainty over trade approval. This model assumes that
rms place a probability on the success of an approved trade. With this general
setting, transaction costs and uncertainty in trade approval tend to strengthen the
causation between the distribution of permits and the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium
outcome, although, the explicit levels of transaction costs and trade probability make
detailed descriptions of the e¤ects troublesome. To support his ndings, Montero
(1998) simulated a permit market using discontinuous marginal abatement costs for
each rm and found the initial allocation was able to determine the e¢ ciency at the
equilibrium even with constant marginal transaction costs (due to the discontinuous
abatement costs).
It appears that transaction costs, with or without uncertainty, create an im-
portant link between the equilibrium outcome and the allocation of permits.11 In
summary;
Remark 2 The existence of non-constant marginal transaction costs is a su¢ cient
condition for the initial allocation to determine the equilibrium outcome in the permit
market.
Although studies focusing on transaction costs and the initial allocation of per-
mits appear to be well founded, there has been little attempt to extend the theory
signicantly. Imperfectly competitive permit markets are a signicant issue when
11A number of papers have extended the use of transaction costs but without signicant comment
on the relationship between the initial allocation of permits and the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
outcome. For instance, Netusil and Braden (2001) examined the e¤ects of sequential and bilateral
trading with transaction costs and Nagurney and Dhanda (2000) modelled an oligopolistic product
market with multiple pollutants and transaction costs.
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designing and implementing programs and it may be important to include analysis
of the relationship between transaction costs, initial allocation and the equilibrium
outcome in an imperfectly competitive permit environment. Also, transaction costs
appear to be signicant when the target pollutant is non-uniformly mixed, yet no
studies attempt to analyse the consequences for the initial allocation in such schemes.
The role of dynamic transaction costs may also be an important extension as market
learning and experience may alter the signicance and characteristics of transaction
costs.
2.3.3 Dynamic Permit Markets
Up to this point we have reviewed the relationship between the initial allocation and
market e¢ ciency in a static tradeable permit market a scheme with one compliance
period and one initial allocation. However, the static analysis is often limited in
e¤ectiveness as many tradeable permit schemes have multiple compliance periods
(e.g. EU-ETS and the two phases of the SO2). In this subsection, we discuss the
relationship between the initial allocation and market e¢ ciency when a tradeable
permit market is dynamic a market in which there are multiple compliance periods
and permit allocations (initially allocated at the start of every period).
In order to analyse the a¤ect of the initial allocation on market e¢ ciency, one
must consider a number of additional concepts: the use of updated baselines (his-
torical information on emissions and output) and the intertemporal exchanging of
permits (banking and borrowing).
It may become necessary for a regulator to alter the baseline of historical emis-
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sions and/or output throughout a dynamic permit market, for example, this may be
of importance when a regulator has to consider how to accommodate new entrants
and rm closures in a compliance period (Åhman et al. 2007). Without some type
of dynamic revision of permit allocations, rms that close plants will continue to
receive permits in every future period and new entrants would have to purchase all
permits from the market (which may not be desirable).
Throughout this review (and thesis), we dene an updating grandfathering mech-
anism as one that reviews a rms allocation based on their historically updated
production and/or emissions choices. The use of a rms output (and emissions)
to allocate permits has been widely discussed in a static setting. Fischer (2001)
considered environmental policy schemes (tradeable performance standards, taxes
and tradeable permits) that rebated revenues based on output market shares. For
a tradeable permit market this meant an output-based grandfathering allocation.
Fischer (2001) found that using such an allocation process provided an implicit out-
put subsidy.12 This conclusion was supported by Burtraw et al. (2001; 2002) and
Burtraw et al. (2005; 2006) who investigated the cost-e¤ectiveness of alternative
allocation mechanisms in the electricity sector of a tradeable permit scheme. More-
over, Fischer (2003b), Fischer and Fox (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007) extend the
basic model to include imperfect competition in the output market and a general
12Output-based allocation has similar e¤ects to a rate-based target or intensity cap where
energy intensity is capped instead of absolute emissions (Dewees, 2001; Ellerman and Wing, 2003;
Kuik and Mulder, 2004). Both types of allocation system result in similar implicit output subsi-
dies. The noticeable di¤erence between the two types concentrates on the cap. In output-based
allocations, the aggregate emissions cap is generally xed so that average allocation per unit of
output has to be altered to take into account (changing) total output. Whereas under a rate-based
mechanism allocation per unit of output is held constant and instead the aggregate emissions cap
is altered (e¤ectively there is no absolute aggregate emissions cap) (Fischer, 2003a). It is not in
the scope of this review to consider these types of mechanisms in detail (See, Sterner and Höglund,
2000; Fischer, 2001; Fischer 2003b).
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equilibrium analysis, respectively.
As output-based allocations create an implicit output subsidy, Edwards and
Hutton (2001) used a computable general equilibrium model of the UK to investigate
a number of possible allocation mechanisms and found an output-based allocation
improved GNP and welfare in the economy (encourages a switch to domestically
produced goods). Similarly, Haites (2003) nds this type of mechanism can be used
in a tradeable permit markets to reduce the output decline of industries that are
adversely a¤ected by international competition. Furthermore, Åhman et al. (2007)
has advocated an updated system (with a su¢ ciently long time lag of ten years) for
the EU-ETS to incorporate new entrants and rm closures and suggests that it may
weaken rmsperverse incentives in the market.
In general terms, the regulator can allow rms to exchange permits within and
between periods (either with themselves or other rms) so that rms have the option
to bankand borrowpermits. Banking is the term used to describe a rm reserv-
ing current period permits for use in a future compliance period, whereas borrowing
arises when a rm uses a proportion of future period permits in the current period.
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) modelled the banking of permits and found that the
competitive equilibrium was least-cost. By allowing for borrowing and continuous
time, Rubin (1996) showed the equilibrium least-cost outcome is reached and de-
tailed emissions and price paths for the duration of the dynamic market. Schennach
(2000) considered bankable permits in the context of the SO2 trading program and
found rmsbehaviour can be split into two periods: the rst period where a pro-
portion of permits are banked and the second period, where all permits are used
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immediately with the remaining banked permits. Schennach (2000) is able to de-
termine permit price and emission paths as well as the length of banking period
and also extends the model to include the consequences for banking incentives when
uncertainty regarding the demand for electricity and technological innovations ex-
ists. Another important aspect of intertemporal trading is the extent of the damage
caused by the timing of emissions. Kling and Rubin (1997) argued that allowing
intertemporal trade may mean that a rm delays abatement till later periods which
results in higher present value abatement costs and damages above the e¢ cient level.
Yet, when a stock pollutant is considered the e¢ cient level can be achieved (Leiby
and Rubin, 2001).
We now turn to the discussion of studies that analyse the relationship between
the initial allocation and market e¢ ciency by making a distinction between studies
that allow for inter-temporal trading and those that do not.
No Inter-temporal Trading
Initially consider a competitive permit market which allocates a lump-sum endow-
ment to each rm at the start of (possibly innite) periods, such as an one-o¤
grandfathering mechanism. Without banking and borrowing, the dynamic model is
similar to a continually repeated static market. Therefore, it follows that rmsbe-
haviour (the choice of output and emissions) is independent of the permit allocation
received and the rmsmarginal abatement costs will equate market e¢ ciency is
independent from the choice of initial allocation.
However, as mentioned above, there may be a need to periodically review the
baselines of historical emissions and output (e.g. new entrants and closures). Under
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updated grandfathering a link is created between a rms permit allocation and the
historical choices of output and emissions. Essentially this is the Ratchet E¤ect,
which uses current rm performance to determine the targets and endowments al-
located to the rms in future periods (see for example, Freixas et al. 1985; Harrison
and Radov, 2002). The rst paper to formally analyse a dynamic permit market
with an updated allocation mechanism was Böhringer and Lange (2005a).
Böhringer and Lange (2005a) found that the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium was
determined by the structure of the market and whether rm-specic information
was used to allocate permits. Böhringer and Lange (2005a) considered two types of
permit market: an open and closed market. In an open system, rms obtain permits
from a regulator but can also purchase permits from outsidethe market such as
a domestic allocation within an international market. In contrast, a closed permit
market does not allow trading to occur outside the market in so far as the regulator
has full control over the supply of permits, such as in the SO2 program.
It was found that when the market is open, an allocation process that uses
updated historical information on emissions and/or output creates distortionary in-
centives for rms to increase emissions and output (similar to Fischer (2001)). Con-
sequently, the initial allocation can only achieve the least-cost equilibrium outcome
when the endowments to rms are distributed using a method which is independent
of rm emissions and output, such as an auction.
However, under a closed system, Böhringer and Lange (2005a) found it is pos-
sible to allocate permits using historical updated emissions information and still
reach a least-cost equilibrium. By allocating permits to rms based on identical
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allocation rules, all rms experience the same marginal benet of obtaining permits,
and although the demand for permits increases, this is reected by an increase in
the nominal permit price (as the supply of permits is xed) (This will be discussed
extensively in Chapter (3)).
For both an open and closed market, Böhringer and Lange (2005a) showed that
using an updated output-based allocation will never obtain the least-cost equilib-
rium outcome. Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) supports this outcome by creating a
dynamic general equilibrium numerical model that used auctioning and allocations
based on output and emissions to distribute pollution permits and found output-
based allocation is more costly than either auctioning or one-o¤grandfathering.
In a separate model without considering the opennessor closedness, Sterner
and Muller (2006) discuss the static, updating and current period methods of alloca-
tion based on emissions, inputs and outputs of rms and nd, similar to Böhringer
and Lange (2005a), that the use of emissions and output (except when static) have a
suboptimal price, abatement and output e¤ect compared to the least-cost outcome.
Further support for Böhringer and Lange (2005a) is supplied by Martinez and
Neuho¤ (2005). Martinez and Neuho¤ (2005) considered the electricity sector in
the EU-ETS that allocates permits through the updated historical information of
emissions and nds that such a scheme distorts the permit price. Ine¢ ciencies in the
market will be created if permits are traded between sectors/regions that face dif-
ferent updating rules and discount factors. In other words, similar to the Böhringer
and Lange (2005a) result, if the allocation rule is identical across, sectors and rms,
then it is possible to allocate permits in a least-cost manner. Similarly, Neuho¤ et
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al. (2006) numerically simulated the consequences for the EU-ETS electricity sec-
tor with an updating output-based allocation and found clear evidence of implicit
output subsidies and noticed that the number of plant closures falls when using
an output-based allocation and accelerated construction of plants occurs for new
entrants. Demailly and Quirion (2006) numerically simulated the cement sector in
the EU-ETS and compared one-o¤grandfathering and updated output-based allo-
cation and again nd updated output-based allocation, induces an implicit output
subsidies and reduces abatement compared to auctioning and one-o¤grandfather-
ing.
Given the regulator knows the permit market structure, it can choose a form
of initial allocation than can induce e¢ ciency at the equilibrium. In particular, if
the market is open then a lump-sum allocation (such as an auction) will induce
e¢ ciency whereas if the market is closed then it is possible to induce e¢ ciency by
distributing permits based on updated historical emissions information. Updated
output-based allocation always produces distortionary incentives to increase output
and consequently should not be used by the regulator.
However, by adapting Fischer (2001), Böhringer and Lange (2005b) compared
output-based and emissions-based allocations with respect to output and employ-
ment and found the former is more desirable than the latter as emission-based
allocations not only distorts output (as an output-based allocation would do), it
additionally distorts the choice of emission rates due to the subsidy on emissions.13
13Bode (2006) also analyses updated emissions-based and output-based allocations for the elec-
tricity sector and nds installations, due to their alternative fuel types, can have varying degrees of
rent distribution due to the di¤erent allocation rules. However, he does not consider the e¢ ciency
of the allocation schemes.
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Inter-temporal Trading (Banking and Borrowing Allowed)
We now extend analysis to a dynamic permit market that allows banking and bor-
rowing to occur.14 Initially consider a competitive permit market which endows
each rm with a constant (lump-sum) allocation at the start of each period, such as
a predetermined allocation that is subdivided for each period. Assuming there are
no informational deciencies, in each period, a rm, will choose an optimal level of
emissions to minimise the present value of abatement costs (Cronshaw and Kruse,
1996). In such a market the permit price will rise at the rate of interest similar to
Hotellings rule (Tietenberg, 1985).
Although the above studies (Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Rubin, 1996; Kling and
Rubin,1997; Leiby and Rubin, 2001) are important in investigating the possibility
of intertemporal trade, they do not focus on the link between initial allocation and
e¢ ciency at the equilibrium. Due to the assumption of complete information, the
focus has concentrated on analysing the optimal emissions and price paths whilst
portraying the initial endowment of permits as optimal for each rm and exogenous
from their actions. However, some studies have begun to focus on the relevance
of the initial allocation in a banking and borrowing setting. Yates and Cronshaw
(2001) emphasised the importance of the initial allocation in determining the least-
cost outcome. Assuming rms have better information than the regulator (e.g.
rms will have more information on abatement costs) a choice of initial allocation
can be found to obtain the least-cost outcome. In particular, the level of optimal
14Although not discussed in this chapter, a number of studies have combined the inter-temporal
banking and borrowing of permits with market power (Hagem and Westskog, 1998; Liski and
Montero, 2005).
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allocations is dependent on the optimal permit discount rate (a regulatory rule that
determines the rate at which the number of banked permits in the current period
are exchanged for future permits). This framework was extended by Feng and Zhao
(2005) who included uncertainty and focused on multiple e¤ects on the banking
permit redistribution compared to a no banking scenario. The optimal level of
permits appeared to be identical regardless if banking was included or not.
Very few studies have investigated the link between market e¢ ciency and up-
dated grandfathering when the banking and borrowing of permits is allowed. Mar-
tinez and Neuho¤ (2005) introduced a permit market with banking and borrowing
that allowed rms to be allocated permits based on updated historical emissions and
nd that banking and borrowing with updating causes emissions to move from the
second period to the rst.
Rehdanz and Tol (2007) investigated a two period model with updated grand-
fathering. By introducing banking and borrowing, it was shown that there is a
tendency for borrowing to occur when updated grandfathering is used. Intuitively,
borrowing allows rms the option to increase current period emissions and as a re-
sult obtain a larger future period allocation. In particular, there is net borrowing
when future emissions reduction obligations are large relative to the current period.
In a dynamic permit trading market, the initial allocation may alter the e¢ ciency
of the equilibrium outcome when a link exists between rm actions and permit rent.
However, it was discussed that in some special circumstances (e.g. Böhringer and
Lange, (2005a)), historical updated emissions can be used to achieve a least-cost
equilibrium. This will be the focus of the preceding chapter. When banking and
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borrowing is allowed, recent ndings show that the updating and banking e¤ects
can switch emissions to current periods and distort incentives. It follows that:
Remark 3 The initial allocation based on updated emissions and/or output may
determine (dynamic) market e¢ ciency at the equilibrium.
In a dynamic market setting, research that focuses on the link between the initial
allocation and the e¢ ciency at the equilibrium is in its infancy. This is especially
true when one considers the lack of studies which discuss this link with banking and
borrowing. As it appears that dynamic permit markets are increasingly important
in the current regulatory climate, attempts need to be made to fully understand the
link between the dynamic market, the initial allocation and permit market e¢ ciency
in equilibrium.
2.4 Conclusion
Tradeable permit markets are a frequently used instrument to control pollution.
Within existing schemes, the choice of permit allocation is controversial as it can
determine the e¢ ciency and equity in the market. A change in the initial allocation
may distort rmspollution reduction incentives with consequences for the market
e¢ ciency and simultaneously alter the distribution of rents (with consequences for
equity in the market).
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss theoretical studies that attempt to
investigate the link between the initial allocation of permits and market e¢ ciency.
We restrict our chapter in two main directions. First, we focus on grandfatheringof
71
Permit market developments Importance of the Initial Al-
location
Uncompetitive Behaviour Initial Allocation may be impor-
tant when uncompetitive behav-
iour exists in permit market
Transaction costs Initial Allocation may be impor-
tant when non-constant transac-
tion costs exist
Dynamic Market Initial Allocation may be impor-
tant when rm choice variables
are used as the allocation crite-
rion
Table 2.2: Implications for Market E¢ ciency
permits free allocation based on historical emissions and/or output information
as it is a frequently used mechanism. Second, we concentrate on studies that analyse
the theoretical consequences for market e¢ ciency insofar as we neglect discussions
that relate to the equity and distributional arguments of initial allocations.
We rst examined the competitive permit market then relaxed the models as-
sumptions in three distinct ways: market imperfections, transaction costs and dy-
namic permit markets. We found that the initial allocation of permits in a perfectly
competitive permit market can be distributed arbitrarily to the rms as the least-
cost equilibrium will be achieved by the competitive trading of permits. As table
(2.2) suggests, when the competitive model assumptions are relaxed, the market
e¢ ciency and initial allocation of permits are found to be linked.
That is, when a permit market is imperfectly competitive, experience transaction
costs or is modelled dynamically then links exist between e¢ ciency at the market
equilibrium and the initial allocation.
Existing pollution permit markets experience, to some degree, elements of market
power, transaction costs and dynamic behaviour. Therefore, this review illustrates
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the need for regulators to not only consider equity but also market e¢ ciency issues
when creating appropriate initial allocation mechanisms.
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Part II
Issues in the Dynamic Initial
Allocation of Pollution Permits
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Chapter 3
The Optimal Initial Allocation of
Pollution Permits: A Relative
Performance Approach
3.1 Introduction
Tradeable permit markets have become an important policy tool in the control of
pollution.1 Schemes such as RECLAIM and the SO2 market in the US have shown
that tradeable permits are a viable and cost e¤ective market-based mechanism (e.g.
Stavins, 1998; Schmalensee et al., 1998). Yet there is still an active debate about how
to allocate permit endowments among the participating rms at the beginning of
each trading period. As Böhringer and Lange (2005a) argue, some initial allocation
mechanisms may create inter-temporal distortions and result in socially suboptimal
1This chapter has been adapted from MacKenzie et al. (2007a).
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outcomes.
In this chapter, we extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005a) to ac-
commodate most of the existing dynamic initial allocation mechanisms (including
grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using
rmshistorical outputs for allocating permits is never optimal, while using rms
historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow
class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality
by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of out-
put and emissions. We outline su¢ cient conditions for a socially optimal relative
performance mechanism and discuss the issues related to the choice of a suitable
mechanism for initial allocation.
In our analysis, we discuss two types of mechanisms that are commonly consid-
ered for allocating initial endowments of permits. The rst mechanism, which we
call an Absolute Performance Mechanism (APM), involves permit allocations based
on the levels of individual rm activity. The second mechanism, which we call a
Relative Performance Mechanism (RPM), involves permit allocations based on how
the levels of a rms activity compare to the levels of other rmsactivities, or on
inter-rm relative comparisons. The distinction between these two mechanisms is
crucial as rmsbehaviour in the permit market is subject to whether rmsbe-
lieve they are obtaining permits individually or, as under a RPM, as part of a game
where a rms allocation is dependent on other rmsactions. We show in this chap-
ter that a mechanism that allocates permits based on rmsabsolute performance
(APM), as used by Böhringer and Lange (2005a), is a special case of a generalized
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relative performance mechanism (RPM), and thus that the two mechanisms share
a number of optimality properties in a dynamic setting. We however argue that
mechanisms which are based on relative performance might be superior over those
based on absolute performance and o¤er a promising alternative to auctioning and
grandfathering, namely a rank-order contest.
Both types of mechanisms have had important applications in existing tradeable
permit markets. Absolute performance mechanisms have been advocated in the
form of relative emissions or intensity-based emissions caps (Fischer 2001; Ellerman
and Wing, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Kuik and Mulder, 2004; Pizer, 2005; Newell and
Pizer, 2006).2 In such a scheme intra-rm relative comparisons exist, where the
performance of a given rm is evaluated relative to its own activity, but not rela-
tive to the activity of other rms. Rather than having a cap on absolute levels of
emissions, an intensity-based cap involves a ceiling on the emissions intensity (i.e.
emissions per one unit of output). This type of approach is becoming increasingly
common, for example, Bode (2005) notes that a number of participants in the UK
emissions trading scheme were given an intensity target. Furthermore, the Bush
administration in the US has strongly advocated this type of approach to tackle
climate change (Kolstad, 2005; Pizer, 2005). When a trading system is based on
emissions intensity, each rm can unilaterally increase both their output and emis-
sions without changing emissions intensity and without any e¤ect on other rms
2We make a distinction between intensity-based caps and output-based allocation (although
they do both act as an implicit output subsidy). In intensity rate-based mechanisms the emission
cap is adjusted to maintain a constant emissions intensity and hence allocation is not dependent
on other rmsbehaviour (e.g. the levels of other rmsemissions and output choices). In con-
trast, output-based mechanisms alter the average allocation per unit of output to maintain a xed
emissions cap (allocation is dependent on rmsbehaviour).
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(the permit allocation is an adjustable grandfathering mechanism).
However, the majority of distribution rules which have been discussed are relative
performance mechanisms. The two most common RPMs include auctions (where
rmsare allocated permits based on their relative bids) and grandfathering with
a xed cap (where rms are allocated permits based on their relative emissions
levels with respect to some xed cap) (see Hahn and Noll, 1982; Lyon, 1984; 1986;
Oehmke, 1987; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Van Dyke, 1991; Franciosi et al., 1993;
Parry, 1995; Parry et al., 1999; Cramton and Kerr, 2002). However, there is a large
selection of RPMs that have not been extensively considered in the literature. For
example, yardstick competition, where each rms performance is assessed relatively
to the performance of other rms has been suggested (Shleifer, 1985; Franckx et al.,
2005; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b). Moreover, a novel RPM that could be
envisaged to allocate permits is the use of contests or tournaments where rms spend
resources in order to wina proportion of the permit allocation (Moldovanu and
Sela, 2001; 2006).
Inter-rm comparisons using relative performance mechanisms have a number of
general regulatory advantages which have been widely documented in the literature
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holmström, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebu¤ and
Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b; Mookherjee, 1984; Shleifer, 1985; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001;
2006). Relative performance mechanisms can also be advantageous in an environ-
mental context. Govindasamy et al. (1994) suggested the use of a tournament to
control non-point pollution, and found that a RPM results in a number of desirable
outcomes. Franckx et al. (2005) extended the work of Govindasamy et al. (1994)
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by using a di¤erent RPM, yardstick competition, and conducted the analysis in a
more general environmental regulatory setting. They nd that this RPM will be
desirable when a large number of rms participate and common shocks (such as
similar technology shocks or oil price changes) are experienced by all rms.
Rather fewer authors have focused on relative performance issues in emissions
trading. Using a rent-seeking model, Malueg and Yates (2006) examine the e¤ects
of citizen participation in a permit market to determine the endowment and price of
permits. They nd that citizenschoice of lobbying and permit purchases in a market
depends on the initial allocation mechanism chosen (auctioning or grandfathering).
Finally, Groenenberg and Blok (2002) outline an initial allocation mechanism for a
permit market that bases distribution on benchmarking the production process of
each rm and nd it eliminates a large amount of problems associated with existing
allocation mechanisms.
For a number of decades the free allocation (grandfathering) of permits has
been discussed as a feasible method of allocation (e.g. Tietenberg, 1985). Indeed,
the majority of actual emissions trading schemes to date use grandfathering as the
primary allocation mechanism due to its political viability: market participants will
always lobby for the free allocation of permits (Stavins 1998). Grandfathering might
also be seen as o¤ering a closer t to existing regulatory approaches, since it does
not involve any fundamental change in property rights compared with, for instance,
a system of performance standards for polluting emissions. Grandfathering might
also be preferred by governments on competition grounds, since the avoidance of
a lump-sum distribution from industry to government can avoid disadvantaging
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domestic rms relative to their international competitors. On the negative side,
grandfathering could be seen as rewarding rms who have engaged in relatively
low pollution control e¤orts in the past. As grandfathering is a commonly used
tool, the discussions regarding the e¤ects of the mechanism have been widespread.
In particular, Requate and Unold (2003) have shown that substantial innovation
incentives exist for rms in a grandfathered emissions scheme. However, Goulder
et al. (1997) found grandfathering to be a rather ine¢ cient allocation mechanism
compared to alternative allocation procedures. Recently, grandfathering has been
adapted to include a dynamic element (Bode, 2006; Böhringer and Lange, 2005a).
In particular, Böhringer and Lange (2005a) have discussed updated grandfathering
which continually updates the free allocation of permits based on historical emissions
and output.3 Similarly, Sterner and Muller (2006) discuss the static, updating and
current period methods of allocation based on emissions, inputs and outputs of
rms and nd, similar to Böhringer and Lange (2005a), that the use of emissions
and output (except when static) have a suboptimal price, abatement and output
e¤ect compared to the least-cost outcome.
Another important aspect of the mechanisms in question involves multi-period
choice problems in pollution permit markets. Several studies have focused on general
design considerations for multi-period permit markets (Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996;
Rubin, 1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997; Schennach, 2000; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Yates
and Cronshaw, 2001), yet only a few studies have focused on the initial allocation
of permits in this setting. In the context of the electricity sector, Bode (2006)
3Also see Fischer (2001), Haites (2003) and Fischer and Fox (2004) who consider output-based
allocation.
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nds considerable variation in the distributional impacts among di¤erent allocation
mechanisms within a dynamic emissions trading scheme. Jensen and Rasmussen
(2000) model a number of allocation mechanisms in a dynamic setting and nd that
welfare and employment vary drastically across allocation mechanisms.
The work which is the most relevant to our chapter is by Böhringer and Lange
(2005a), who compare the e¢ ciency of dynamic permit allocations based on output,
emissions and a lump-sum transfer. In comparing e¢ ciency, they make a distinction
between markets that are open (i.e. when rms can trade outside the domestic
market) and closed (i.e. when participating rms cannot trade in permits outside
the domestic market). This distinction is important to policy analysis as tradeable
permit markets are becoming increasingly varied in size and scope and have the
potential to have either an open or closed market structure. They nd in a closed
market it is optimal to allocate permits on criteria not related to output, whereas
for an open market, an e¢ cient allocation occurs when the permits are distributed
using a lump-sum approach. However, in their treatment of the initial allocation
mechanism, Böhringer and Lange (2005a) assume that the permit distribution to a
rm is based only on rmsabsolute levels of output and emissions, so that other
rms actions do not a¤ect the allocation of a given rm. Yet, given the xed emission
cap considered by Böhringer and Lange (2005a), the permit allocation to a rm is
also crucially dependent on the behaviour of rival rms. This is because a xed
emissions cap implies that if in the current period rival rms, say, increase their
output and emissions relative to a given rm, then the current-period aggregate
output and emissions increase, thus decreasing the proportion of future permits
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that each rm can receive per each unit of current output and emissions. As the
result, even if a given rm does not alter its own choices, its own future allocation
of permits will change. Thus we argue that the initial allocation process considered
by Böhringer and Lange (2005a) should take into account other rmsactions and
thus should be modelled as a relative performance mechanism.
Our chapter therefore attempts to extend Böhringer and Lange (2005a) by im-
plementing a more general design of a dynamic initial allocation mechanism, which
allows for the allocation of permits to be based on each rms choices relative to other
rms. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005a), we consider allocation mechanisms
which are based on choices of output and emissions, but in addition we consider
possible permit allocations based on an external factor which is independent of
output and emissions. This allows us to create an encompassing model for most ex-
isting types of initial allocation mechanisms such as grandfathering, auctioning and
contests. We show that a RPM can e¢ ciently (socially optimally) allocate pollution
permits if the criteria used to compare rms is based on such an external factor,
in a contest. Given the variety of potential external factors, we suggest a number
of criteria that a regulator may take into account when choosing a suitable factor.
Given the political economy problems with both auctions and grandfathering as a
way of initially allocating permits, this new mechanism may well be of interest to
policy makers.
Our contribution is thus two-fold. First, we extend the results of Böhringer
and Lange (2005a) to a wider class of mechanisms, so-called relative performance
mechanisms, such as grandfathering with xed cap, yardsticks, auctions, contests,
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etc. Although such mechanisms create a situation where rmschoices are interde-
pendent, the general intuition of Böhringer and Lange (2005a) holds in the Nash
equilibrium of the ensuing game. That is, for a wide range of mechanisms, for the
initial allocation to be cost-e¢ cient, it should not depend on rmsoutputs, and
may depend on rmsemissions only in limited circumstances. Second, we propose
that the lump-sum distribution advocated by Böhringer and Lange (2005a) can be
implemented better with a relative performance mechanism based on an external
factor. Such a cost-e¢ cient mechanism allows the regulator to achieve a secondary
target, such as raising revenue, - thus killing two birds with one stone.
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the rst to introduce a generalised
RPM into a permit market which allows us to model most existing relative-based
mechanisms and has the added advantage of encompassing APMs. The chapter is
organised as follows: section 3.2 outlines our model and presents the social optimal-
ity conditions and rms optimisation problem. A socially optimal dynamic initial
allocation mechanism, when the market experiences both exogenous and endogenous
permit prices, is considered in section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the external factor,
while section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We follow Böhringer and Lange (2005a) and consider a multi-period partial equi-
librium model. The technology of rm i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) at time t (t = 1; 2; : : :)
is given by a cost function cit(eit; qit), where qit is the rms output level, and
eit the rms emissions resulting from production. Costs cit are assumed to be
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twice di¤erentiable and convex, with @cit
@eit
 0,@cit
@qit
> 0, @
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 

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2
> 0.
The rm sells its output in a competitive product market at a price of pt. Finally,
the rm is regulated by a competitive emissions-trading program and receives an
initial allocation of permits Ait.
We further assume that each rm i also produces a factor zit which has no
direct relevance in the product and emissions market, and thus is outside the regula-
tors interests and/or jurisdiction. This externalfactor is producedby each rm
independently of output and emissions at a cost vit(zit) (possibly zero), with dvitdzit  0.
While this external factor is irrelevant to the product and emissions market, it may
determine rmspermit allocations Ait in a manner to be specied later.
3.2.1 The Generalised Allocation Mechanism
Böhringer and Lange (2005a) considered a mechanism whereby pollution permits are
allocated based on the levels of rms historical production qit and emissions eit.4 We
rst extend this mechanism by assuming that in addition to output and emissions,
some externalfactor may play a role in how many permits will be allocated to a
given rm, but this factor has no relevance to the product and emissions market,
and thus is beyond the interest or jurisdiction of the regulator (and it is this factor
which determines the lump-sum allocations in the model of Böhringer and Lange,
2005a).
4Böhringer and Lange (2005a) considered a number of historical observation periods, l =
(1; 2 : : : ; s). For expositional simplicity, we restrict our model to l = 1 (the historical period is
simply the previous period). It is straightforward to generalise our model to l > 1 historical
observation periods.
84
Examples of a possible external factor include population size in a rms local-
ity, a rms socially responsible activities, a rms emissions of other pollutants, a
random event such a lottery draw and so on. We denote such external factors as
zit. While we will discuss the external factor more in section 3.4, it is worth noting
here that the nature of the external factor determines both the cost of this factor
to the rm, as well as the degree of rms control over this factor. For example,
population size is both beyond the rms control and it is freeto the rm. On the
other hand, lottery tickets can be bought by rms, or can be allocated to rms by
the regulator (and thus are beyond rmscontrol). In contrast, in a permit auction,
both success and costs of each rms bid depends on the bids of other participating
rms.
Thus, the allocation mechanism based on absolute performance (APM) is given
by
AAPMit = 
t 1
q;it
~h(qi(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it ~g(ei(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it
~f(zi(t 1)) (3.1)
where ~h; ~g; ~f are increasing and continuously di¤erentiable functions, and t 1q;it , 
t 1
e;it ,
t 1z;it  0 are the weights (in period t) placed on period t   1s performance. The
weights reect the relative importance of a particular activity, and can vary across
time periods and across rms.
We extend equation (3.1) by allowing for rmsperformance to be evaluated in
comparison to other rms, i.e. how a given rm is performance at time t in produc-
tion qit, emissions eit, an external factor zit compares relatively to the performance
of every other rm  i = f1; : : : ; i  1; i + 1; : : : ; ng. Formally, rm is performance
at time t in output relatively to other rmsoutput q it is given by a relative perfor-
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mance function h = h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)). Similarly, relative performance in emissions
and external factor are given by g = g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)), and f = f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)),
respectively. We assume hi = @h@qit , gi =
@g
@eit
, fi =
@f
@zit
> 0 so that, for given levels of
other rmsperformance, higher levels of emissions, output, and the external factor
result in a larger permit allocation. We also assume that h i = @h@q it , g i =
@g
@e it
,
f i =
@f
@z it
 0, so that for a given level of rms performance, its allocation does
not increases if other rmsincrease their levels of emissions, output, or the external
factor.5
We take a rather general view of the relative allocation functions. That is, to
allow for uncertainty over allocations, we treat these functions as expectations over
possible realisations. Thus allocations can be distributed using deterministic rules
(such as yardstick competitions) devised by the regulator, as well as by lotteries,
auctions, or contests. For analytical tractability, we assume that the relative alloca-
tion functions h; g; f are continuously di¤erentiable.6 For example, a rms relative
allocation can be determined continuously based on how its own output compares to
aggregate output, e.g. h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = 
qit
qit+
P
 i q it
. Another example of a con-
tinuous relative allocation function includes Tullock-type (winner takes all) contest
allocations, where a rms expected amount of permits is given by all participat-
ing rmsoutputs as follows: h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = 
qrit
qrit+
P
 i q
r
 it
- i.e. the size of the
permit lot  multiplied by the probability of winning the contest (see Skaperdas,
5Instead, one can assume that hi and gi are negative.
6Our argument will not change if we relax the assumption of continuity to include relative per-
formance mechanisms such as winner-pay and all-pay auctions involving discontinuities in rms
payo¤ functions. To deal with such discontinuities, one typically assumes that all rms face com-
monly known continuously di¤erentiable distribution of rmstypes, and that all rms follow
symmetric strictly increasing and di¤erentiable strategy, so that each rms expected payo¤ func-
tion becomes continuously di¤erentiable.
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1996).
Thus, the permit allocation for rm i at time t, according to the generalised
Relative Performance Mechanism is
ARPMit = 
t 1
q;ith(qi(t 1);q i(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)) (3.2)
Comparing this relative performance allocation mechanism to that based on
absolute performance (3.1), one can observe the following:
Remark 4 If h i  g i  f i  0 then a relative performance allocation mecha-
nism reduces to an absolute performance allocation mechanism.
In other words, the absolute performance mechanism considered by Böhringer
and Lange (2005a) is a special case of relative performance mechanism when rm is
allocation is independent of the remaining rmsactions. In this case, the remaining
rmsactions have no impact on rm is allocation, and a rm i can obtain permits
by optimally choosing qit, eit and zit, without considering other rmsactions.
Note that Böhringer and Lange (2005a) implicitly assume that the grandfather-
ing mechanism is an absolute performance mechanism. However, with a xed emis-
sion cap, for a given behaviour of other rms, if a particular rm increases/decreases
its output and/or emissions, that would a¤ect the aggregate output and emissions of
domestic rms, ultimately a¤ecting how many permits both that rm and all other
rms will receive. Thus, it is implicit in Böhringer and Lange (2005a) that the factor
weights will change each period to reect changes in the aggregate activities. To see
this, suppose that at time t a xed amount of permits Et is allocated among n rms
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proportionally to each rms output qit. In other words, each rm i receives an alloca-
tion tqit, where t =
Et
qit+
P
 i q it
. Thus, the output weight t has to be adjusted each
period to reect changes in aggregate production. It is easy to see that such a xed
cap grandfathering mechanism is a RPM with h(qi(t 1); q i(t 1)) = Et
qit
qit+
P
 i q it
.
When a relative performance mechanism is used, rm is choices a¤ect the num-
ber of permits allocated to rm j 6= i, and thus a¤ect rm js prots, and vice versa.
In other words, a RPM creates a situation where rmschoices are interdependent.
In such a situation, a rational rm will make its choices strategically, by taking
into account the anticipated actions of its rivals. The relative performance permit
allocation mechanism thus results in a game among participating rms, which leads
rmsbehaviour to be typically di¤erent from their behaviour when faced with an
APM. To explore the distortionary e¤ect of such behaviour, we rst need to consider
the socially optimal situation.
3.2.2 The Socially Optimal Outcome
We now consider the regulators point of view. Following Böhringer and Lange
(2005a) we assume that the regulator cares about prots and costs associated with
the production of output and emissions of the specic pollutant but is not interested
in the external factors such as population size, lottery draws, or auction bids (we
will come back to this assumption in Section 3.4). Thus, the regulators objective is
to maximise (minimise) the aggregate prot (cost) that all the domestic rms incur
while producing the product of the regulators interests or jurisdiction whilst being
constrained by the emissions program.
88
When trade in emissions permits is not restricted to the regulators jurisdiction,
rms can import/export emissions across the systems borders. From a regulators
point of view, this is a (small) open emissions trading system, where the permit
price is exogenously determined, and the aggregate emissions in the jurisdiction are
not capped. This may occur when the market is open to transactions from other
(possibly larger) schemes. For example, in the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS), member states allocate permits domestically, but rms in each
member state can trade permits with rms in other member states.
In such a system, the regulators objective takes into account the balance of the
trade in the emission permits. Thus, given the set of prices (t; pit), the regulators
objective is to
Max
qit;eit
X
t
"
nX
i=1
pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  t
 
nX
i=1
eit   Et
!#
(3.3)
where t is the exogenous permit price determined by the (international) demand
and supply of permits in the open market and Et is the domestic emissions cap at
time t. For each rm i and each of its rival  i = f1; : : : ; i   1; i + 1; : : : ; ng, the
socially optimal conditions are as follows:7
pit =
@cit
@qit
(3.4)
 @cit
@eit
=  @cjt
@ejt
(= t) (3.5)
for all i; j 6= i; t. That is, at period t all rms will simultaneously equate their
7We follow the language of Böhringer and Lange (2005) and refer to the least-cost outcome and
corresponding conditions as socially optimal.
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marginal production costs to their rm-specic product price (3.4). Also, in the
equilibrium, rmsmarginal abatement costs will be equalized (3.5), and will be
equal to the (exogenously determined) common permit price.
In contrast, in a closed emissions trading system, a single regulator distrib-
utes the total supply of permits, and thus ensures that the aggregate emissions are
capped:
P
i eit = Et. The emissions permit price is endogenously determined by
the (domestic) demand and supply in the closed market. The regulators objective
function is thus:
Max
qit;eit
X
t
"
nX
i=1
pitqit   cit(eit; qit)
#
subject to
nX
i=1
eit = Et (3.6)
The socially optimal conditions are identical to the conditions (3.4-3.5), except the
permit price is now endogenously determined.
3.2.3 Firm Optimisation
We rst extended the allocation model of Böhringer and Lange (2005a) by allowing
for evaluations based on an independent external factor such as population size,
socially responsible activities, emissions of other pollutants, lottery draw, and so on.
We now focus our attention on the rm-specic problem. Given the prole of other
rmsactions, the set of prices (t; pit), and its permit allocation Ait for the target
pollutant, a rm i will choose a level of emissions, output and an external factor,
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(qit;, e

it;, z

it) to maximise its total stream of prots:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t=1
[pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  vit(zit)]  t(eit   Ait)
Thus, when a relative performance mechanism (3.2) is used to allocate pollution
permits, rm is objective function is:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t=1
([pitqit   cit(eit; qit)  vit(zit)]  teit
+t[
t 1
q;ith(qi(t 1);q i(t 1)) + 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1);e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1))]]

For each rm i and its rivals  i = f1; : : : ; i   1; i + 1; : : : ; ng, the optimal choices
are determined by the rst order conditions as follows:
pit + t+1
t
q;i(t+1)hi(qit;q it) =
@cit
@qit
(3.7)
t   t+1te;i(t+1)gi(eit;e it) =  
@cit
@eit
(3.8)
t+1
t
z;i(t+1)fi(zit;z it) =
dvit
dzit
(3.9)
Similarly to the absolute performance allocation mechanism of Böhringer and
Lange (2005a), when a rms current output and emissions determine its future
allocation of permits (and thus its prots), each rm will take this intertemporal
e¤ect into account.8 Thus, relative to the socially optimal conditions (3.4) and (3.5),
a mechanism which uses past performance in output and emissions will generate an
8Moreover, the longer historical period over which rms historical relative performance in
output and emissions is taken into account by the scheme designers, the more important is the
e¤ect of each current choice on future allocations. Because we assume that only one previous
period a¤ects current allocation, we do not explicitly address this point here.
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intertemporal distortion of rmsincentives.
Importantly, this holds both for the absolute performance mechanism (3.1) but
also for the relative performance mechanism (3.2). To see that, compare equations
(3.7) to (3.4), as well as (3.8) to (3.5). Given that gi and hi are both positive,
such a mechanism creates an implicit incentive to increase production and emissions
beyond socially optimal levels.9 Because the external factor z is outside the interests
or jurisdiction of the social planner, it does not distort incentives when either a
relative or absolute performance mechanism is used (3.9). For a given prole of other
rmsactions, rm i chooses external factor zit, optimally, so that the marginal cost
of obtaining the factor equals the marginal future benet obtained from the permit
allocation. In summary, we have the following generalisation of the intuition of
Böhringer and Lange (2005a):
Remark 5 When rmspermit allocations are at least partially determined by out-
put and emissions, all permit allocation mechanisms of the general form (3.2) create
distortionary incentives in the product and permit markets.
As we noted above, the absolute performance mechanism (3.1) is a special case
of the relative performance mechanism (3.2). Thus, any mechanism that allocates
permits based on historical output and/or emissions will distort rms incentives to
produce output and emissions optimally. Not only would the distortions occur when
the adjustable cap grandfathering scheme (which is an APM) is used, but also any
other scheme which utilizes rmsrelative performance with respect to each other
in output and/or emissions.
9Similarly, if either or both gi and hi are negative, there would be an incentive to decrease
either production or emissions or both to a suboptimal level.
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This problem, of increased output and emissions, is associated with the ratchet
e¤ect- using current performance to determine future targets and future initial
allocations (Weitzman, 1980; Freixas et al., 1985; Bergland et al., 2002). If a rm
decided not to increase emissions (output) then their permit allocation would be
ratcheted down, as their emissions (output) would be relatively lower than all
other rms. If such a system was implemented, rms that actively lowered emissions
(output) would be implicitly punished. Therefore, each rm has an incentive to
increase its relative emissions (output) to stop their future permit allocation from
being lowered. Thus, both RPMs and APMs will create distortions in the output
and permits market when the criteria used to allocate permits is based on historical
output and/or emissions information.
However, RPMs possess an additional important feature that APMs do not,
namely, that a RPM results in a game among participating rms. This is because
when each rm is evaluated relatively to other rms, rmsactions become interde-
pendent. In the Nash equilibrium of this game, each rm chooses a prole (qit; e

it; z

it)
according to equations (3.7)-(3.9) given the equilibrium beliefs about other rms
choices.
3.3 Socially Optimal Allocation Mechanisms
In the last section we examined the ine¢ ciencies caused by a generalised relative
performance mechanism where the criteria used to allocate permits were based on
historical output, emissions, and an external factor. In this section we will extend
the argument of Böhringer and Lange (2005a) against the use of historical outputs in
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generalized relative performance mechanisms. Moreover, when the system is open,
so that the permit price is determined exogenously, the external factor should be the
sole determinant of the rms allocations. When the closed system is used, where
the permit price can endogenously adjust to the aggregate supply of emissions, there
is a possibility of using a linear performance scheme in emissions.
3.3.1 Open System
Recall that in a (small) open permit trading system, the aggregate supply of permits
is determined jointly by the domestic allocation of permits and by the allocations of
permits to all other foreign participants. Thus, the permit price is determined ex-
ogenously. Following Böhringer and Lange (2005a), the market equilibrium outcome
(3.8), can be transformed into the socially optimal outcome (3.5), by implement-
ing the su¢ cient condition te;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. Similarly, one can ensure that
the individually optimal production level (3.7) corresponds to the socially optimal
production level (3.4), by setting tq;i(t+1) = 0 for all i. This leads us to the following:
Proposition 6 In a (small) open trading system, a socially optimal outcome can
be achieved by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor
zit only. That is, an optimal mechanism involves setting 
t 1
q;it  t 1e;it  0, for all i; t
in the allocation equation (3.2):
Ait = 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1); z i(t 1)) (3.10)
94
That is, in open trading systems, to achieve the socially optimal outcome, a
regulator should place a zero weight for historical output and emissions, and design
a system that is based solely on rmsperformance in an external factor, which is
not related to the output and emissions choice variables. By restricting allocation
to variables that do not a¤ect the permit and product market, the rms incen-
tives remain undistorted. This occurs because using an external factor breaks the
intertemporal link between the permit rent (output subsidy) and the incentive to
alter the choice variables. Our results agree with the commonly held view that one
can obtain a socially optimal outcome by distributing permits based on an external
factor (Goulder et al., 1997; Cramton and Kerr, 2002). Because an absolute perfor-
mance mechanism is a special case of relative performance mechanism, the above
result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer and Lange (2005a, Proposition 2).
That is, if the allocation function for each rm i is independent of rivalsactions, it
is socially optimal to use historical external factor to allocate permits.
3.3.2 Closed System
We now consider an emissions program where the permit price is endogenously
determined by the demand and supply in a closed permit market. This includes a
conventional closed market system where the sole supply of permits originates from
one regulator and where the permit price is determined by the aggregate level of
emissions in the emissions program.
Comparing equations (3.4) with (3.7) and equations (3.5) with (3.8) one can
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obtain the following socially optimal conditions for output and emissions:
tq;i(t+1)hi(qit;q it) = 0 (3.11)
te;i(t+1)gi(eit;e it) = 
t
e;j(t+1)gj(ejt;e jt) (3.12)
8i, j 6= i and  i = f1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; ng.
Similar to the exogenous case, equation (3.11) suggests that to achieve social
optimality, the marginal benet to rm i from increasing output should be equal to
zero. Thus, a su¢ cient condition for achieving social optimum involves the regulator
placing a zero weight on each rms historical output:
tq;i(t+1) = 0 8 i; t (3.13)
In contrast, equation (3.12) suggests that the marginal permit allocation should
be equal across rms. This condition is di¢ cult to ensure for all rms and for all
functional forms of g. We could nd only one set of su¢ cient conditions for social
optimality in emissions which holds for all functional forms of g, which is similar to
the su¢ cient conditions for output:
te;i(t+1) = 0 8 i; t (3.14)
that is, the regulator should put a zero weight on each rms historical emissions
choices. These conditions not only ensure social optimality for any relative (and
thus absolute) performance mechanism, but also requires less problem solving by
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the regulator and participating rms.
Instead, if a non-zero weight for historical emissions choices is selected then only
a narrow class of RPMs satisfy the social optimality condition (3.12). In other words,
only RPMs that create an identical marginal allocation can obtain a socially optimal
outcome. An example of such a mechanism is a yardstick mechanism that allocates
permits to each rm based on how its historical emissions compare to the other rms
average historical emissions e.g. g(eit; e it) = 1te;i(t+1)

Et+1
n
+ t

eit  
P
 i e it
n 1

for all i and t (as well as its absolutecounterpart g(eit) = tte;i(t+1)
eit). Obviously,
equating emissions weightse;it across rms makes the problem easier.
Thus, any RPM with identical marginal allocations across rms can socially
optimally allocate permits based on rms relative performances with respect to
historical emissions and an external factor. Our results agree with Böhringer and
Lange (2005a) who were able to prove that the optimality result holds for a linear
APM. Therefore, RPMs and APMs that have identical marginal allocations across
rms can obtain a socially optimal outcome.
Thus, it follows from inspection of equations (3.11) and (3.12) that:
Proposition 7 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved
by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor zit as well
as using suitably chosen relative performance schemes in historical emissions, and
ignoring rms historical outputs, i.e. t 1q;it  0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation
equation (3.2) becomes:
Ait = 
t 1
e;it g(ei(t 1); e i(t 1)) + 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1); z i(t 1)) (3.15)
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where function g is chosen such that condition (3.12) is satised.
Again, because absolute performance mechanisms are a special case of relative
performance mechanism, the above result can be reduced to the result of Böhringer
and Lange (2005a, Proposition 1). Importantly, one can achieve social optimality in
the closed system by using the same permit allocation scheme as in the open system:
Corollary 8 In closed trading system, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved
by allocating permits based on relative performance in an external factor zit only,
i.e. t 1q;it  t 1e;it  0, for all i; t. Thus, the allocation equation (3.2) becomes:
Ait = 
t 1
z;it f(zi(t 1);z i(t 1)) (3.16)
In other words, regardless of the nature trading system, one can implement the
socially optimal permit allocation mechanism based on the relative performance
in the external factor. Thus, the external factor plays a key role in optimal per-
mit allocation scheme, calling for further issues to be considered by the allocation
mechanism designer.
3.4 The External Factor
We argued in the previous section that one can achieve social optimality in the
product and target pollutant markets by using rms relative performance with
respect to an external factor to allocate target pollution permits. In this section, we
will describe the external factor, possible mechanisms based on relative performance
in this external factor, as well as the benets of this approach.
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3.4.1 Criteria for the Choice of an External Factor
We dene the external factor as anything which has no direct relevance to the prod-
uct and target pollutant emissions markets, and which is thus beyond the interest
or jurisdiction of the regulator. Examples of possible external factor include popu-
lation size in rms locality, rms socially responsible activities, rms emissions of
other pollutants, a random event such a lottery draw, and so on. Since the external
factor can take a variety of forms, the regulator faces a choice of a suitable external
factor. However, there are a number of issues involved in the external factor choice.
Independence: To achieve social optimality, the productionof the ex-
ternal factor has to be independent of rmsoutput and emissions of
the target pollutant. Obviously, if the external factor is correlated with
rms output and/or emissions, rmsincentives will be distorted, and
social optimality will not be achieved.
Ease of use: As the main objective of the regulator is to minimise the ag-
gregate cost of the emissions program, a desirable external factor should
be easy for the regulator to observe.
Reward of E¤ort: The regulator may choose the external factor to reward
rmse¤orts. When heterogeneity of rmsis substantial, the external
factor may take a form of intensity, or within-rm relative assessment
- for example, proportion of rms community activities relative to the
size of locality.
Equal Opportunity: The regulator may wish to ensure that all rms
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have equal opportunity to obtain permit allocations, and thus that the
external factor can be produced by every participating rm. When the
regulated rms believe they are being treated fairlyin a sense of equality
of opportunity, then the emissions program may have a higher chance of
success.
Political Acceptability of the External Factor: The success of the alloca-
tion scheme may depend on political acceptability of the external factor
by the regulated rms and regulator (as well as possibly by the general
public).
Fair Allocations: As psychologists suggest, judgments of allocative fair-
ness are a¤ected by the relative merits of the recipients, thus suggesting
that relative performance mechanisms may be perceived to be fairas
long as the external factor is considered to be meritorious.10
Double Dividend: Of particular interest may be those external factors
where the marginal benets will typically exceed the marginal social
costs. In other words, the external factor may be chosen so that it
confers some additional benet to the regulator other than the control
of emissions. The regulator could dene a costly zit in such a way as it
would prefer to observe higher (or lower) values.
As the last three of these issues may be of particular interest to mechanism
designers, we will discuss them in detail.
10Note further that, as Mellers (1982, 1986) demonstrated, the allocations (of salaries and taxes)
judged to be fairby human subjects, depended on the rank of each recipients merit in the
merit distribution of the comparison group. In other words, a rank-based contest may be a good
candidate for a fairrelative performance mechanism.
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3.4.2 A Non-Monetary External Factor
As it was mentioned above, one of the possible reasons why regulators avoid allo-
cating permits based on rms performance in external monetaryfactor - such as
auction bids - is that it is politically unpopular. We thus suggest that perhaps a
mechanism that is based on relative performance in a non-monetary external factor,
may have a better political acceptability, in particular if they involve a possibility of
social betterment. When a non-monetary external factor is chosen as a basis for per-
mit allocations, there are no direct nancial transfers. Firms instead are rewarded
for the (non-monetary) actions they choose. This reasoning is very similar to the
arguments that advocate a grandfathering system rather than an auction (Stavins,
1998). However, as we showed above, grandfathering schemes involving historically
updated outputs and emissions are distortive. Yet we suggest that a regulator can
choose a non-monetary external factor that is agreeable for rms (or at least less
controversial than other criteria).
There is a variety of possible non-monetary external factors. Charitable activi-
ties such as support of improvements in education and health infrastructure in the
local community may be viable. This may prove to be a meritorious allocation
process; rms are given the right to pollute based on the degree of their social
responsibilities within a community. Another set of alternative external factors may
be of particular relevance to environmental regulator. These may include reduction
of an external basketof environmental pollutants or environmental indicators, for
example noise pollution, or investments in energy e¢ ciency. That is, rms could
be allocated permits for the target pollutant based on their reduction of completely
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separate and independent pollutants.
However, we have to emphasize again that, to achieve social optimality in output
and emissions markets, a potential non-monetary external factor zit has to be inde-
pendent from the rms emissions and output choices. Thus special care has to be
taken in regulators choice of non-target pollutants as external factors as emissions
of some pollutants can be correlated with emissions of the target pollutant, leading
to potential ine¢ ciencies in target pollutant emissions market.
3.4.3 The Regulators Secondary Objective
As we mentioned above, there may exist external factors which are irrelevant to the
product and target pollutant emissions market, but nevertheless the regulator may
be interested in rms engaging in production of this external factor. If this is the
case, the regulator may have a primary objective of controlling emissions at lowest
social cost, as well as a secondary objective of increasing the aggregate amount of
the external factor, or its net benets.
One obvious example of multiple regulatory objectives is the double dividend
argument for the use of auctions for permit allocations. As Cramton and Kerr
(2002, p.335) suggest, a permit auction can raise revenue whilst enforcing emissions
control. This revenue can be used to reduce distortionary taxes in the economy (e.g.
Parry, 1997) or reduce the burden on auction participants through a revenue neutral
auction (Hahn and Noll, 1982; Hahn, 1988).
Alternatively, there can be two (non-competing) regulators with di¤erent objec-
tives. For example, the energy (electricity) industry may be required to participate
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in an emissions program whilst simultaneously being overseen by social/public policy
regulator to promote rmsanti-discriminatory personnel policies. The environmen-
tal policy regulator aims to control aggregate emissions at the lowest possible cost
and is not concerned about the size or cost of the external factor in any way. The
second regulator is possibly a social/public policy regulator whose aim is to max-
imise the aggregate external factor produced by the participating rms. Another
example of a double objective may be the regulation of two environmental targets,
with one target being controlled by target pollutant permit market, and another
target currently being unregulated - for example, emissions of CO2 and a basket of
other greenhouse gases. In any case, the secondary objective involves maximization
of rmsaggregate activities, expenditures, or e¤orts (for a similar objective see for
example Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).
As we argued above, one can achieve the socially optimal outcome in product
and target pollutant markets by allocating permits using an external factor only.
Therefore, using such an approach simultaneously achieves the primary target of
socially optimal outcome in the two markets and a secondary target of maximisation
of the aggregate external factor. Formally, let  2 (0; 1] represent the relative
importance of the primary target (emissions control), and let us consider the closed
system (the argument for the (small) open system will be only slightly di¤erent). In
this case, the combinedregulatory objective is:
Max
qit;eit;zit
X
t
nX
i=1
[(pitqit   cit(eit; qit))  (1 )zit] subject to
nX
i=1
eit = Et (3.17)
The rst order conditions for emissions and output are identical to the socially
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optimal equations (3.4) and (3.5). Moreover, this combined regulatory objective
allows for rmsindividually optimal choice of the external factor. It follows from
inspection of equations (3.7)-(3.9) and (3.17) that:
Remark 9 If a RPM is used to allocate permits based on a costly external factor
then a secondary (regulatory) target can be achieved whilst still achieving the socially
optimal outcome with respect to the target pollutant.
In other words, by allocating target pollutant permits among rms based on
their relative performance in a suitably chosen external factor, a regulator can kill
two birds with one stone by achieving emission control at the lowest social cost
in output and permit markets, and maximizing aggregate production of a socially
benecial external factor.
3.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the impact and optimality of implement-
ing a generalised (dynamic) relative performance mechanism for the initial allocation
of pollution permits. We extend the results of Böhringer and Lange (2005a) to ac-
commodate most of the existing dynamic initial allocation mechanisms, including
grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms, such as rank-order con-
tests. We show that using rmshistorical outputs for allocating permits is never
optimal, while using rmshistorical emissions is optimal only in closed trading sys-
tems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to
achieve social optimality by allocating permits based on an external factor which is
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independent of output and emissions. We outline su¢ cient conditions for a socially
optimal relative performance mechanism and discuss the issues related to the choice
of a suitable mechanism for initial allocation.
Due to these potential benets, we advocate using a relative performance mech-
anism with an external factor for the dynamic allocation of permits. The numerous
advantages of using a relative performance mechanism include its adaptability to
changing economic, technological, and other conditions, as well as a possibility of
transferring risk of possible systemic shocks (such as oil price changes) to the regu-
lator. The advantage of using an external factor involves a possibility of achieving
secondary regulatory goals, such as revenue maximization, social betterment or re-
duction in other environmental problems. Moreover, if the secondary goal is political
agreeable, the permit trading scheme may also enjoy greater public acceptance.
Allocating permits for a target pollutant based on rmsrelative performance
in external factor increases rmsexibility in meeting both regulatory goals by
choosing the most cost-e¤ective approach. That is, rms cost-e¤ective behaviour
may depend on whether it has comparative advantage in abatement of the target
pollutant, or in the production of the external factor. We think that such potential
asymmetries among rms are important for the optimal design of permit allocation
schemes, a topic of potential future research.
We also propose a novel allocation mechanism involving a rank-order contest,
which is a generalization of an all-pay auction. In an external factor rank-order
contest, rms are ranked in the order of their relative production of the external
factor, and it is rms rank, and not the level of the external factor, that determines
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rms permit allocation. As the theoretical literature suggests, an allocation scheme
with a suitably chosen prizestructure is expected to achieve the secondary goal
of maximizing aggregate production of the external factor - the goal which may
not be achievable with other allocation mechanisms. In other words, by allocating
target pollutant permits among rms using a rank-order contest in socially desirable
activities (including abatement of unregulated greenhouse gases or even charitable
activities) a regulator can kill two birds with one stone by achieving emission
control at the lowest social cost in output and permit markets, and maximizing
aggregate amount of a socially benecial activity.
The external factor rank-order contest has some advantages over the presently
used grandfathering scheme. While regulators seem to prefer grandfathering due to
its political agreeability among the regulated rms, these schemes can be unpopular
with the general public. In contrast, an external factor contest not only has a
potential of achieving social optimality, but also it achieves a secondary regulatory
goal (which may be perceived as achieving fairness), while the grandfathering
scheme involving historical output and emissions achieves none of these two goals.
While we have presented arguments in favour of using RPMs based on an exter-
nal factor in allocating permits, we nevertheless appreciate the potential practical
di¢ culties involving in the choice of a suitable external factor. The success of the
trading scheme rests on the regulators ability to nd an external factor that is de-
sirable, politically agreeable, independent from output and emissions, and allows for
an adequate comparison between rms. We nevertheless hope that the arguments
presented in this chapter may be of relevance to environmental policy makers.
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Chapter 4
Lobbying Activity in a Tradeable
Permit Market
4.1 Introduction
Tradeable permit markets, in principle, allow cost e¤ective pollution control (Mont-
gomery, 1972).1 As shown in Chapter 2, in a perfectly competitive permit market,
equilibrium e¢ ciency is independent from the choice of initial allocation as each
rm trades permits until their marginal abatement cost is equated to the permit
price. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is still an active debate about the
e¢ ciency properties associated with initial allocation mechanisms when permits are
allocated over multiple trading periods. This debate, however, has largely overlooked
a common phenomenon in existing tradeable permit markets namely, rm and/or
industry lobbying to obtain advantageous distribution rules and permit allocations
1This chapter has been adapted from MacKenzie et al. (2007b).
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(see for example, Svendsen, 1999; 2005). Firms and/or industries may lobby the
regulator to reduce their costs of regulation either by gaining larger permit alloca-
tions or by improvedtrading rules (e.g. allowing banking and borrowing, allowing
grandfathering instead of auctions). Yet very little is known theoretically about the
e¤ects of lobbying activity on the e¢ ciency of permit markets. We therefore aim to
explore analytically the consequences of lobbying in a tradeable permit market with
multiple periods.
In this chapter we model an initial permit allocation mechanism in a multi-
period setting when the allocation of permits is determined jointly by two factors:
the historical emissions of participating rms and the extent to which each rm
lobbies for additional permits.2 We denote the combination of the two activities
as rent-seeking activity. We show that distortions in the tradeable permit market
occur when the costs of rent-seeking (emissions and lobbying activity costs) are
separable (i.e. independent from each other). However, when the rent-seeking costs
are non-separable (i.e. interdependent), the least-cost equilibrium can be reached.
We also show, in the presence of lobbying activity, that a tradeable permit market
can maintain e¢ ciency when permits are distributed using static grandfathering
instead.
In our model, one of the key factors determining rmspermit allocations is their
historical emissions. Here, we refer to updated grandfathering as the free allocation of
permits based on historical emissions that are continually updated throughout time,
2Our analysis would also hold for alternative scenarios where, in addition to historical emissions,
the regulator bases permit allocations on some other activities (such as abating other pollutants
and so on), rather than on lobbying. While such scenarios are theoretically plausible (and would be
covered by our analysis), they do not capture the current situation in the existing permit markets.
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whilst lobbying activity is considered to be any legal or political activities of the rm
aimed at increasing their proportion of the permit allocation.3 The popular view in
the literature is that updated grandfathering is a politically viable distribution rule
because it mirrors changes in the output and emissions market by allowing recent
information about output and emissions to alter current period permit allocations,
such as altering permit allocation with respect to new entrants and plant closures
(Åhman et al. 2007). It is likely that some form of updated grandfathering will
exist in future periods of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) (Böhringer
and Lange, 2005a; Keats Martinez and Neuho¤, 2005; Bode, 2006; Rosendahl, 2006;
Neuho¤ et al. 2006). Updated grandfathering may also be a feature of a post-
Kyoto exible mechanisms for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. However, the
dynamic nature of updated grandfathering introduces additional complexities that
may reduce market e¢ ciency. Böhringer and Lange (2005a) have discussed updated
grandfathering nding that the dynamic allocation has to be carefully considered
to reduce distortions in the product and permit market. More recently, Rosendahl
(2006) extended the Böhringer and Lange (2005a) study by showing additional con-
ditions for rst best outcomes, and detailed the e¤ects on the permit price due to
the updated grandfathering system.
We also assume that rms can adjust the permit allocation obtained from the
grandfathering mechanism by investing in lobbying activity. The majority of liter-
ature analysing lobbying activity uses rent-seeking theory as rst formalised in the
seminal work of Tullock (1980). As shown by Tullock (1980), rent-seeking rms
3See Fischer (2001) for a static analysis of permit allocation based on output.
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dissipate some or all of the available rent and this has the possibility of creating
welfare losses. As discussed in Nitzan (1994), most subsequent studies attempt to
extend and apply the simple rent-seeking theory of Tullock (1980) to evermore com-
plicated and realistic situations. In contrast, the literature regarding environmental
policy lobbying, although well established, has generally avoided analysis incorpo-
rating theory of rent-seeking behaviour (Heyes, 1997; Michaelowa, 1998; Svendsen,
1999; Damania, 2001; Brandt and Svendsen, 2004; Hanoteau, 2005; Markussen and
Svendsen, 2005; Svendsen, 2005; Malueg and Yates, 2006). Two broad directions
of research are followed instead. The rst concentrates on environmental policy
choice, for instance, Svendsen (1999) and Damania (2001) analyse lobbying activity
for the choice of an environmental instrument (emissions trading versus emissions
standards). Second, lobbying activity has been modelled by Brandt and Svendsen
(2004), Markussen and Svendsen, (2005) and Svendsen (2005) to show the e¤ects of
lobbying in determining the allocation rule and market design in the EU emissions
trading scheme. Similarly, Hanoteau (2005) analyses a permit market where a reg-
ulator determines the choice of allocation rule and emissions cap and nds that the
choice of distribution rule is important as this a¤ects industry lobbying activity and
as a result, the aggregate emissions cap.
A common aspect in the majority of literature is the assumption that lobbying
activity only exists prior to policy implementation. Firms and industries lobby to
obtain advantageous allocation rules and permit market designs before the scheme
begins. However, as our chapters suggests, it is apparent that when a tradeable
permit market is operational, lobbying activity can, and most likely will, continue to
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play a prominent role in the determination of permit distributions and the aggregate
emissions cap in each period.
In a perfectly competitive permit market, e¢ ciency at the equilibrium outcome
has been shown to be independent of the choice of initial allocation (Montgomery,
1972; Tietenberg, 1985). However, many studies, by relaxing the assumption of a
perfectly competitive permit market, have shown links between the initial allocation
of permits and e¢ ciency at the market equilibrium. As explained in Chapter 3, the
initial allocation of permits has consequences for the market e¢ ciency when there
are: strategic and imperfectly competitive rm behaviour (Hahn 1984; Misiolek and
Elder 1989); transaction costs (Stavins, 1995) and multiple periods (Böhringer and
Lange 2005a). Yet few studies have attempted to analyse lobbying activity in this
least-costcontext something this chapter aims to achieve. Recently, Lai (2007)
formally analysed the social welfare consequences when rms and environmental
groups lobby over the determination of an aggregate emissions cap and nds grand-
fathering may be more e¢ cient than auctioning. However, no allowance is made
for rms to lobby to obtain an individually larger permit allocation, irrespective
of whether the permit cap increases or not. Indeed in Lais (2007) analysis, the
permit market equilibrium is found to be least-costwith no distortions altering
rmsabatement choices. To the best of our knowledge, no study has thus inquired
into the post-implementation aspects of lobbying activity in a permit market where
the allocation rule has already been determined and rms use political activities to
increase their own permit allocation. Also, no studies formally analyse the interac-
tions between rms that are competing for a proportion of an aggregate emissions
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cap. Indeed, there has been no analysis on the consequences for permit market
e¢ ciency in the presence of lobbying activity. This, then, is our contribution to the
literature.
We begin from a situation where a regulator has implemented an emissions trad-
ing scheme with updating grandfathering as the main allocation mechanism. Each
rm will obtain a distribution of permits through a grandfathering mechanism and
lobbying activity. Our multi-period, partial equilibrium model allows the regulator
to allocate permits to rms based jointly on their previous emissions and lobbying
activity levels relative to every other rm using a permit allocation rule which is for-
mally similar to a Contest Success function (CSF) (Tullock, 1980; Skaperdas, 1996,
Groenenberg and Blok, 2002; Bode, 2006). Note that we do not consider the wider
welfare implications of lobbying activity here, focusing solely on the permit market.
Two papers are particularly relevant for our argument namely, Böhringer and
Lange (2005a) and Chung (1996). Böhringer and Lange (2005a) compare the e¢ -
ciency of a multi-period permit allocation based on output, emissions and a lump-
sum transfer. They nd in a closed market (i.e. when participating rms cannot
trade in permits outside the domestic market) that it is optimal to allocate permits
on criteria not related to output, whereas for an open market (i.e. when rms can
trade outside the domestic market), an e¢ cient allocation occurs when the permits
are distributed using a lump-sum approach. Our model uses a similar framework
for the multiple trading periods but introduces lobbying activity as a determinant
of the permit allocation and allows the absolute aggregate emissions cap to change.
Chung (1996) extends a Tullock-style rent-seeking contest model to include a rent
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that is endogenously determined by aggregate e¤orts, that is, the rent increases with
aggregate e¤ort. He nds that the extended contest generates excessive e¤ort levels
which are socially wasteful. We use the concept of an endogenously determined
prizeto investigate the e¤ects of lobbying on a tradeable permit market.
Following Chung (1996), we extend the basic model to allow a regulator to be
inuenced by the aggregate lobbying activity in the permit market. Consequently,
the regulator can be persuadedinto increasing the aggregate emissions cap when
aggregate rent-seeking activity increases. We allow the aggregate emissions cap to
be non-responsive (i.e. exogenous) and responsive (i.e. endogenous) to aggregate
lobbying activity. We nd that market e¢ ciency is not altered by the type of
aggregate emissions cap, however social welfare is reduced when the emissions cap
is endogenous. Interestingly, this reduction in welfare also exists for a market with
static grandfathering.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 outlines the model, while sec-
tion 4.3 presents the benchmark model of updated grandfathering with a xed ag-
gregate cap. Section 4.4 contains the main results on the e¢ cient allocation rule
based on rent-seeking activity, where the costs of rent-seeking are separable and
non-separable. Section 4.5 explores the e¤ects of exogenous vs. endogenous aggre-
gate emissions cap, while section 4.6 is devoted to situation where the allocation is
based on lobbying activity only. Section 4.7 details some policy implications of the
analytical model, and the last section concludes.
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4.2 The Basic Model
Consider a set of rms  = f1; : : : ; Ng that participate in a competitive tradeable
emissions market in order to control a pollutant over an innite time horizon (t =
1; 2; : : :). Firms di¤er in their abatement costs, so that rm i has cost function cit(eit)
with c0it  0; c00it  0 for i 2 . It is well-known that the emissions permit trading
outcome controls a specied level of pollution at least-cost (or it is allocatively
e¢ cient) if rmsmarginal cost of emissions are equated, i.e.
dcit
deit
=
dcjt
dejt
8 i 2 ; j 2 nfig; 8 t (4.1)
otherwise the outcome is distortionary (e.g. Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1985).
Thus, the question of interest to us is how to allocate permits in a non-distortionary
way.
To create a realistic allocation mechanism, let us suppose that permits are distrib-
uted in accordance with two key determinants. Firstly, rms obtain permits through
an updated grandfathering scheme in which each rm receives a free allocation of
current period permits based on a previous periods emissions level (Böhringer and
Lange, 2005a; Keats and Neuho¤, 2005; Bode, 2006). Therefore, the rms baseline
allocation will be updatedas time progresses. Secondly, rms can alter their cur-
rent period permit allocation by investing in a previous periods lobbying activity 
the use of political activities, persuasion, and so on, to increase their permit alloca-
tion by inuencing the regulators decisions (see for example, Brandt and Svendsen,
2004; Svendsen, 2005; Hanoteau, 2005; Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; Malueg and
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Yates, 2006; Lai, 2007).4
We assume that the tradeable permit market has already been implemented,
with the initial permit allocation (at time t = 0) to be exogenously determined by
means of auctioning or grandfathering. Assume that the timeline of decisions is
as follows. In period t   1, rm i selects a level of emissions ei(t 1) and lobbying
activity (si(t 1)) which will become common knowledge in period t.5 As a result,
the regulator allocates period t permits to each rm based on their size of historical
emissions and lobbying activity relative to every other participating rm.6
It seems to be plausible that, when grandfathering is implemented, both a rms
choice of historical emissions and lobbying activity, combined, determine the permit
allocation it receives. To capture this possibility, we assume that, when a regulator
makes a decision about rm is permit allocation, the regulator responds to the
combination of rm is choice of net emissions and its lobbying activity. More
specically, the regulator views historical emissions and lobbying as two elements of
xit = xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1)) which represents rent-seeking activity of rm i with historical
emissions ei(t 1) and lobbying si(t 1). We initially assume that the costs of emissions
and lobbying activity are separable (independent from each other) so that the cost
of lobbying activity is vit(sit) with v0it > 0, v
00
it  0 and vit(0) = 0. The relaxation of
this assumption will be discussed later.
Assuming no permit banking and/or borrowing exists no transfer of permits
4This model only considers legal forms of lobbying activity, illegal activities such as bribery and
corruption are not considered.
5The model bases permit allocations on one period of historical emissions for analytical tractabil-
ity, but similar results can be found when extended to multiple historical periods.
6A similar result occurs when current period (sit) lobbying is used instead of historical levels
(si(t 1)).
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between separate time periods and focusing only on the permit market, each rm
maximises (minimises) the prot (cost) in the permit market for each period by
choosing suitable levels of lobbying activity and emissions. Formally, given a period
t permit price pt and the discount factor , rm is objective is:
max
eit;sit
i =
X
t
t

pt(ait(xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1)))  eit)  cit(eit)  vit(sit)

(4.2)
where ait(xit) is the regulators allocation of period t permits to rm i. Intuitively,
each rm wants to maximise the sale of permits to the market whilst minimising
the costs of emissions abatement and lobbying activity.
We further assume that each rms permit allocation is determined by how its
rent-seeking activity compares to that of other participating rms, i.e.
ait =
xit
xit +
P
j2nfig xjt
 Et (4.3)
for i 2 , j 2 nfig where x is rent-seeking action and Et is the total permit supply
issued by the regulator at time t. From equation (4.3), it is clear rm i receives a
permit allocation in period t equal to a proportion of the aggregate emissions cap
and this proportion is determined by its combined lobbying and emissions relative
to every other rm. This mechanism captures the realistic scenario that rms will
be allocated permits based on historical emissions but they also have an ability
to inuence the regulators nal decision by investing in lobbying activity (see for
example, Grubb et al. 2005).
Notice that this formulation of the permit allocation, ait, is formally similar
116
to a Contest Success Function (CSF) (Tullock, 1980; Skaperdas, 1996), commonly
used in the literature on lobbying. Typically, a CSF describes the probability of
rm i winning a single indivisible prizebased on how its lobbying activity stands
relatively to that of other rms. Here, instead, we assume that a total pie of
permits is divided into multiple permit allocations based on how each rms rent-
seeking activity stands relatively to that of other rms.7 This method allows a clear
explanation of how permits can be distributed amongst rms with respect to any
relative choice of emissions and lobbying activity.
Notice that this formulation allows for two special cases. The rst case is grandfa-
thering with a xed cap, which distributes a xed allocation of permits (the reward)
using each rms relative choices of historical emissions. That is, a rm will receive a
proportion of the aggregate cap based on their historical emissions relative to every
other rm (see for example, Groenenberg and Blok 2002; Bode, 2006). The second
case is purelobbying, when a permit allocation can be distributed amongst rms
using the relative lobbying activities of each rm compared to others in the permit
market. Both special cases will be discussed later.
We also allow for the possibility that the aggregate emissions cap Et is endoge-
nously determined with respect to aggregate rent-seeking activity (Chung, 1996), i.e.
that the aggregate emissions cap may increase when aggregate rent-seeking activity
increases:
Et = At  (
X
i2
xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1))) t (4.4)
where At is some xedaggregate emissions cap and  t 2 [0; 1) models the regu-
7Imperfectly discriminating contests with multiple prizes have been investigated by Van Long
and Vousden (1987), Berry (1993) and Clark and Riis (1996).
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lators responsiveness towards aggregate rent-seeking activity at time t (we assume
that
P
i2 xit > 1). To reach the socially optimal level of pollution, the regulator se-
lects the xedaggregate emissions cap ( At) so that the marginal benet is equated
to the marginal damage of pollution, B0(At) = D0(At) where B0(:), D0(:), D00(:) > 0
and B00(:),< 0. The regulators responsiveness,  t, determines to what extent ag-
gregate rent-seeking activity a¤ects the aggregate emissions cap. The range of  t is
chosen so that the aggregate emissions cap can capture two realistic situations. The
rst one is a xed cap ( t = 0) and the second one is an emissions cap where an
increase in aggregate lobbying e¤ort increases the emissions cap at a decreasing rate
(0 <  t < 1) implying diminishing returns from aggregate lobbying e¤ort (Chung,
1996).
4.3 Benchmark Model: Updated Grandfathering
To aid comparison between a permit market with and without rent-seeking, consider
a benchmark case where permits are allocated amongst the rms using an updated
grandfathering system with a xed aggregate emissions cap without any lobbying
activity. That is, each rm obtains a permit allocation in period t based only on how
its previous emissions (ei(t 1)) stand relative to that of every other rm. For this
benchmark case, we also assume that the total emissions cap Et is xed at time t,
i.e. Et = At. Without lobbying activity, equation (4.2) gives the following objective
function for rm i:
max
eit
i =
X
t
t

pt(ait(ei(t 1))  eit)  cit(eit)

for i 2  (4.5)
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where the permit allocation ait is given by:
ait =
ei(t 1)
ei(t 1) +
P
j2nfig ej(t 1)
 At (4.6)
where At is again, the strictly xed, non-zero, absolute aggregate emissions cap in
time period t. The rst-order condition is:8
pt   pt+1@ai(t+1)(eit)
@eit| {z }
Distortion
=  dcit
deit
(4.7)
where
@ai(t+1)(eit)
@eit
= At+1 
P
j2nfig ejt
eit +
P
j2nfig ejt
2 (4.8)
From equation (4.8), rm is permit allocation is dependent on its proportion of
emissions with respect to every other rm in the previous period and the aggre-
gate emissions cap, and thus each rm makes its decision strategically. Due to the
updating grandfathering process, each rms choice of Nash equilibrium emissions
depends on the expected future permit allocation value, the current period permit
price and own marginal abatement cost, as well as other rmsequilibrium choices.
Comparing this rst order condition to the least-cost condition (4.1), it can be ob-
served that each rm has a distortionary incentive to increase emissions, as their
choice of current period emissions will determine future allocations (Böhringer and
Lange, 2005a). From equation (4.7), the equalisation of marginal abatement costs
across all rms only occurs in the unlikely event of eit  ejt for 8t; i 2  and
8It can easily be shown that @
2
@e2it
< 0.
119
j 2 nfig. Therefore, the use of an updated grandfathering mechanism to allocate
permits in a tradeable permit market is ine¢ cient (not least-cost) (Böhringer and
Lange, 2005a).
4.4 Permit Allocation with Rent-Seeking Activ-
ity
We now consider a more realistic, but also more complex, case when rms permit al-
location depends on its relative level of rent-seeking activity, xit = xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1)).
That is, each rm can alter its permit allocation by adjusting the level of emissions
and lobbying activity. We make a distinction between two cases: separable and
non-separable costs of rent-seeking. Separable rent-seeking costs allow both the cost
of emissions and lobbying activity to vary independently of each other, whereas
non-separable costs of emissions and lobbying activity are interdependent.
4.4.1 Separable Rent-Seeking Costs
Suppose that rm i has separable costs of rent-seeking so that the costs of emissions
and lobbying activity are independent. Firm is maximisation problem will then
be determined by its objective function (4.2), allocation rule (4.3), and aggregate
emissions cap (4.4). Thus, rm is optimal choices of emissions eit and lobbying sit
for all t will be given by the following system of rst order conditions:
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 tpt   t dcit
deit
+ t+1pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@eit| {z }
Distortion
= 0 (4.9)
t+1pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@sit
  tdvit
dsit
= 0 (4.10)
where
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
=
P
j2nfig xj(t+1)
(xi(t+1) +
P
j2nfig xj(t+1))
2
 A(t+1)  (
X
i2
xi(t+1))
 (t+1) (4.11)
+
xi(t+1)
xi(t+1) +
P
j2nfig xj(t+1)
 A(t+1)   (t+1)  (
X
i2
xi(t+1))
 (t+1) 1
That is, rm i selects a level of emissions to equate their marginal abatement
cost with the permit price plus an additional distortionary term (Böhringer and
Lange, 2005a). The distortionary term is e¤ectively the net benet obtained by
choosing a particular level of rent-seeking. This distortionary term includes the
future expected allocation of permits pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
and the marginal return in rent-
seeking given a change in emissions
@xi(t+1)
@eit
.
To examine the distortion in the emissions market, let us rearrange equations
(4.9) and (4.10) as follows:9
9To ensure optimality, we assume @
2xi(t+1)
@e2it
;
@2xi(t+1)
@s2it
 0 and @
2xi(t+1)
@e2it
 @
2xi(t+1)
@s2it
 

@2xi(t+1)
@eit@sit
2

0.
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pt   pt+1 @ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@eit
=  dcit
deit
(4.12)
pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@sit
=
dvit
dsit
(4.13)
Substituting equation (4.13) into (4.12) gives:
pt   dvit
dsit

 @xi(t+1)
@eit
@xi(t+1)
@sit
!
=  dcit
deit
(4.14)
where
@xi(t+1)
@eit
@xi(t+1)
@sit
is the technical rate of substitution between current period emis-
sions and lobbying activity. From equations (4.12) and (4.14) it follows that:
Proposition 10 Given rms separable rent-seeking costs and a positive level of
rent-seeking activity the tradeable permit market does not reach the least-cost equi-
librium.
From Proposition (10), as long as the marginal cost of lobbying and the marginal
return from emissions and lobbying activity are positive then an incentive exists for
rm i to increase emissions above the least-cost level. In comparison, from equation
(4.14), when
@xi(t+1)
@eit
= 0 (i.e. if rent-seeking does not depend on past emissions),
there is no distortionary incentive to increase emissions and the permit market is
least-cost as shown in equation (4.1) (we discuss this later in section (4.6)).
In the benchmark model, the distortion was created as the level of current period
emissions altered the rms future permit allocation. In comparison, when lobbying
activity is introduced, the distortionary choice in emissions still exists but now it
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is dependent on the marginal costs of lobbying and the rms relationship between
future rent-seeking, emissions and lobbying activity. To summarise, in the presence
of lobbying activity, a permit market that uses an updated grandfathering allocation
mechanism (and where costs are separable) does not reach the least-cost equilibrium.
4.4.2 Non-separable Rent-seeking Costs
We assume now that the costs of rent-seeking are not separable. In certain circum-
stances it may be benecial to consider the cases where, for instance, a regulator
believes a large polluter nds lobbying relatively cheaper to implement than a
smallpolluter, say due to internal organisational structures. In other words, in
equation (4.2) we can substitute vit(sit), the costs of lobbying activity, for a cost
of rent-seeking given by it(xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1))) with
@it
@xit
> 0; @
2it
@x2it
 0. Assume
also that it(xit(ei(t 1); 0))  0, i.e. when a rm does not engage into lobbying, its
rent-seeking cost is zero.
Firm is maximisation problem is determined by substituting the new cost func-
tion for rent-seeking (it(xit)) into equation (4.2) along with equations from the
previous subsection for the allocation rule (4.3) and aggregate emissions cap (4.4).
Thus, rm is optimal choices of emissions eit and lobbying sit for all t will be given
by the following system of rst order conditions:
 tpt   t dcit
deit
+ t+1pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@eit
  t+1@i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@eit| {z }
Distortion
= 0 (4.15)
t+1pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@sit
  t+1@i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
@sit
= 0 (4.16)
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where
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
is given in equation (4.11). Similar to the previous section, rm i
selects a level of emissions to equate their marginal abatement cost with the permit
price plus an additional distortionary term.
Let us rearrange equation (4.15) as follows:
pt   

pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
  @i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)

@xi(t+1)
@eit| {z }
Distortion
=  dcit
deit
(4.17)
That is, the distortionary term has two components - rst, the marginal return in
rent-seeking given a change in emissions
@xi(t+1)
@eit
, and second, the currently antici-
pated marginal return to future rent-seeking pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
  @i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
.
Again, notice that if
@xi(t+1)
@eit
 0 the distortion is zero. As we argued above,
if permit allocation depends on past emissions and lobbying with separable costs
then the distortion will persist. Surprisingly, however, if rms permit allocation
is determined jointly by past emissions and current lobbying via rent-seeking (non-
separable costs), a permit allocation may be non-distortional provided that the
regulator announces a pre-specied rule that fusesrmschoices of emissions and
lobbying into rent-seeking, which, in turn, is used to allocate permits in a pre-
specied way. In other words, the potential ine¢ ciency in the permit market is
drawn outby lobbying activity.
To see this, recall that current emissions a¤ects the level of rent-seeking, and
consider rm is current-period lobbying decision. Rearranging equation (4.16) gives:


pt+1
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
  @i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)

@xi(t+1)
@sit
= 0 (4.18)
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That is, given the permit allocation rule, rm i anticipates that given its optimal
choice of current emissions eit, it will choose optimally lobbying s

it, so that the two
choices will be combined to determine the next-period rent-seeking level xi(t+1), and
thus its next-period permit allocation ai(t+1).
If both emissions and lobbying play a pre-specied role in determining allocation
via rent-seeking then notice that, from equation (4.18) rm is optimal choice of sit
implies that
p(t+1)
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
=
@i(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
for i 2 ; 8 t (4.19)
so that each rm, in each time period, will choose a level of rent-seeking activity
xi(t+1) to equate their marginal expected permit allocation to their marginal cost of
rent-seeking activity. In turn, this condition implies that the rst order condition
for emissions (4.15) (and thus equation (4.17) as well), reduces to
pt =  dcit
deit
(4.20)
which is a non-distortionary outcome! That is, when making an emissions choice at
time t, the rm takes into account its use of optimal lobbying, and, as the result,
this emissions choice turns out to be non-distortionary, resulting in an (allocatively)
e¢ cient tradeable permit market.
Proposition 11 Given an allocation rule that uses the past choice of updated emis-
sions and lobbying activity where the costs of rent-seeking are non-separable in emis-
sions and lobbying then the tradeable permit market reaches the least-cost equilib-
rium.
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Proposition 11 is counter-intuitive as it suggests that when permit allocations
depend on past emissions, lobbying activity can actually improve e¢ ciency in a
tradeable permit market as long as the costs of rent-seeking are non-separable. We
are not suggesting that lobbying activity is e¢ cient or desirable by itself. Instead,
we show that the distortions arising from updated grandfathering schemes may be
corrected by fusing lobbying with updated historical emissions. The existence
of lobbying activity draws out the ine¢ ciency from the choice of emissions and
focuses it on a choice of legitimate lobbying activity. Simply put, rms can sub-
stitute lobbying activity for historical emissions. In contrast, as the benchmark
model shows, updated grandfathering, where no lobbying activity exists, is ine¢ -
cient because the only possible method to obtain a larger proportion of permits is to
increase current period emissions. Therefore, it follows that fusing historical emis-
sions with historical lobbying activity allows (allocative) e¢ ciency to be maintained
in the permit market by allowing rms two methods to achieve their desired permit
allocation.
4.5 Exogenous and Endogenous Aggregate Emis-
sions Caps
In the last section, we found that the e¢ ciency in a tradeable permit market with
updated grandfathering and lobbying activity depends on the relationship between
the costs of rent-seeking. Assuming separable costs between emissions and lobbying
activity results in distortions being created in the permit market. However, when
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the costs are fused(i.e. non-separable) into combined rent-seeking activity it is
possible that the tradeable permit market is least-cost. This is in contrast to the
benchmark model that showed distortions in the permit market exist because of
the use of an updated grandfathering allocation mechanism without any lobbying
activity. In this section, we explore the potential consequences of the responsiveness
of the regulator to aggregate rent-seeking activity. We begin by discussing the
exogenous (or xed) aggregate emissions cap.
Observe that, as equation (4.11) shows, on the margin, there are two e¤ects from
a unit increase in rent-seeking activity. The rst term in equation (4.11) represents
rms marginal permit gain given the size of the permit pie, and the second term
represents the e¤ect of rms rent-seeking activity on the size of the total permit
pie.
When the regulator is unresponsive to aggregate rent-seeking ( t = 0), the
aggregate emissions cap is exogenous. Although the lobbying activity does not
alter the cap, it is still being used by the regulator to distribute permits among
the participating rms. For both types of rent-seeking costs, when the aggregate
emissions cap is xed, the socially optimal level of pollution is produced (B0(At) =
D0(At)).10
When the costs of rent-seeking are separable, rm is level of optimal rent-seeking
is found by substituting  t = 0 into equation (4.11) and substituting into equations
(4.12) and (4.13) where xi(t+1) is found by the (independent) choice of emissions and
10As explained earlier, we do not explicitly analyse welfare consequences of rent-seeking activity
for the wider economy (Lai, 2007). However, it is implicit in our analysis that lobbying activity in
general is welfare reducing. What is important, from our analysis, is that we consider the direction
of welfare changes from an exogenous to endogenous aggregate emissions cap.
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lobbying activity so that xi(t+1) = (e

it; s

it). As shown in section (4.4), distortions
exist in the tradeable market.
For non-separable rent-seeking costs, to nd the level of rent-seeking when the
aggregate cap is exogenous, again we substitute  t = 0 into equation (4.11) to
get the future marginal change in allocation given a change in future rent-seeking,
@ai(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
. Substituting this into equation (4.19) reveals that the optimal level of future
rent-seeking activity must satisfy:
p(t+1)
P
j2nfig xj(t+1)
(xi(t+1) +
P
j2nfig xj(t+1))
2
A(t+1) =
@vi(t+1)
@xi(t+1)
(4.21)
From section (4.4), the tradeable permit market can reach the least-cost equilib-
rium outcome.
However, an exogenously determined aggregate emissions cap, although promi-
nent in theoretical discussions of emissions trading, is unrealistic in many scenarios,
as the aggregate emissions cap is often altered by a regulator in response to rms
lobbying activity and emissions choices. For instance, in the EU-ETS phase I al-
location, the majority of member states allocated more permits than the market
required, due partly to industrial lobbying activity and the large emissions of par-
ticipating rms (Grubb et al. 2005 p128).
We now model a situation where the aggregate emissions cap depends on rent-
seeking activity. Allowing  t 2 (0; 1) illustrates a realistic scenario of the regulator
allowing the emissions cap for the market to increase at a non-increasing rate in
response to aggregate lobbying activity (see Chung, 1996). Intuitively, the regulator,
after observing the total rent-seeking activity, may be persuaded to increase the
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aggregate permit cap if they become convinced that the cap is too small and that
the costs of meeting this reduction in pollution will be too large. A rms choice of
emissions and lobbying will determine not only their own share of permit allocation,
but will also a¤ect the size of the aggregate permit pie (which is the aggregate
emissions cap).
For rent-seeking costs that are separable, substituting  t 2 (0; 1) into equation
(4.11) and substituting equation (4.11) into equations (4.12) and (4.13) gives the
optimal levels of emissions and lobbying activity when the aggregate emissions cap is
endogenously determined by rent-seeking activity. Similar to the exogenous cap, the
optimal level of rent-seeking activity rm i will choose, when the cap is endogenous,
depends on xi(t+1) = (e

it; s

it). Note the distortions in the tradeable permit market
continue to exist with an endogenous cap.
For the case with non-separable rent-seeking costs, similar to above, given the
allocation rule, and using  t 2 (0; 1), we get
p(t+1)
2664
P
j2nfig xj(t+1)
(xi(t+1)+
P
j2nfig xj(t+1))2
 A(t+1)  (
P
i2 xi(t+1))
 (t+1)
+
xi(t+1)
xi(t+1)+
P
j2nfig xj(t+1)
 A(t+1)   (t+1)  (
P
i2 xi(t+1))
 (t+1) 1
3775 = @vi(t+1)@xi(t+1)
(4.22)
For both types of rent-seeking costs, holding everything else constant, direct com-
parison of the choice of rent-seeking under an exogenous and endogenous cap reveals
that when rent-seeking can alter the aggregate emissions cap, then there is an in-
centive to increase lobbying and emissions. Moreover, the more responsive the
regulator is to aggregate rent-seeking activity ( (t+1)), the more rms increase their
rent-seeking activity. The intuition is fairly clear, the more the regulator is known to
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respond to rent-seeking activity, the more each rm will increase their rent-seeking
to obtain a larger permit allocation. Yet the optimal choice of rent-seeking is chosen
so that the tradeable permit market is e¢ cient.
Furthermore, in contrast to the exogenous cap, when the aggregate emissions
cap is endogenous, the supply of permits increases, resulting in a lower permit
price, and higher emissions. This has direct consequences for social welfare. Recall
that the regulators choice of xed cap was based on equating the marginal benet
and damage of pollution. It then follows that when aggregate rent-seeking activity
increases the aggregate emissions cap, social welfare is reduced (B0(Et) < D0(Et)).
In summary:
Corollary 12 Given the regulator uses an allocation rule based on historical emis-
sions and lobbying, allowing for an endogenously determined aggregate emissions cap
reduces social welfare, however permit market e¢ ciency is invariant to the permit
cap.
4.6 Lobbying Activity as the Only Allocation De-
terminant
In the last section we considered the case where a rms permit allocation was
determined by both historical emissions and lobbying activity. In this section we
consider a simpler case where the rent-seeking of each rm is a function of lobbying
activity, xit = xit(si(t 1)) and we assume that this is independent from the choice
of emissions (we assume @xit
@ei(t 1)
 0; @xit
@si(t 1)
> 0 8 i; t). This then means that
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the allocation of permits to each rm will depend only on their relative choice of
historical lobbying activity.
It is important to note that this section and all the results associated with it
illustrate the outcome of static (pure) grandfathering, where the only emissions
level that a¤ects rm is permit allocation is the historical emissions level chosen
before the permit scheme started. In a static grandfathering allocation system with
lobbying activity, rm is rent-seeking term is xit = xit(~ei; si(t 1)) where ~ei is the
historical emissions chosen before the start of the permit scheme, which is thus not
a decision variable in the current period. Therefore, although rm i obtains an
allocation based on ~ei in each period, the allocation can adjust due to the rms
historical lobbying activity relative to every other rm. In summary:
Remark 13 A tradeable permit market with static grandfathering allocation and
lobbying activity is represented by xit = xit(si(t 1)).
In this case, from equation (4.2) replace xit(ei(t 1); si(t 1)) with xit = xit(si(t 1))
and it follows that rm is optimal choices are as follows:11
pt =  dcit(eit)
deit
(4.23)
pt+1
dai(t+1)
dxi(t+1)
dxi(t+1)
dsit
=
dvit
dsit
(4.24)
where
dai(t+1)
dxi(t+1)
is similar to that in equation (4.11). Firm i chooses eit so that equation
(4.23) holds and given xit, rm i selects s

it so that x

it = xit(s

it). In contrast from
11A similar rst order condition occurs when we alter the cost of rent-seeking in equation (4.2).
In other words, the cost of rent seeking would be it(xit(si(t 1))). This produces the rst order
condition 0 = 
h
pt+1
dai(t+1)
dxi(t+1)
  di(t+1)dxi(t+1)
i
dxi(t+1)
dsit
131
section (4.4), the level of emissions is now independently chosen from the level of
rent-seeking. From equation (4.23) it is immediate that:
Proposition 14 If allocation is determined by lobbying activity only, xit = xit(si(t 1)),
then the tradeable permit market achieves the least-cost equilibrium.
A commonly held view in the literature is that lobbying activity from rms are
a set of wasteful actions that are used to distort the permit market, either through
altering the permit market structure or trading rules (for example, Svendsen, 2005).
If lobbying activity is the only determinant in permit allocation and is independent
from emissions, then the actions have no a¤ect on the permit market e¢ ciency.
Again, we do not suggest that lobbying activity is desirable or e¢ cient in itself,
rather that the deadweight loss created by the use of wasteful lobbying activity does
not alter the permit market cost-e¢ ciency.
We showed in section 4.3 that an updated grandfathering scheme with no lob-
bying creates intertemporal distortionary incentives to emit. In comparison, given
xit = xit(si(t 1)), it is clear from Proposition 14 that there is no distortionary incen-
tive to emit here. The permit allocation to each rm is now independent of the level
of emissions within the period of operation of the permit market and hence there is
no incentive for any rm to increase emissions over and above the optimal choice at
equilibrium.
Similar to section 4.5, it is possible to model both an exogenous ( t = 0) and
endogenous ( t 2 (0; 1)) aggregate emissions cap. Under an endogenous permit cap,
similar to section 4.5, emissions will increase as the permit supply increases and as a
result, social welfare is reduced. However, unlike the previous (non-separable cost)
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case, the level of lobbying is independent of emissions so that lobbying activity
is selected by xit = xit(si(t 1)). Again, we do not suggest that lobbying activity
is desirable and do not consider the welfare consequences for a xed permit cap,
but allowing an endogenous aggregate emissions cap may reduce welfare to a larger
extent than when an exogenous permit cap is implemented (as the marginal benets
and damages are no longer equated under an endogenously determined permit cap).
Equation (4.23) shows that the choice of current period emissions (eit) is inde-
pendent from the optimal level of future rent-seeking (xit). It follows that rm i
then chooses a level of current period emissions to equate its marginal abatement
cost with the permit price with no consideration of what lobbying is chosen.
As the relationship between lobbying and current period emissions no longer
exists, it implies that the regulators future permit allocation rule will not distort
rmschoices of emissions. In other words:
Corollary 15 Under a static grandfathering market with lobbying activity, the trade-
able permit market reaches the least-cost equilibrium. However, welfare is reduced if
an endogenously determined aggregate emissions cap is implemented.
4.7 Policy Implications
The analysis in this chapter suggests that di¤erent relationships between the rent-
seeking costs of emissions reductions and lobbying may have di¤erent incentives for
rms behaviour, and thus are important for policy making. It was noted that,
when tradeable permits are distributed using updated grandfathering, then distor-
tions occur in the permit market. A similar distortion is present when updated
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grandfathering and lobbying activity are combined, where the costs of rent-seeking
are separable. Yet when the cost of rent-seeking is assumed to be non-separable
then the updated grandfathering process is fusedwith lobbying activity and mar-
ket e¢ ciency may be maintained. Due to this information, rms plan future levels
of rent-seeking activity and then begin to optimally choose current period emissions
and lobbying activity. It was also noted that the use of static grandfathering created
no distortions in the tradeable permit market. However, for all types of allocation,
if the regulator is responsive to aggregate rent-seeking (i.e. the aggregate emissions
cap is endogenous) then social welfare is reduced assuming the cap is initially set
optimally.
When the regulators sole objective is to maintain e¢ ciency in the tradeable
permit market, the use of updated grandfathering should only be considered as
a feasible allocation mechanism when the regulator considers the rms costs of
rent-seeking to be non-separable. On the other hand, static grandfathering reduces
the incentive to increase current period emissions for a larger future period permit
allocation. Moreover, if the regulator adjusts the aggregate emissions cap due to
pressure from aggregate rent-seeking then, welfare is reduced as a higher level of
emissions exists than is socially optimal (yet permit market e¢ ciency is invariant).
Considering existing tradeable permit markets, such as the EU-ETS, it is most
likely that rent-seeking activity will not only redistribute allocation amongst rms
but also increase the aggregate emissions cap and thereby reduce welfare. Therefore,
it is imperative that regulators must put in place mechanisms and procedures that
credibly commit themselves to specic permit allocations and exogenous aggregate
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emissions caps. We leave this mechanism design problem for future work.
Although auctioning and other lump-sum methods of allocation may be desirable
from the perspective of e¢ ciency, if the regulator wants to distribute permits for free,
it should focus on using static grandfathering, as using updated grandfathering in
the presence of lobbying activity may induce distortionary incentives in the tradeable
permit market.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact and optimality of a multiple
period permit market when rms lobby the regulator to obtain a larger permit
allocation. In the model, the regulator distributed permits amongst rms based
on their historically updated emissions. However, each rm may a¤ect its permit
allocation by investing in lobbying activity, persuading the regulator to increase
their permit allocation. We discussed cases where historical emissions and lobbying
activity combined to produce a signal for the regulator to distribute permits and
when only lobbying activity determined permit allocation (static grandfathering).
Within these two cases we made a distinction with respect to the aggregate emissions
cap. The rst case restricted rent-seeking activity to alter the distribution among
the rms, that is, the aggregate emissions cap was exogenously xed in the market.
The second case additionally dealt with the possibility that aggregate rent-seeking
activity could, to some extent, alter the aggregate emissions cap. In our model,
rmscooperation in lobbying activity is not necessary for a larger emissions cap. For
instance, this could occur when there is industry-wide condemnation of a regulators
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announced aggregate emissions cap, such as happened in the phase I allocation
process EU-ETS of the UK government and other member states.
We initially show that a market that allocates permits through updated grandfa-
thering and lobbying activity, where the costs are separable, can experience reduced
permit market e¢ ciency. Yet when the costs are assumed to be non-separable, e¢ -
ciency in the permit market may be maintained. We allowed the absolute aggregate
emissions cap to be exogenous and then endogenous to the level of aggregate rent-
seeking - however, when the regulator is responsive to the lobbying activity, welfare
is reduced.
From the regulators perspective, if it believes that it cannot credible commit to
a future allocation rule which is unresponsive to aggregate rent-seeking activity, it
should avoid updated grandfathering and instead grandfather permits in the static
form (or even better auction the permits).
This chapter has focused on the equilibrium conditions and market e¢ ciency
levels in a permit market where lobbying activity with an updated grandfathering
allocation combines to signal to the regulator a rms desire for permits. The
model could be extended by relaxing the assumption of a competitive permit mar-
ket by analysing strategic considerations of imperfect competitive behaviour, by
assuming asymmetry either in the rent-seeking cost functions of rms or in their
ability to a¤ect the regulator through lobbying activities and emissions choices.
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Part III
Recommendations and Conclusion
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Chapter 5
A Permit Allocation Contest for a
Tradeable Permit Market
5.1 Introduction
In a tradeable pollution permit market, the regulators choice of initial allocation
mechanism is one of the most important and contentious design issues. The regulator
must, among other issues, decide on the proportion of permits each rm obtains
and the cost borne by each rm. As a result, the decisions surrounding the initial
allocation have signicant e¤ects on the distribution of rents, political viability and
success of a scheme. Due to the importance of the initial allocation mechanism in
the design of a tradeable permit market, it is our aim in this chapter to illustrate a
new design in permit allocation.
In this chapter we model an initial allocation mechanism in a static tradeable
permit market.1 Our mechanism, denoted by a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC),
1We use a static tradeable permit market for analytical simplicity. Similar results occur when
138
distributes permits to the rms based on their rank. This ranking is achieved by or-
dering the rms based on their observable external actionwhere the external action
is an activity or characteristic of the rm that is independent of their choice of emis-
sions in the tradeable permit market. The ranking criterion (the external action)
is determined by the regulator who chooses to full a public policy objective. We
show that this mechanism e¢ ciently allocates permits and as a result the tradeable
permit market is cost-e¤ective. Moreover, we determine the symmetric equilibrium
strategy of each rm to choose their external action. We nd the choice of external
action is dependent on each rms ability at producing the action, expected value
of allocation, permit price and the cost of producing the action.
Allocation mechanisms that use the ranking of agents have frequently been ap-
plied in areas such as labour market and sporting competition analysis (see, for ex-
ample, Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Szymanski, 2003). Within the literature two main
types of ranking mechanism exist: rank-order tournaments and contests. Rank-order
tournaments are incentive schemes used in situations where rmsperformance is
observed with some exogenous noise. Rank-order tournaments typically outperform
absolute, or individualistic schemes, in particular when the observation noise is com-
mon to all rms (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holmström, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983;
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983b; Mookherjee, 1984).
When there is no individual-specic noise involved in the observation of rms
actions, one can implement a rank-order contest, which is, in e¤ect, a multi-prize
all-pay auction (Glazer and Hassin 1988; Barut and Kovenock 1998; Clark and Riis
the model is extended to include multiple periods.
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1998; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; 2006). In a rank-order contest, there is a nite
number of prizes to be distributed among the participating agents, with the size of
each prize known before the onset of the contest. Firms compete in this contest by
submitting costly (monetary or non-monetary) bids. Firms then are ranked in
order of their bids, and the prizesare distributed to the rms according to rms
rankings. That is: a rm that submits the highest bid is ranked rst, and thus gets
the largest permit allocation (rst prize); the rm that submits the second-highest
bid is ranked second, and thus gets second-largest allocation (second prize), and so
on, up to the rm that submits the lowest bid being ranked last, and thus receiving
the smallest allocation (possibly nothing). Rank-order contests, like tournaments,
tend to outperform alternative types of individualistic and contract based regulation.
The rationale for implementing rank-based mechanisms is clear when we con-
sider the literature that focuses on environmental policy issues. By applying the
seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), Govindasamy et al. (1994) advocated the
use of a tournament to control non-point pollution, whereby each polluting rm is
ranked on its input use or pollution abatement e¤ort. Govindasamy et al. (1994)
found that a tournament can work well as it can achieve the same e¢ ciency con-
ditions as a pigouvian tax but with less costly information requirements. Franckx
et al. (2004) extended the work of Govindasamy et al. (1994) by introducing the
abatement of multiple pollutants and found that tournaments outperform emissions
taxes when the pollution specic errors(such as weather and climatic conditions)
are highly correlated amongst rms emissions level. Shogren and Hurley (1997)
experimentally tested a tournament reward system to consider the implication for
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environmental policy (for example, Coase bargaining and environmental conict)
and found that using such a reward system obtained the theoretical predictions
quicker than standard mechanisms.
The above tournament studies have all assumed a realisation of a random er-
ror and as a result, assumed a probabilistic link between rm action and reward.
Although correct in many circumstances, for example when considering emissions
of air and water pollutants (as they are often stochastic in nature), cases do exist
in environmental policy where the e¤ort of the rm is deterministically linked to
their observable action, that is, situations do exist where rank-order contests can be
desirable. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt at implement-
ing a rank-order contest to environmental issues and, in particular, no attempt at
implementing a rank-order contest as a mechanism to initially allocation pollution
permits. This, then, is our main contribution to the literature.
In existing tradeable permit markets, allocation types can usually be distin-
guished into two broad categories: the grandfathering and auctioning of permits.
The grandfathering of permits occurs when the regulator freely allocates allowances
to each rm based on their historical emissions (perhaps output or some other
proxy). Although a popular and frequently used mechanism, grandfathering is far
from an ideal allocation mechanism as it is often viewed as politically cumbersome
and ine¢ cient (Stavins, 1998, Cramton and Kerr, 2002). Firms may have an in-
centive to lobby the regulator in favour of larger permit allocations which, due to
the wasteful use of resources, may reduce welfare in the economy. Moreover, when
grandfathering is used with information that is updated over time (updated grand-
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fathering), a link is created between a rms current level of emissions and its future
permit allocation which may result in a distortionary incentive to increase emissions
(Böhringer and Lange, 2005; Keats and Neuho¤, 2006).
A feasible alternative to grandfathering is generally considered to be auctioning.
In an auction, permits are allocated to each rm based on their monetary bid rela-
tive to every other rm (Oehmke, 1987; Cramton and Kerr, 2002; Hahn and Noll,
1982; Franciosi et al. 1993; Lyon, 1984; 1986). Auctions are often considered to
be a representative example of a lump-sumallocation mechanism as permits are
distributed to each rm independent of their size of historical emissions. Due to
this characteristic of auctioning, it is viewed as a desirable and e¢ cient method of
allocating permits (see, for example, Cramton and Kerr, 2002). However, the main
drawback, and as a result, the main reason for the infrequent use of auctions is
the political di¢ culty in implementing such a mechanism. As the winners in the
auction are obliged to pay for the permits, resistance against implementing auctions
(in the form of lobbying for grandfathering) have been a severe restriction on the
implementation of such schemes.2 It is often possible to reduce rms resistance
against auctions by redistributing the revenue to the participants (revenue neutral
auction (Hahn and Noll, 1982)) or to reduce distortionary taxes in the economy (the
revenue recycling e¤ect (Parry, 1995; Parry et al., 1999)).
With problems associated with both grandfathering and auctioning it is desirable
to try and engineer alternative mechanisms that may be better suited for tradeable
permit markets something this chapter aims to achieve.
2Auctioning, however, is slowly becoming an increasingly important and favoured initial allo-
cation mechanism in existing tradeable permit markets, such as the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).
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Our partial equilibriummodel attempts to reach a middle ground between grand-
fathering and auctioning. As our model is a type of all-pay auctionit has many
similarities to a standard permit auction. Yet, as the ranking criterion in the PAC
can be non-monetary, it is possible to have characteristics similar to a grandfather-
ing mechanism. Our model has two stages, in the rst stage every rm is ranked in
order of their size of external action. Each rm obtains a permit allocation which
is directly related to their ranking in the PAC. In the second stage, the rms ob-
tain the permit allocation and choose a level of emissions to minimise the cost of
participating in the tradeable permit market.
The works that are most relevant to our argument are Glazear and Hassin (1988)
and Moldovanu and Sela (2001). Glazer and Hassin (1988) study the design of a
contest to try and maximise the expected aggregate output of a set of rms. They
nd that with identical rms, the prizes should be set equal (apart from the lowest
prize which should be zero). Moreover, when rms have di¤erent abilities, it is
optimal to choose only one prize. In a similar vein, Moldovanu and Sela (2001)
study a rank-order contest with several risk neutral agents and a contest designer
aiming to maximise the total expected e¤ort. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) separate
their model into three distinct cases: when the costs of choosing e¤ort are linear,
concave or convex. Restricting the model to two prizes, they nd it is optimal to
allocate a single prize when contestants costs are linear or concave and to allocate
two (possibly equal or unequal) prizes when costs are convex. Our model uses
a similar contest structure to the above studies by allowing a number of permit
allocations to be allocated to several rms in a tradeable permit market. We study
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an allocation system in which there are no random errors present to alter rms
external action choices (a perfectly discriminating contest), so that the regulator
observes each rms level of external action without random errors. Although not
attempted in this chapter, it is entirely possible to extend our model to introduce
random shocks into the determination of rms external actions (an imperfectly
discriminating contest).
The chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 introduces the concept of a PAC
and explains the rationale for its use. Section 5.3 discusses the general properties of
the model. Section 5.4 discuses the tradeable permit market. section 5.5 details the
PAC mechanism discuses the rms problems and analyses the regulators optimal
choice of permit allocations, Section 5.7 details some policy implications and Section
5.8 concludes.
5.2 An Alternative Initial Allocation Mechanism
Design
The choice of initial allocation mechanism is one of the most important design issues
of a tradeable permit market and as mentioned above, the majority of regulators
tend to choose an allocation mechanism that resembles either the grandfathering or
auctioning of permits. However, problems are associated with both types of mech-
anism. Among others, grandfathering is generally considered to be an ine¢ cient
mechanism as signicant lobbying activity and distortionary incentives are encoun-
tered in the distribution process, whereas auctions, although more e¢ cient, tend to
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be di¢ cult to implement due to the political pressure from rms (see, for example,
Cramton and Kerr, 2002; Svendsen, 2005; Böhringer and Lange, 2005a). In this
section, we start by introducing an alternative candidate mechanism and highlight
the rationale for using this approach.
This chapter concentrates on a rank-order contest: a mechanism where agents
are rank-ordered with respect to their (costly) bids (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Holm-
ström, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983a; 1983b; Mookher-
jee, 1984; Glazer and Hassin, 1988; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; 2006). In our model,
we use a rank-order contest to allocate permits in a tradeable permit market, which
we denote as a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC). To keep the ranking criterion
as general as possible, we assume that rms will be ranked on their choice of an
observable external action.3 The observable external actionis an activity or char-
acteristic of the rm which is independent from its choice of emissions and the
permit market. For example, possible external actions include the improvement
in noise reduction in rms facilities, the record of health and safety incidents or
some corporate and social responsibility criterion and so on. The regulator aims to
select an appropriate criterion to rank all rms so that the action is independent of
emission choices and where the aggregate action can full an objective set by the
regulator, we return to this issue in the next section.
A Permit Allocation Contest is a special type of auction in which every par-
ticipating rm, regardless of the nal outcome, incurs the cost of choosing a bid
or action(an all-pay auction). It follows that a PAC has a number of properties
3The external action can be, at the extreme, an invariant characteristic of a rm, e.g. population
for a country under a global tradeable permit market. However, it is most likely that an external
factor will be chosen so that rms have the ability to alter their permit allocation.
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Properties of a PAC
Disproportionality: At the margin, agentsactions may have dispropor-
tionate e¤ects on their permit allocation resulting in a larger incentive
to maximise the policy objective.
Adaptability: An extensive choice of allocation criterion (external factor)
may exist, which allows the scheme to be implemented in a larger number
of scenarios.
Linkage: A clear link exists between an agents socially benecial actions
and the permit allocation they receive. An agent that produces better
actions will obtain a higher permit allocation.
Fairness: A PAC can appear fair to society as permits are allocated
using an instrumentalist approach so that prior permit holdings have no
inuence.
Table 5.1: A Permit Allocation Contest
similar to a standard permit auction (and some unique to itself). Table (5.1) high-
lights some fundamental properties of a generalised PAC that may exist for permit
allocation.
In a PAC, the decisions regarding the number and size of permit allocations has
a substantially di¤erent e¤ect on the incentives of each rm compared to alternative
mechanisms, such as a winner-paysauction. The permit allocations in the PAC are
not directly related to the rmsexternal actions, but instead they are determined
by rms rankings according to the size of their external actions. Thus, a small
increase in the rms external actions may result in a disproportionately large change
in permit allocation. For example, only a small increase in external action by the
second-ranked rm could have made this rm the winner of the contest, and thus
lead to the largest permit allocation (which is typically made to be substantially
larger than the second prize).4 Rank-order contests, and in particular our PAC,
involve a clear rule of allocation of prizes (i.e. no regulators subjective judgement is
4This frequently happens in sport tournaments where the di¤erence between prizes (and notably
between rst and second prizes) is non-linearly increasing (Szymanski, 2003).
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involved), and are easily adaptable to changing market and technological conditions.
Moreover, as Krishna and Morgan (1997) showed, all-pay auctions tend to generate
higher aggregate bids than their winner-pay counterparts. In addition, as Moldovanu
and Sela (2001) showed, when the prize structure is suitably chosen, such a contest
will tend to generate the largest aggregate bids. As the choice of external action at
the margin can signicantly alter a rms permit allocation, the robust incentives
created in the PAC system should induce all rms to maximise their external action.
As the ranking criterion need not be monetary in value, there may be a wide
variety of possible external actions to choose from (any action that is independent
of emissions choices is possible). It follows that one may be chosen so that the
scheme is politically acceptable for the regulator, market participants and the wider
economy. Consequently, a PAC system has the possibility of being implemented in
a wide variety of tradeable permit market contexts. For instance, a PAC could be
implemented in an international permit market where the participating countries are
allocated permits (or a burden is assigned to each country) based on their (country)
external action, such as the proportion of recycling in that the country and so on.
Yet, this system could also be adapted to smaller markets, such as rms choosing
external actions based on their improvement in noise pollution. Every tradeable
permit market has heterogeneous circumstances in which it operates and with a
PAC, public policy objectives (and external actions) can be chosen to compliment
the social normsand prevailing political opinion in the specic emissions trading
scheme. In contrast, although auctioning and grandfathering can be used in all
tradeable permit markets, the only allocation criterion available is the comparison of
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rmsmoney bidsand historical emissions, respectively. The lack of other possible
allocation criterion may make, especially for the case of auctions, implementation
more di¢ cult.
Using a PAC in a tradeable permit market may o¤er the (political) benet of
having a clear connection between permit allocations (including the di¤erences be-
tween them) and some socially benecial rm action. It is possible that a PAC
system may actually appear fairer to a larger number of groups in society than
alternative mechanisms as it couples permit allocation (a reward to the rms) with
some public policy objective. In contrast, grandfathering permits creates a perverse
link between emissions and the permit rent each rm receives.5 Therefore, large pol-
luters are implicitly rewarded and small polluters are implicitly punished for their
choice of emissions.
Similar to the auctioning of permits, a PAC takes an instrumentalistperspec-
tive in that it ignores past and current permit holdings when determining permit
allocations (Raymond, 2003). Therefore, this type of allocation approach treats all
rms equally in that rms who invest early in pollution abatement are not implic-
itly punished (as would happen under a grandfathering scheme). However, unlike
an auction, a PAC mechanism can be adapted so non-monetary criterion are used to
rank the rms which may be more appealing to participating rms than an auction.
Although a PAC distribution mechanism appears to have a number of possi-
ble advantages over alternative mechanism a limitation of the PAC is the external
5The equitable issues associated with permit allocation are notoriously under researched, mainly
due to the normative aspects involved (Raymond, 2003). All allocation mechanisms can appear
fairas it very much depends on the attitude to property and the specic circumstances, i.e. an
industry level or global emissions trading scheme.
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action must be dened in an appropriate manner. As noted above, an optimal ex-
ternal action has to be independent of emissions so that no distortions are created in
the permit market whilst simultaneously being politically acceptable for all market
participants. Unsurprisingly, the existence of an optimal external action may not
necessarily occur. The ease at which an external action can be chosen crucially de-
pends on the specic institutional context of the permit market. For instance, when
the market participants are countries, such as in an international permit market, it
may be relatively easy to nd an external action that is both socially benecial and
independent of emissions. Countries in a carbon dioxide permit market, such as the
EU-ETS, could be ranked on the proportional reduction of landll waste from the
non-trading sector (or the production of methane from it). As the market partici-
pants, become smaller in size (e.g. industries or rms), it may be more di¢ cult to
nd an external action with the desirable qualities. Throughout this chapter, for
analytical simplicity, we discuss rms as the participating agents, however, it can
be adapted to a wider institutional context.
5.3 General Properties of Model
Let  = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a set of rms that participate in a competitive tradeable
permit market to control a pollutant. In this (static) tradeable permit market, rm
i chooses a level of emissions ei at a cost ci(ei) with
dci(ei)
dei
 0 and d2ci(ei)
de2i
 0.
The regulator has a secondary objective, un-related to emissions reduction. To
allow for analysis, we restrict our attention to public policy scenarios in which the
regulator aims to minimise a social badproduced by all rms in the permit market,
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such as the improvement of: health and safety incidents, noise pollution, other
pollutants, labour laws, corporate responsibility and so on. Therefore, in our model,
the regulator simply wants to minimise the aggregate social bad(or maximise some
social benet) by using incentives in the form of permit allocations (without the
need for standard command and control regulation). To adhere to the regulators
public policy objective, rm i chooses an external actiondenoted by zi, in which it
bears a cost v(zi) with
dv(zi)
dzi
 0 and d2v(zi)
dz2i
 0. In other words, the external action
is an activity taken by each rm, independent of emissions choices, to comply with
the regulators goal of minimising some aggregate social bad.6
The model is separated into two distinct stages. In the rst stage, the regulator
initially allocates the pollution permits to the market and in the second stage, rms
are allowed to trade the pollution permits obtained in the rst stage.
In stage one, the regulator chooses an ordered vector of permit allocations, s =
(s1; s2; : : : ; sn) 2 Rn+ subject to s1  s2  : : :  sn  0 and
Pn
j=1 sj = E where sj
is the jth permit allocation and E is the absolute aggregate emissions cap for the
tradeable permit market (the regulators precise choice of permit allocations will be
considered later in this chapter). Using the permit allocation vector, the regulator
distributes a (possibly unequal) permit allocation to each rm whilst ensuring the
absolute emissions cap is binding. The specic permit allocation to a rm depends
on each rms size of external action relative to every other rm, so that rms that
6In most permit markets, the participation of rms in the permit market is usually dependent
on their inclusion in a product market e.g. a permit market may require participation of all energy
producers. Given the permit market participants have similar product markets, it is possible that
each rm in the permit market has a number of characteristics or actionsthat are comparable
amongst all participants, independently chosen from its emissions and socially benecial, which
can be used as the external factor.
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have a larger relative size of external action obtain a larger permit allocation.7 In
a PAC, the regulator observes the external actions of all rms and ranks them in
descending order of their external action where the rm with the highest level of
external action is ranked rst, the second highest rm is ranked second and so on
until all rms are ranked.8 Each ranked-ordered rm obtains a corresponding permit
allocation so that the rm with the top ranking obtains the largest permit allocation
(s1), the second ranked obtains the second highest permit allocation (s2) and so on
until all individual permit allocations are distributed to the rms.
In stage two of the model, given a known permit allocation, each rm decides
to choose a level of emissions to minimise the cost of participation in the tradeable
permit market.
As mentioned above, the regulator has two non-competing policy objectives.9
Firstly, the regulator is motivated to choose a vector of permit allocations to min-
imise the aggregate abatement cost in the tradeable permit marketthe standard
permit market regulatory objective. Second, the additional objective of the regu-
lator is to provide incentives for the permit market rms to maximise some pre-
determined public policy target which we dene as the maximisation of expected
aggregate external actions. As such, the regulator is not a strict social cost min-
imiser since it is not concerned with the rmscosts of obtaining an external action
7The regulator must choose an external action that is feasible for the tradeable permit market.
To avoid size e¤ects, it is likely the regulator could use changes in external action throughout time,
for example, the relative reduction of noise pollution over time.
8Other possible mechanisms are also feasible, we could for example, apply a yardstick compe-
tition mechanism to the external factor. Using a yardstick model would allow each rm to obtain
a continuous expected allocation, instead of a discontinuous allocation, as experience in a PAC.
Apart from this di¤erence all results should hold.
9Alternatively, the model can include two regulators with independent, non-competing policy
objectives.
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(it simply wants to maximise the aggregate action). Following this approach shows
the realistic separation and independence between two legislative procedures which
may commonly occur between a product and tradeable permit market. The regula-
tor is not focusing on choosing an e¢ cient level of aggregate external action for the
second public policy objective, instead, the regulator wants to simple maximise the
aggregate actions.
We solve the model backwards by investigating the permit market in the following
section and then focusing on the initial allocation of permits in the subsequent
section.
5.4 Stage Two: The Permit Market
In this section, we investigate rm is optimal choice of emissions in a permit market
when the tradeable permits have been allocated using a PAC.
From stage one, let us assume that rm i chose a positive level of external
action (zi) and, as a result of the rms ranking, the regulator distributed a permit
allocation ~si 2 s to the rm where ~si is independent of ei. With the endowment
of tradeable permit obtained, rm i aims to minimise (maximise) the cost (prot)
of participating in the permit market. Formally, given a permit price p, rm is
objective function is:
min
ei
ci(ei) + p(ei   ~sj) (5.1)
Solving for rm is emissions gives us:
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 dci(ei)
dei
= p (5.2)
From equation (5.2), each rm will choose a level of emissions to equate their
marginal abatement cost with the permit price and it follows from standard theory
that:
Remark 16 When a PAC distributes permits, the tradeable permit market is least-
cost.
A PAC is an e¢ cient instrument to allocate permits as it is a lump-sum
mechanism a mechanism by which permits are distributed independently of the
choice variable (emissions). The criterion for allocating the permits (the external
action) is independent of emission choices, therefore, no distortions exist in the
tradeable permit market. Due to the lump-sumcharacteristics of a PAC, e¢ ciency
in the tradeable permit market is independent from the vector of permit allocations
chosen by the regulator (Montgomery, 1972).
5.5 Stage One: The Initial Allocation of Permits
(PAC)
In the last section, it was noticed that when rms obtain tradeable permits through
a PAC a mechanism that ranks rms in order of their level of external action the
permit market can be least-cost. In this section, we investigate the PAC in more
detail and, in particular, given an exogenously xed permit allocation vector, nd
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the conditions that a¤ect each rms choice of external action. We then investigate
the optimal choice of permit allocation vector that can maximise the aggregate
external action (public policy objective).
The Permit Allocation Contest in this chapter, follows closely to the work of
Glazer and Hassin (1988), Barut and Kovenock (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela
(2001; 2006). For analytical simplicity, we assume throughout that every rm par-
ticipates in the PAC. Therefore, we are implicitly assuming the cost involved in
participating in the PAC is less than the cost of abatement and/or purchasing per-
mits from the market.10 We begin by discussing the rms problem.
5.5.1 Firms Problem
Following Moldovanu and Sela (2001), we represent the ability of each rm to pro-
duce an external action by the parameter i where the costs of producing the ex-
ternal action are iv(zi). The ability parameter is private information to each rm
and is known before the PAC commences. We further assume that the ability para-
meter is separable to the external action and is independently drawn from a support
[; 1] where 0 <  < 1 with the (commonly known) distribution function G(i) with
density G0(i) > 0. Suppose rmsstrategies to choose a level of external action are
symmetric and strictly decreasing. Indeed, each rm follows a symmetric strategy
of choosing a level of external action dependent on their ability, zi = h(i) where h
is a strictly decreasing, monotonic and di¤erentiable function.
10The results would still be maintained if we assumed that some rms did not participate in the
PAC. The vector of permit allocations would be distributed to the rms that did participate in
the PAC and the remaining rms would purchase permits, reduce emissions or a mixture of both.
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Although the permit allocation vector is common knowledge, the individual rm
is unaware of the precise permit allocation obtained until the completion of the PAC.
It follows that each rm will, given their knowledge of their ability (and distribution
of abilities) and vector of permit allocations, use a value of expected permit allo-
cation to choose an optimal level of external action. Conditional on all rms using
their symmetric strictly decreasing strategies h(i) with the common distribution
function G(i), the expected permit allocation to each rm is represented by:
B(G(i)) =
nX
j=1
sj

n  1
j   1

(1 G(i))n j (G(i))j 1 (5.3)
The expected permit allocation in equation (5.3) is a linear combination of n or-
der statistics where the probability of obtaining the jth permit allocation is based on
the probability of being ranked jth in the PAC (Glazer and Hassin, 1988; Moldovanu
and Sela, 2006). For example, the probability of winning the largest permit alloca-
tion is the probability of being ranked rst ((1 G(i))n 1), alternatively, it is the
probability of n   1 rms being ranked below this rm. Equation (5.3) is strictly
decreasing in i as a larger i implies a lowerability and choice of external action
and thus a lower expected permit allocation.
Example For a PAC with n = 2 rms and j = 2 permit allocations, the expected
permit allocation for rm i is:
B(G(i)) = s1 (1 G(i)) + s2 (G(i))
Given the expected allocation of permits and the choice of external action from
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every other rm, each rm aims to choose a level of external action to maximise
their allocation of permits for the tradeable permit market in the forthcoming period.
Formally, given the permit price p and the external actions of every other rm, rm
is objective function is:
max
zi
p B(G(i))  iv(zi) (5.4)
where B(G(i)) is given in equation (5.3). From the objective function in equa-
tion (5.4), we now determine rm is optimal choice of external action to obtain
the largest amount of tradeable permits. Similar to Moldovanu and Sela (2006), we
have the following proposition:
Proposition 17 Given the external action of all other rms and a known vector of
permit allocations, rm i will choose a level of external action so that:
zi = v
 1

p 
Z 1
i
 B
0(:)(G0(t))
t
dt

. (5.5)
Proof. Given the common strategy zi = h(i) which is strictly decreasing,
monotonic and di¤erentiable function, suppose rm i chooses a level of external
action ~i so that ~zi = h(~i). Substituting this common strategy into the (5.4)
equation gives
p:B(G(h 1(~zi)))  iv(~zi)
Di¤erentiating with respect to ~zi is
p:
dB
dG
 dG
dh 1(~zi)
 dh
 1
d~zi
  i  dv(~zi)
d~zi
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In equilibrium, rm i will choose ~zi = zi so that
p:
dB
dG
 dG
dh 1(zi)
 dh
 1
dzi
  i  dv(zi)
dzi
= 0
Multiplying by dzi
dh 1 and dividing by i gives
dv(zi)
dh 1(zi)
=
p:B0(:)(G0(h 1(zi)))
i
Again, using the common strategy zi = h(i) gives
dv(zi)
di
=
p:B0(:)(G0(i))
i
The nth ranked rm has no incentive to choose a positive level of external action
as it can obtain the same permit allocation by choosing an external action of zero.
Notice that this gives the upper boundary condition h(1) = 0. Integrating with
respect to i with the boundary condition gives
v(zi) = p 
Z 1
i
 B
0(:)  (G0(t))
t
dt
and as required
h(i) = zi = v
 1

p 
Z 1
i
 B
0(:)(G0(t))
t
dt

From Proposition (17), it is clear to see that the cost of the external action has
a crucial determination of the level chosen. Indeed, the lessconvex a rms cost
157
function then the larger the choice of external action will be. Also, it is clear that
as the value of each permit appreciates each rm will choose a larger value of exter-
nal action (dzi
dp
> 0), as a result, a regulator is likely to experience a large increase
in aggregate external actions. The value of the marginal permit allocation is also
important when we consider the expected allocation (B0(G(i))): a larger expected
permit allocation will give the incentive for all rms to choose larger external ac-
tions. From equation (5.3), the expected permit allocation is determined by two
variables: the choice of permit allocation vector and the distribution of rmsabil-
ities. Therefore given a xed distribution of abilities, the regulator has the ability
to increase the size of aggregate external actions by choosing an appropriate permit
allocation vector to maximise the expected permit allocation.
5.5.2 Regulators Problem
In the last subsection, it was shown that, to obtain a permit allocation, each rm
used a symmetric equilibrium strategy to determine their optimal level of external
actions. Consequently, each rm based their decision of external actions on the
value of permits (both the price of permits and the distribution of permits), the
distribution of abilities, their own, privately known, ability and their cost function.
In this subsection, we focus on the second policy objective of the regulator, namely,
the regulators motivation to maximise some public policy objective.
Up to this point, we have assumed that the vector of permit allocations has been
exogenously xed and known to all rms. In this sub-section, we relax this assump-
tion and allow the regulator to choose a vector from the set of feasible permit al-
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locations
n
(s1; s2; : : : ; sn) 2 Rn+ : s1  s2  : : :  sn  0;
Pn
j=1 sj = E
o
. Given the
regulator has acknowledged some public policy objective prior to the PAC, the reg-
ulators objective is to choose a vector of permit allocations to maximise this public
policy objective. Formally, using the symmetric equilibrium strategy of each rm in
equation (5.5), the regulators objective is to:
T = n
Z 1

h(i) G0(i)di (5.6)
subject to:
s1  s2  : : :  sn  0, and
nX
j
sj = E
where h(i) is the symmetric strategy for the external action given by equa-
tion (5.5). Therefore, T is the expected value of aggregate external actions given
that each rm obtains an ability from the support [; 1] and each rm follows the
symmetric equilibrium strategy.
Similar to Glazer and Hassin (1988), the regulators objective in equation (5.6), is
not easily analytically solvable without the introduction of specic functional forms.
However, a number of key implications are discussed below.
It is often discussed in tradeable permit market literature that an egalitarian
approach, where permits are allocated equally to all rms, is a possible permit
allocation process (Rose and Steven, 1993; Raymond, 2003). Indeed, It has been
strongly advocated as a distribution rule for an international permit market, where
allocation is based on equal number of permits per capita (Kverndokk, 1995; Rose
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et al. 1998). However, the most extreme egalitarian approach is where every rm
obtains an identical amount of permits independent of all information a pure
lump-sum approach. In such a scenario, the regulators vector of permit allocations
is segal = (E
n
; E
n
; :::; E
n
), where each rm in the PAC obtains an identical share of the
permit cap. If the regulator were to use such a vector of permit allocations, then
from equation (5.6), it is immediate that:
Corollary 18 If the regulator chooses an egalitarian permit allocation vector (pure
lump-sum approach) (segal) then no second public policy objective is achievable.
Proof. Under an egalitarian distribution segal = (E
n
; E
n
; :::; E
n
). Therefore it fol-
lows that B(G(i)) = En and consequently we have B
0(:)G0(i) = 0 where there
is no uncertainty in the permit allocation as the distribution of permits is in-
dependent of rms external actions. Hence from equation (5.5) it follows that
zi = v
 1
h
p  R 1
i
0 dt
i
= v 1[p  (C   C)] = v 1[0] = 0.
Under this type of egalitarian approach, individual allocations are identical which
means the distribution of permits is independent of each rms choice of external
action, therefore, no incentive exists for rms to choose a positive level of external
action. In policy terms, this type of egalitarian approach should not be chosen if
the regulator wants to combine the permit allocation of a tradeable permit market
with a public policy objective.
As can be observed from Corollary (18), for a regulator to succeed in a public
policy objective, it must choose a vector of permit allocations that discriminates
against rms with larger external actions compared to ones with smaller actions.
For a policy objective to be met, even partially, a rm must be rewarded for choosing
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a higher level of external action relative to other participating rms.11
As Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Barut and Kovenock (1998) have proved, to
maximise the aggregate external action, sn must be a zero permit allocation. If this
did not occur, there would be an incentive for rms with weakerabilities (high
s) to reduce their level of external action and obtain a positive level of permit
allocation. Choosing a vector of permit allocations with sn = 0 will induce each
rm to choose a non-zero level of external action. In essence, have n   1 non-zero
permit allocations.
It is di¢ cult to analytically solve for the permit allocations. Although it is
known that a discriminatory vector of permit allocations is needed, to what extent
this vector is discriminatory is answered in the subsequent sub-section.
5.6 Numerical Analysis
By using GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System), we numerically estimate
optimal permit allocation vectors for a tradeable permit market with three partic-
ipants.12 We neglect the numerical analysis of the competitive tradeable permit
market and instead focus on the PAC mechanism. Each PAC participant chooses
an external action with quadratic costs of the form, iv(zi) = iz2i . In Table (5.2),
we prescribe abilities for each rm (i) from a uniform distribution on the support
[0:5; 1] which gives the following ability parameters for the three participating rms
where a lower value indicates a strongerability and vice versa.
11The largeexternal action can be a proportional change in their own actions. Therefore, large
rms, in the absolute sense, do not have size e¤ectadvantages
12For tractability, this analysis considers three rms. Of course, this analysis can be extended
to more than three rms (with similar results).
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Firm Ability Parameter
Firm 1 0:875
Firm 2 0:75
Firm 3 0:625
Table 5.2: Firmsability parameters from a uniform distribution
From Proposition (17), rm i will choose a level of external action so that:
zi = 8(s1   s2)[ 1  lni + i] + 4(s2   s3)[ 2 + lni   i] (5.7)
given rm is belief that all remaining rms use a symmetric strategy for their exter-
nal action. From equation (5.7), the choice of rm is external action is dependent on
the permit allocations and their ability. In particular, the external action is depen-
dent on the di¤erence in size between rst and second and second and third permit
allocations. The regulator has two policy decisions to select. The rst decision is
whom to allocate permits to, here, a choice between one and three permit allocations
is allowed (therefore there is a possibility that some participating rms do not obtain
an initial allocation and have to purchase permits o¤ the market). Second, within
the three possible choices of permit allocation, the regulator is allowed to select an
initial distribution of permits between the market participants. In particular, the
regulator decides on a permit allocation vectorthat ranges from complete equality
(vector 1) and becomes increasingly discriminatory towards the choices of external
action (vector 7). Given a permit allocation vector, the proportion of permits al-
located to each rm is denoted by the rank ordering (1st; 2nd; 3rd). For example, in
Table (5.3), when three permit allocations are awarded to three participating rms,
162
Distribution type Aggregate Action (T )
Three Permit Allocations
1. (33:3%; 33:3%; 33:3%) 0
2. (40%; 40%; 20%) 1190.6628
3.(50%; 40%; 10%) 1558.5242
4. (60%; 30%; 10%) 1519.6218
5. (70%; 25%; 5%) 1657.043
6. (80%; 15%; 5%) 1610.0269
7. (94%; 5%; 1%) 1680.7801
Two and One Permit Allocations
1. (50%; 50%; 0) 1882.6032
2.(55%; 45%; 0) 1868.9567
3. (60%; 40%; 0%) 1854.2658
4. (70%; 30%; 0%) 1821.4074
5. (80%; 20%; 0%) 1783.0847
6. (90%; 10%; 0%) 1737.6872
7. (100%; 0%; 0%) 1682.0963
Table 5.3: Aggregate External Actions
the rst permit allocation vector is (33:3%; 33:3%; 33:3%) which illustrates that the
rms ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd receive a third of the permit allocation each. Given the
regulator distributes 100,000 permits to the market with a xed market permit price
of e10, Table (5.3) illustrates a selection of possible permit allocation vectors and
the corresponding aggregate external actions. The aggregate external actions are
the numerical estimates of the e¤ortof all participating rms, such as the amount
of resources used for noise reduction, investment in health and safety procedures.
Graphically representing Table (5.3) in Figure (5-1) illustrates the level of aggre-
gate external actions for all permit allocations. The x-axis represents the regulators
choice of permit allocation vector (a move rightward increases the discriminatory
power of the vector).
163
Aggregate External Actions
0
500
1000
1500
2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Permit Allocation Vector
A
gg
re
ga
te
 E
xt
er
na
l
A
ct
io
ns
Three Permit Allocations
One and Two Permit
Allocations
Figure 5-1: The Result of a PAC on Aggregate External Actions
From Figure (5-1), with three permit allocations, there is a tendency for aggre-
gate external actions to initially increase as the permit allocation vector becomes in-
creasingly discriminatory. Aggregate actions increase rapidly and the rate of change
slows as the three allocations become more discriminatory. In contrast, with one
and two permit allocations, as the vector becomes more discriminatory, there is a
tendency for aggregate external actions to reduce.
Again, from Figure (5-1), a link exists between the number of permit allocations
and the aggregate external action. In particular, it appears that the choice of a larger
number of permit allocations results in lower aggregate external actions. The extent
of this problem reduces as the permit allocation vector becomes more discriminatory.
In policy terms, the regulator has a trade-o¤. The regulator may nd it desir-
able to distribute a large number of permit allocations. A larger number of permit
allocations means fewer rms obtain no initial allocation which might improve the
164
mechanisms implementation chances. However, the regulator also wants to maximise
the aggregate level of external actions which is achieved by reducing the number of
permit allocations. It is possible that the regulator could choose either a large num-
ber of permit allocations with a very discriminatory permit allocation vector (as the
problem of low aggregate external action reduces with more discriminatory vectors)
or choose a smaller number of permit allocations but allow more equality in distri-
bution of permit allocations. The specic choice of how many permit allocations
to distribute and the discrimination involved in the permit allocation vector will
depend very much on the current political circumstances surrounding the tradeable
permit market. The regulator must consider both elements carefully to create a
desirable initial allocation mechanism. To analyse the choice of external actions
further, we now discuss the external actions of individual rms.
5.6.1 Three Permit Allocations
When the regulator distributes three permit allocations all rms obtain a permit
allocation. As proved in Corollary (18) and observed in Figure (5-2), when the
permit allocation vector is egalitarian (permit vector one), each rm chooses a zero
level of external action as there is no incentive to compete against the remaining
rms. A movement to a more discriminatory vector (a rightward movement) shows
that rms with strongerabilities will always produce more external action than
weakerrms (this is also true for all other permit allocations). For example, for
any permit allocation vector, rm 1 (the strongestrm) produces the highest level
of external action whereas the rm 3 (the weakestrm) always produces the lowest
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Figure 5-2: Three Permit Allocations and Corresponding External Actions
amount.
It is apparent from Figure (5-2) that as the regulator chooses more discrimina-
tory vectors, rms with weakerabilities will reduce their external action sooner
that rms with higher abilities. For instance, rm 1 (the weakestability) reduces
their external action from permit vector three onwards, whereas rms with stronger
abilities do not reduce their external actions. The strongestability rms tend to
increase their external actions as the permit allocation vector is made more discrim-
inatory and they obtain a larger number of permits. For a PAC with three permit
allocations, the aggregate external actions tend to increase as the strongest rms
actions outweighs the reductions from the weakestrm.
5.6.2 One and Two Permit Allocations
Allowing for only one or two permit allocations means that at least one rm will not
obtain a permit allocation and have to purchase permits on the market. Initially,
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two equal permit allocations are awarded and then increased in discriminatory power
until the last allocation is a single allocation. As the permit allocations change in
discrimination, it can be seen from Figure (5-3) that the weaker rms (rms 1 and 2)
begin to reduce their choice of external actions as it becomes increasingly likely that
they will not receive a permit allocation. Reducing the number of permit allocations
has a negative e¤ect on the aggregate external action. Although, the strongest
rm continues to increase their choice of external action this is outweighed by the
reduction in the two weakerrmsactions.
From the chosen vectors of Table (5.3), allowing two equal prizes results in the
largest external action as this gives the weakest rm some incentive to choose
larger external actions, however, as the number of permits is reduced in the second
allocation, it becomes less worthwhile for rms 1 and 2 to participate in the PAC.
Similar to Moldovanu and Sela (2001), as the costs of the rms are convex, allowing
a single permit allocation will never optimally maximise the external actions of
the participating rms. Instead, two equal permit allocations will maximise the
aggregate external action.
5.7 Policy Implications
Using a PAC mechanism gives theoretical benets in that (i) permits are e¢ ciently
allocated and (ii) a secondary public policy objective can be fullled. One possible
application of a PAC into an existing tradeable permit could be the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). Under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) under articles 4.2 (a) and 20, the convention
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outlined the concept that economic regions, such as the EU, could legitimately act,
sign and ratify the convention (and any future protocols) on a EU scale whilst us-
ing internal procedures to di¤erentiate targets amongst the member states (United
Nations, 1992). In other words, the EU was allowed to create a bubblewhere the
burden of a common EU target could be redistributed between member states
commonly known as the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) (Phylipsen et al. 1998;
Ringius, 1999; European Commission, 2000; Lacasta et al., 2002; European Union,
2003). After signicantly costly and drawn-out political discussions an agreement
was reached in 1998 where European carbon dioxide emissions would, in net, re-
duce by 8 per cent of 1990 levels. Five member states, including all the cohesion
states were allowed to increase their emissions in the commitment period 2008-2010
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) while the remaining member states
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reduced emissions (by di¤ering amounts).13
One possible alternative to the BSA could be to use a PAC to determine the
burden each member state has to bear in a tradeable permit market. The scheme
could work as follows: the European Commission could outline a contest in which
lower burdens of carbon dioxide reduction in a tradeable permit market (i.e. more
permits allocated to member states) are awarded to higher ranked member states. As
discussed in section (5.5), the ranking criterion must be independent of the tradeable
permit market and must be an objective the European Commission would like to
full. A solution could be to rank member states on an activity associated with
their non-permit trading sectors. A process could be created to rank and allocate
permits to member states in order of their proportional improvements in pollution
from domestic transport, pollution from landlls, recycling, and so on. In other
words, a PAC can link the burden of emissions reduction (via a permit allocation)
with reductions in national greenhouse gas emissions from the non-trading sector.
5.8 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to outline a new type of permit initial allocation
mechanism. In our model, rms in a tradeable permit market were initially allocated
permits using a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC). A PAC is a rank-order contest
in which the rms are ranked in order of their size of external action. The external
action is dened as an activity or characteristic of the participating rms that is
13Cohesion states refers to the group of member states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain)
that obtain assistance under the European Cohesion fund which promotes economic development
and convergence of living standards in low income countries (Dessai and Michaelowa, 2001; Aidt
and Greiner, 2002)
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independent of emissions choices. Each rm obtains an allocation of permits based
on the ordinal ranking they achieved in the PAC.
In our model, the regulator was assumed to have two policy objectives. First,
the regulator, by choosing a permit allocation vector, minimised the aggregate cost
of reducing emissions in the permit market. Second, the regulator chooses a permit
allocation vector to full a pre-determined public policy objective, which dened as
the maximisation of the aggregate external actions. The regulator will determine the
external action typeso that it is independent of all rmsemissions and also socially
benecial, such as an improvement in health and safety policy and corporate and
social responsibility. As discussed, an external action may not exist that complies
with all the requirements.
We nd the permit allocation vector is independent of the e¢ ciency in the per-
mit market. Therefore, from standard theory the permit market is cost-e¤ective.
Focusing on the PAC, we show that each rm uses a symmetric strategy to select a
level of external action. Firms tend to choose their external actions based on their
privately known ability and their expected permit allocation value. Moreover, the
distribution of permits and permit price are also signicant at altering the choice of
external action.
To obtain the public policy objective, the regulator must choose an optimal
permit allocation vector. We nd that for a public policy objective to be achieved,
the vector must be discriminatory. In other words, the regulator must reward rms
for choosing larger external actions. We numerically analysed a PAC with three
participating rms. We nd that two equal permit allocations results in the largest
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size of aggregate external action.
The PAC, at its simplest, has attempted to reach the middle ground between
grandfathering and auctioning. Firms generally lobby for grandfathering due to
the enormous rents available. On the other hand, auctions, if implemented, would
improve the market e¢ ciency and allow revenue recycling. A PAC creates similar
incentives to an auction and could, in theory, e¢ ciently allocate permits. Moreover,
a PAC could be designed so that it becomes politically feasible. The large poten-
tial criterion available to rank rms allows many possible tradeable permit market
circumstances to be considered. However, it was noted, that the identication and
implementation of an external action is a limitation to the PAC. For the PAC to
work e¤ectively, the external action must be independent of emissions and politically
agreeable to rms, the regulator and a wider society. Yet this may prove to be less
of a problem in the future. Pollution, and especially climate change, has become
an important issue in the current political sphere and it likely that bolder steps to
tackle pollution in the future will be needed. It may appear that a strong case for
a PAC implementation exists in international permit schemes.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
Tradeable permit markets allow rms the ability to trade pollution rights and as a
result, pollution can be controlled at the lowest social cost. However, the initial al-
location of permits can signicantly alter the equity and e¢ ciency of the market and
the regulator must carefully consider the design of the initial allocation mechanism.
Due to the importance of the initial allocation of permits, the main objective
of this thesis was to consider the link between the e¢ ciency in a tradeable permit
market equilibrium and the initial allocation of permits. In particular, this research
investigated the link between market e¢ ciency in a dynamic tradeable permit mar-
ket and multiple initial allocations. To discuss the relationship between the initial
allocation and market e¢ ciency, this research focused on three sub-questions:
 What are the consequences for market e¢ ciency in a tradeable permit market
when rms are initially allocated permits in a multi-period market?
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 What are the consequences for market e¢ ciency in a dynamic tradeable permit
market when rms lobby over permit allocations?
 Are there optimal alternative initial allocation mechanisms that can be used
in a dynamic setting?
To answer these questions multi-period, partial equilibrium models were created
in which one regulator supplied permits to rms in a perfectly competitive permit
market where each rm attempted to minimise (maximise) the cost (prot) from
the tradeable permit market.
This research attempted to contribute to the literature in a number of ways.
First, this thesis extended the theoretical analysis of multi-period permit markets
by creating a generalised mechanism that encompassed all known types of permit
allocation in a dynamic setting. Second, this thesis has illustrated the rst attempt
at discussing the dynamic link between market e¢ ciency and lobbying activity over
permit allocations. Finally, this thesis attempted to add to the literature on initial
allocation mechanism design by introducing a new, alternative design, namely, a
rank-order contest.
To allow for this focus, the thesis was restricted in a number of directions. First,
attention focused on the permit market e¢ ciency and as a result, issues with the
wider economy and especially in a general equilibrium setting were ignored. Second,
although the political economy of tradeable permit markets is an important issue in
determining the viability and success of certain schemes this is generally ignored in
the thesis.
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6.2 Research and Results
This thesis began in Chapter 2 by reviewing the literature that discussed the link
between the initial allocation of permits and e¢ ciency in the permit market equi-
librium. The chapter began by discussing the reasons behind the independence
between market e¢ ciency to be independent and the initial allocation of permits
(perfect competition, no transaction cost and a static market). The chapter focused
on the attempts taken to relax the assumptions and it was shown that the introduc-
tion of rmsstrategic behaviour, transaction costs or multiple periods may create
a link between market e¢ ciency at equilibrium and the initial allocation.
Chapter 3 created a generalised allocation mechanism for the initial allocation
of pollution permits in a dynamic setting. This mechanism allowed permits to be
allocated based on historical emissions, output and a factor independent of both
an externalaction. This mechanism could encompass auctions, benchmarking and
updated grandfathering the use of updated historical information on rmsemis-
sions and output levels. All these mechanisms were modelled through a relative
performance approach where allocation to each rm is based on their actionrela-
tive to the remaining rms. In this chapter is was found that in a dynamic permit
market the use of output as an allocation criterion is never optimal as an incentive
to increase production always exists. The use of emissions as a dynamic criterion is
generally not socially optimal. Instead it is argued that allocation should be based
on the information of an external factor, such as the social benecial actionsof
rms. This not only optimally allocates permits but creates a secondary benet
which is a generalised double dividende¤ect.
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Chapter 4 considered the issue of lobbying activity over a permit allocation in
a dynamic permit market. Each rm had the ability to determine their future
permit allocation by their choice of rent-seeking activity the combined choice of
emissions and lobbying activity. It was found that market e¢ ciency is altered by
rent-seeking activity when the costs of emissions and lobbying activity are separable.
In such a case, a direct link exists between the choice of emissions and lobbying and
future rent. However, when the costs of emissions and lobbying activity are non-
separable market e¢ ciency may be maintained as lobbying can be chosen ex-post
to coincide with an e¢ cient tradeable permit market. The model was extended
to include the cases where (i) the choice of emissions no longer altered a rms
permit allocation (static grandfathering) and (ii) the aggregate emissions cap is
partly determined by rmsrent-seeking activity. When the choice of emissions no
longer alters permit allocation, it was found that the inter-temporal link between
emissions and future permit rent was eliminated and the tradeable permit market
was least-cost. Moreover, it was found that allowing for rent-seeking activity to
partly determine the aggregate emissions cap did not vary the market e¢ ciency,
however, an increase in the cap reduced social welfare.
Finally in Chapter 5, an alternative initial allocation is advocated a rank-order
contest. This mechanism allocates permit to rms based on the rank ordering of
rms based on some socially benecialactivity pre-determined by the regulator.
It was shown that the permit allocation contest e¢ ciently allocated permits so that
the tradeable permit market was least-cost. Moreover, a symmetric strategy was
created to illustrate each rms optimal choice of external action. A rms choice
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of external action was found to be dependent on: the cost of the external action;
the expected permit allocation, the permit price and the rms ability parameter.
The chapter was advanced by discussing the regulators problem in which it aimed
to allocate the aggregate emissions cap to rms to maximise some socially benecial
goal. The chapter concluded by numerically simulating possible permit allocations
and found that, with three rms, two equal permit allocations will maximise the
secondary benet.
6.3 Policy Implications
In general, this thesis can give guidance to policymakers and regulators on optimal
methods of allocation in a dynamic setting. This research has produced a number
of important policy implications that concentrate on the use of criterion and ini-
tial allocation mechanisms. Three clear policy implications have resulted from this
research:
 The use of updated grandfathering the use of updated historical informa-
tion of rmsemissions and output levels as an initial allocation mechanism
should, in general, be avoided.
 Regulators should be concerned with lobbying activity in a tradeable permit
market.
 An array of optimal initial allocation mechanisms do exist.
It was shown in Chapters 2 and 3 that the use of updated grandfathering allows
an intertemporal link to be created between the choice of emissions and the future
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rent each rm receives which introduces an incentive to increase emissions above the
socially optimal level. To eliminate this intertemporal link and improve market e¢ -
ciency, regulators should avoid the use of historically updated emissions information.
However, this may be politically problematic. Consider a tradeable permit market
which has a number of compliance periods. It is inevitable that at some point,
there will be new entrants and plant closures. Updated grandfathering is politically
viable as it allows for these changes to occur whilst adjusting permit allocations.
For example, new entrants and rms that close plants, will obtain and lose future
permit allocations, respectively. Contrast this with a static grandfathering case.
Under a purestatic grandfathering case, permit allocation is xed throughout all
compliance periods. Therefore, new entrants may never receive permit allocations
and rms that close plants (factories) continue to receive permit allocation till the
completion of the permit market.1 It may be possible for regulators to implement
updated grandfathering if additional allocation rules can be implemented to reduce
the distortionary incentive to increase emissions.
Regulators must also be concerned with respect to rmslobbying. As Chapter 4
has shown, lobbying activity, in conjunction with rmschoice of emissions, can alter
market e¢ ciency. Also, lobbying activity can increase the aggregate emissions cap
and as a result, reduce social welfare. Regulators must identify lobbying activity and
implement rules and mechanisms to counter such actions. For instance, to maintain
social welfare, regulators should consider policies that pre-commit the regulator to
a specic level of aggregate emissions cap.
1Of course, as seen in the EU-ETS and the SO2 market, it is possible for the regulator to
reservea proportion of aggregate emissions for new entrants.
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Finally, auctioning and grandfathering are the most common techniques to dis-
tribute permits to rms. However, Chapter 5, considers an alternative to both,
namely, a rank-ordered contest. A rank order contest has similar e¢ ciency prop-
erties to an auction but has the potential to be more politically viable and obtain
a secondary policy objective. Optimal mechanism design is heavily dependent on
the heterogeneous circumstances of area of regulation and thus it is important for
regulators to understand and investigate an array of mechanisms to suit their re-
quirements.
6.4 Future Work
This thesis has highlighted important issues in the initial allocation of pollution
permits in a dynamic tradeable permit market. Although, the policy implications
of the research appear to be apparently clear, a large amount of questions, not in
the scope of this thesis, remain unanswered.
The natural direction for future work is the extension of the analysis in this
thesis. The models can be extended to include general equilibrium analysis with
possible uses in Computable General Equilibrium (CGE). Furthermore, the research
presented in this thesis does not focus on inter-temporal trading, that is, the banking
and borrowing of permits throughout time. As inter-temporal trading will become
increasingly important in subsequent years, it is important to investigate the link
between the banking and borrowing of permits, initial allocation and permit market
e¢ ciency.
As shown in this thesis, the investigation of dynamic allocation is important for
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market e¢ ciency. One question arising from this work is how to implement allocation
mechanisms in dynamic permit markets that allow (i) exibility in the determination
of permit allocation (e.g. to allow exibility for new entrants and plant closures) and
(ii) avoid inter-temporal distortions. It follows that one must investigate possible
solutions that can achieve (i) and (ii) through optimal mechanism design something
initially attempted in Chapter 5.
As existing tradeable permit markets mature and new ones are created, par-
ticipating rms will improve their knowledge of such schemes and, in particular,
they may improve their lobbying skills. It is likely, then, that lobbying activity
(in whatever form) will play an important role in the determination of market e¢ -
ciency. However, the analysis of lobbying activity in a tradeable permit market is
in its infancy and many directions and extensions of current work can be followed.
Possible issues include the development of a model that can encompass imperfect
competition in the permit market and collusive behaviour with respect to lobbying
activity.
A growing trend in tradeable permit markets is the regulation by more than one
regulatory agency. For instance, in the EU-ETS, all 27 member states have a role in
allocation determination through their National Allocation plans (NAPs). Indeed
with the continued introduction of multi-state markets (such as the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI)) it will be important to consider models that have a
number of participating regulatory agencies. For instance, analysis must consider
the possible e¢ ciency issues that are encountered where a number of regulators
decide on permit allocation. Issues that must be considered include the timing of
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multiple regulatorsallocations and the levels of permits that are distributed. More-
over, one must consider di¤erent levels of regulation from national to international
and supra-governmental agencies within tradeable permit markets. Most tradeable
permit markets encounter numerous regulations from multiple regulatory agencies
such as a local and regional environmental protection agencies and intergovernmen-
tal agreements and coalitions. Future work in these directions can assist in the
optimal design of future tradeable permit markets and as a result e¢ ciently control
pollution.
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